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Author SHA1 Message Date
jif-oai
e9fb49366c ## New Features
- The TUI now has quick reasoning controls: `Alt+,` lowers reasoning, `Alt+.` raises it, and accepted model upgrades now reset reasoning to the new model’s default instead of carrying over stale settings. (#18866, #19085)
- App-server sessions can now manage multiple environments and choose an environment and working directory per turn, which makes multi-workspace and remote setups easier to target precisely. (#18401, #18416)
- Added first-class Amazon Bedrock support for OpenAI-compatible providers, including AWS SigV4 signing and AWS credential-based auth. (#17820)
- Remote plugin marketplaces can now be listed and read directly, with more reliable detail lookups and larger result pages. (#18452, #19079)
- Hooks are now stable, can be configured inline in `config.toml` and managed `requirements.toml`, and can observe MCP tools as well as `apply_patch` and long-running Bash sessions. (#18893, #18385, #18391, #18888, #19012)
- Eligible ChatGPT plans now default to the Fast service tier unless you explicitly opt out. (#19053)

## Bug Fixes
- Preserved Cloudflare cookies across approved ChatGPT hosts, reducing auth breakage in HTTP-backed ChatGPT flows. (#17783)
- Fixed remote app-server reliability issues so websocket events keep draining under load and shutdown no longer fails when the remote worker exits during cleanup. (#18932, #18936)
- Fixed permission-mode drift so `/permissions` changes survive side conversations and updated Full Access state is correctly reflected in MCP approval handling. (#18924, #19033)
- Fixed `wait_agent` so it returns promptly when mailbox work is already queued instead of waiting for a fresh notification or timing out. (#18968)
- Fixed local stdio MCP launches for relative commands without an explicit `cwd`, bringing fallback path resolution in line with CLI behavior. (#19031)
- Startup now fails less often on managed config edge cases: unknown feature requirements warn instead of aborting, and cloud-requirements errors are clearer about what failed. (#19038, #19078)

## Changelog

Full Changelog: https://github.com/openai/codex/compare/rust-v0.123.0...rust-v0.124.0

- #18870 Load app-server config through ConfigManager @pakrym-oai
- #18866 feat(tui): shortcuts to change reasoning level temporarily @fcoury-oai
- #18430 app-server: implement device key v2 methods @euroelessar
- #18757 fix: fully revert agent identity runtime wiring @efrazer-oai
- #17783 Preserve Cloudfare HTTP cookies in codex @shijie-oai
- #18876 [rollout_trace] Add rollout trace crate @cassirer-openai
- #18401 Support multiple managed environments @starr-openai
- #18797 Allow guardian bare allow output @maja-openai
- #18886 Normalize /statusline & /title items @canvrno-oai
- #18768 [codex] Tighten external migration prompt tests @alexsong-oai
- #18909 Update /statusline and /title snapshots @canvrno-oai
- #18867 sandboxing: materialize cwd-relative permission globs @bolinfest
- #18915 fix: windows snapshot for external_agent_config_migration::tests::prompt_snapshot did not match windows output @bolinfest
- #18416 Add turn-scoped environment selections @starr-openai
- #18391 fix(core): emit hooks for apply_patch edits @fcoury-oai
- #18916 test(core): move prompt debug coverage to integration suite @bolinfest
- #17820 feat: add AWS SigV4 auth for OpenAI-compatible model providers @celia-oai
- #18913 bazel: run wrapped Rust unit test shards @bolinfest
- #18452 feat: Support remote plugin list/read. @xl-openai
- #18936 Fix remote app-server shutdown race @bolinfest
- #18871 refactor: add agent identity crate @efrazer-oai
- #18276 exec-server: carry filesystem sandbox profiles @bolinfest
- #18926 ci: keep argument comment lint checks materialized @bolinfest
- #18935 Keep TUI status surfaces in sync @etraut-openai
- #18923 chore(tui) debug-config guardian_policy_config @dylan-hurd-oai
- #18943 tests: serialize process-heavy Windows CI suites @bolinfest
- #18934 [codex] Clean guardian instructions @dylan-hurd-oai
- #18948 chore: remove unused Bedrock auth lazy loading @celia-oai
- #18277 core: derive active permission profiles @bolinfest
- #18785 feat: add explicit AgentIdentity auth mode @efrazer-oai
- #18953 use long-lived sessions for codex sandbox windows @iceweasel-oai
- #18278 app-server: expose thread permission profiles @bolinfest
- #17693 [codex-analytics] guardian review analytics events emission @rhan-oai
- #17695 [codex-analytics] guardian review truncation @rhan-oai
- #17696 [codex-analytics] guardian review TTFT plumbing and emission @rhan-oai
- #18962 nit: expose lib @jif-oai
- #18502 Support multiple cwd filters for thread list @acrognale-oai
- #18968 fix: wait_agent timeout for queued mailbox mail @jif-oai
- #18971 fix: cargo deny @jif-oai
- #18973 chore: prep memories for AB @jif-oai
- #18852 [codex] Update imagegen system skill @vb-openai
- #18865 Stage publishable Python runtime wheels @sdcoffey
- #18932 TUI: Keep remote app-server events draining @etraut-openai
- #18877 [rollout_trace] Record core session rollout traces @cassirer-openai
- #18959 feat(auto-review) policy config @dylan-hurd-oai
- #18955 Add plumbing to approve stored Auto-Review denials @won-openai
- #18999 arg0: keep dispatch aliases alive during async main @bolinfest
- #18925 feat: Fairly trim skill descriptions within context budget @xl-openai
- #18890 feat(auto-review) short-circuit @dylan-hurd-oai
- #18279 app-server: accept permission profile overrides @bolinfest
- #18582 [2/4] Implement executor HTTP request runner @aibrahim-oai
- #18197 feat: add guardian network approval trigger context @viyatb-oai
- #19033 Fix MCP permission policy sync @leoshimo-oai
- #19016 exec-server: expose arg0 alias root to fs sandbox @bolinfest
- #19036 Overlay state DB git metadata for filtered thread lists @joeytrasatti-openai
- #18956 [Codex] Register browser requirements feature keys @khoi-oai
- #19043 Update bundled OpenAI Docs skill freshness check @kkahadze-oai
- #18504 Rebrand approvals reviewer config to auto-review @won-openai
- #19046 exec-server: require explicit filesystem sandbox cwd @bolinfest
- #18280 clients: send permission profiles to app-server @bolinfest
- #18281 rollout: persist turn permission profiles @bolinfest
- #18888 hooks: emit Bash PostToolUse when exec_command completes via write_stdin @eternal-openai
- #19056 Rename approvals reviewer variant to auto-review @won-openai
- #18583 [3/4] Add executor-backed RMCP HTTP client @aibrahim-oai
- #19059 core: box multi-agent wrapper futures @bolinfest
- #19031 Fix relative stdio MCP cwd fallback @mzeng-openai
- #19063 chore(auto-review) feature => stable @dylan-hurd-oai
- #19050 feat(request-permissions) approve with strict review @dylan-hurd-oai
- #19067 test: set Rust test thread stack size @bolinfest
- #19072 tui: fix approvals popup disabled shortcut test @bolinfest
- #18893 codex: support hooks in config.toml and requirements.toml @eternal-openai
- #18282 protocol: report session permission profiles @bolinfest
- #19053 Default Fast service tier for eligible ChatGPT plans @shijie-oai
- #19055 Add safety check notification and error handling @etraut-openai
- #18283 app-server: accept command permission profiles @bolinfest
- #19012 Mark codex_hooks stable @abhinav-oai
- #18924 TUI: preserve permission state after side conversations @etraut-openai
- #19071 Add computer_use feature requirement key @leoshimo-oai
- #19079 Use remote plugin IDs for detail reads and enlarge list pages @xl-openai
- #19038 feat: Warn and continue on unknown feature requirements @xl-openai
- #19078 Clarify cloud requirements error messages @gverma-openai
- #19085 Persist target default reasoning on model upgrade @shijie-oai
- #19086 app-server: include filesystem entries in permission requests @bolinfest
- #18385 Support MCP tools in hooks @abhinav-oai
- #19113 Fix auto-review config compatibility across protocol and SDK @won-openai
2026-04-23 19:23:03 +02:00
Won Park
17ae906048 Fix auto-review config compatibility across protocol and SDK (#19113)
## Why

This keeps the partial Guardian subagent -> Auto-review rename
forward-compatible across mixed Codex installations. Newer binaries need
to understand the new `auto_review` spelling, but they cannot write it
to shared `~/.codex/config.toml` yet because older CLI/app-server
bundles only know `user` and `guardian_subagent` and can fail during
config load before recovering.

The Python SDK had the opposite compatibility gap: app-server responses
can contain `approvalsReviewer: "auto_review"`, but the checked-in
generated SDK enum did not accept that value.

## What Changed

- Keep `ApprovalsReviewer::AutoReview` readable from both
`guardian_subagent` and `auto_review`, while serializing it as
`guardian_subagent` in both protocol crates.
- Update TUI Auto-review persistence tests so enabling Auto-review
writes `approvals_reviewer = "guardian_subagent"` while UI copy still
says Auto-review.
- Map managed/cloud `feature_requirements.auto_review` to the existing
`Feature::GuardianApproval` gate without adding a broad local
`[features].auto_review` key or changing config writes.
- Add `auto_review` to the Python SDK `ApprovalsReviewer` enum and cover
`ThreadResumeResponse` validation.

## Testing

- `cargo test -p codex-protocol approvals_reviewer`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol approvals_reviewer`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui
update_feature_flags_enabling_guardian_selects_auto_review`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui
update_feature_flags_enabling_guardian_in_profile_sets_profile_auto_review_policy`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
feature_requirements_auto_review_disables_guardian_approval`
- `pytest
sdk/python/tests/test_client_rpc_methods.py::test_thread_resume_response_accepts_auto_review_reviewer`
- `git diff --check`
2026-04-23 03:12:56 -07:00
Abhinav
305825abd9 Support MCP tools in hooks (#18385)
## Summary

Lifecycle hooks currently treat `PreToolUse`, `PostToolUse`, and
`PermissionRequest` as Bash-only flows
- hook schema constrains `tool_name` to `Bash`
- hook input assumes a command-shaped `tool_input`
- core hook dispatch path passes only shell command strings

That means hooks cannot target MCP tools even though MCP tool names are
model-visible and stable

This change generalizes those hook paths so they can match and receive
payloads for MCP tools while preserving the existing Bash behavior.

## Reviewer Notes

I think these are the key files
- `codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/mcp.rs`
- `codex-rs/core/src/mcp_tool_call.rs`

Otherwise the changes across apply_patch, shell, and unified_exec are
mainly to rewire everything to be `tool_input` based instead of just
`command` so that it'll make sense for MCP tools.

## Changes

- Allow `PreToolUse`, `PostToolUse`, and `PermissionRequest` hook inputs
to carry arbitrary `tool_name` and `tool_input` values instead of
hard-coding `Bash` and command-only payloads.
- Add MCP hook payload support through `McpHandler`, using the
model-visible tool name from `ToolInvocation` and the raw MCP arguments
as `tool_input`.
- Include MCP tool responses in `PostToolUse` by serializing
`McpToolOutput` into the hook response payload.
- Run `PermissionRequest` hooks for MCP approval requests after
remembered approval checks and before falling back to user-facing MCP
elicitation.
- Preserve exact matching for literal hook matchers like `Bash` and
`mcp__memory__create_entities`, while keeping regex matcher support for
patterns like `mcp__memory__.*` and `mcp__.*__write.*`.

---------

Co-authored-by: Andrei Eternal <eternal@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-04-23 07:33:57 +00:00
Michael Bolin
8bc667b07b app-server: include filesystem entries in permission requests (#19086)
## Why

`item/permissions/requestApproval` sends a requested permission profile
to app-server clients. The core profile already stores filesystem
permissions as `entries`, but the v2 compatibility conversion used the
legacy `read`/`write` projection whenever possible and left `entries`
unset.

That made the request ambiguous for clients that consume the canonical
v2 shape: `permissions.fileSystem.entries` was missing even though
filesystem access was being requested. A client that rendered or echoed
grants from `entries` could treat the request as having no filesystem
permission entries, then return an empty or incomplete grant. The
app-server intersects responses with the original request, so omitted
filesystem permissions are denied.

## What Changed

- Populate `AdditionalFileSystemPermissions.entries` when converting
legacy read/write roots for request permission payloads, while
preserving `read` and `write` for compatibility.
- Mark `read` and `write` as transitional schema fields in the generated
app-server schema.
- Add regression coverage for the v2 conversion, the app-server
`item/permissions/requestApproval` round trip, and TUI app-server
approval conversion expectations.
- Refresh generated JSON and TypeScript schema fixtures.

## Verification

- `just fmt`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server request_permissions_round_trip`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui
converts_request_permissions_into_granted_permissions`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui
resolves_permissions_and_user_input_through_app_server_request_id`
2026-04-23 00:21:59 -07:00
Shijie Rao
993e3f407e Persist target default reasoning on model upgrade (#19085)
## Why

When the TUI upgrade flow moves a user to a newer model, the accepted
migration should also persist the target model's default reasoning
effort. That keeps the upgraded model and reasoning setting aligned
instead of carrying forward a stale previously saved effort from the old
model.

## What changed

- The accepted model migration path now updates in-memory config, TUI
state, and persisted model selection with the target preset's
`default_reasoning_effort`.
- The upgrade destructuring keeps `reasoning_effort_mapping` explicitly
unused because mappings are no longer consulted on accepted migrations.
- Added a catalog test that starts with a pre-existing saved reasoning
effort and verifies the accepted upgrade overwrites it with the target
model default and emits the expected persistence events.
- Rebasing onto current `main` also updates a TUI thread-session test
helper for the latest `permission_profile` field and
`ApprovalsReviewer::AutoReview` rename so CI compiles on the new base.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-tui model_catalog`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui
permission_settings_sync_updates_active_snapshot_without_rewriting_side_thread`
2026-04-22 23:36:15 -07:00
Gav Verma
2ef2d675d6 Clarify cloud requirements error messages (#19078)
## Why
The current cloud-requirements failures say `workspace-managed config`,
which is ambiguous and can read like it refers to local managed config
such as `managed_config.toml`.

This code path only applies to cloud requirements, so the user-facing
message should name that source directly.

## What changed
- Updated the load failure in
[`codex-rs/cloud-requirements/src/lib.rs`](46e704d1f9/codex-rs/cloud-requirements/src/lib.rs)
to say `failed to load cloud requirements (workspace-managed policies)`.
- Updated the parse failure in the same file to use the same `cloud
requirements (workspace-managed policies)` terminology.
- Kept `workspace-managed` hyphenated because it is used as a compound
modifier.
- Updated the matching assertion in
[`codex-rs/app-server/src/codex_message_processor.rs`](46e704d1f9/codex-rs/app-server/src/codex_message_processor.rs).
- Reused `CLOUD_REQUIREMENTS_LOAD_FAILED_MESSAGE` in the
`codex-cloud-requirements` test where the test is asserting that
crate-local contract directly.

## Testing
`cargo test -p codex-cloud-requirements`
2026-04-22 23:07:08 -07:00
xl-openai
951be1a8a1 feat: Warn and continue on unknown feature requirements (#19038)
Requirements feature flags now fail open like config feature flags, but
with a startup warning.

<img width="443" height="68" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/76767fa7-8ce8-4fc7-8a09-902fcdda6298"
/>
2026-04-22 22:50:44 -07:00
xl-openai
fb6308cf64 Use remote plugin IDs for detail reads and enlarge list pages (#19079)
1. For remote plugin use plugin id (plugin name) directly for read
plugin details;
2. Request up to 200 remote plugins per directory list page.
2026-04-22 22:50:20 -07:00
Leo Shimonaka
7730fb3ab8 Add computer_use feature requirement key (#19071)
## Summary
- add the `computer_use` requirements-only feature key
- include it in generated config schema output
- cover the new key in feature metadata tests

## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-features`
- `just write-config-schema`
- `just fmt`
- `just fix -p codex-features`

cc @xl-openai

---------

Co-authored-by: Dylan Hurd <dylan.hurd@openai.com>
2026-04-22 22:49:26 -07:00
Eric Traut
08b5e96678 TUI: preserve permission state after side conversations (#18924)
Addresses #18854

## Why

The `/permissions` selector updates the active TUI session state, but
the cached session snapshot used when replaying a thread could still
contain the old approval or sandbox settings. After opening and leaving
`/side`, the main thread replay could restore those stale settings into
the `ChatWidget`, so the UI and the next submitted turn could fall back
to the old permission mode.

## What

- Sync the active thread's cached `ThreadSessionState` whenever approval
policy, sandbox policy, or approval reviewer changes.

## Verification

Confirmed bug prior to fix and correct behavior after fix.
2026-04-22 22:40:35 -07:00
Abhinav
23afa173f4 Mark codex_hooks stable (#19012)
# Why

Hooks are ready to graduate to GA in the next release!

# What

- Moves `Feature::CodexHooks` into the stable feature group.
- Marks the `codex_hooks` feature spec as `Stage::Stable` and
default-enabled.
2026-04-23 05:34:05 +00:00
Michael Bolin
9d824cf4b4 app-server: accept command permission profiles (#18283)
## Why

`command/exec` is another app-server entry point that can run under
caller-provided permissions. It needs to accept `PermissionProfile`
directly so command execution is not left behind on `SandboxPolicy`
while thread APIs move forward.

Command-level profiles also need to preserve the semantics clients
expect from profile-relative paths. `:cwd` and cwd-relative deny globs
should be anchored to the resolved command cwd for a command-specific
profile, while configured deny-read restrictions such as `**/*.env =
none` still need to be enforced because they can come from config or
requirements rather than the command override itself.

## What Changed

This adds `permissionProfile` to `CommandExecParams`, rejects requests
that combine it with `sandboxPolicy`, and converts accepted profiles
into the runtime filesystem/network permissions used for command
execution.

When a command supplies a profile, the app-server resolves that profile
against the command cwd instead of the thread/server cwd. It also
preserves configured deny-read entries and `globScanMaxDepth` on the
effective filesystem policy so one-off command overrides cannot drop
those read protections. The PR also updates app-server docs/schema
fixtures and adds command-exec coverage for accepted, rejected,
cwd-scoped, and deny-read-preserving profile paths.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-app-server
command_exec_permission_profile_cwd_uses_command_cwd`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server
command_profile_preserves_configured_deny_read_restrictions`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server
command_exec_accepts_permission_profile`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server
command_exec_rejects_sandbox_policy_with_permission_profile`
- `just fix -p codex-app-server`

---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18283).
* #18288
* #18287
* #18286
* #18285
* #18284
* __->__ #18283
2026-04-22 22:33:16 -07:00
Eric Traut
bbff4ee61a Add safety check notification and error handling (#19055)
Adds a new app-server notification that fires when a user account has
been flagged for potential safety reasons.
2026-04-22 22:24:12 -07:00
Shijie Rao
02170996e6 Default Fast service tier for eligible ChatGPT plans (#19053)
## Why

Enterprise and business-like ChatGPT plans should get Codex's Fast
service tier by default when the user or caller has not made an explicit
service-tier choice. At the same time, callers need a durable way to
choose standard routing without adding a new persisted `standard`
service tier value. This keeps existing config compatibility while
letting core own the managed default policy.

## What changed

- Resolve the effective service tier in core at session creation:
explicit `fast` or `flex` wins, explicit null/clear or
`[notice].fast_default_opt_out = true` resolves to standard routing, and
otherwise eligible ChatGPT plans resolve to Fast when FastMode is
enabled.
- Add `[notice].fast_default_opt_out` as the persisted opt-out marker
for managed Fast defaults.
- Treat app-server/TUI `service_tier: null` as an explicit
standard/clear choice by preserving that intent through config loading.
- Update TUI rendering to use core's effective service tier for startup
and status surfaces while still keeping `config.service_tier` as the
explicit configured choice.
- Update `/fast off` to clear `service_tier`, persist the opt-out
marker, and send explicit standard for subsequent turns.

## Verification

- Added unit coverage for config override/notice handling, service-tier
resolution, runtime null clearing, and `/fast off` turn propagation.
- `cargo build -p codex-cli`

Full test suite was not run locally per author request.
2026-04-22 21:54:44 -07:00
Michael Bolin
082fc4f632 protocol: report session permission profiles (#18282)
## Why

Clients that observe `SessionConfigured` need the same canonical
permission view that app-server thread responses provide. Reporting the
profile in protocol events lets clients keep their local state
synchronized without reinterpreting legacy sandbox fields.

## What changed

This adds `permission_profile` to `SessionConfigured` and propagates it
through core, exec JSON output, MCP server messages, and TUI
history/widget handling.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-tui permissions -- --nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all permissions_messages --
--nocapture`















































---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18282).
* #18288
* #18287
* #18286
* #18285
* #18284
* #18283
* __->__ #18282
2026-04-22 21:29:32 -07:00
Andrei Eternal
2b2de3f38b codex: support hooks in config.toml and requirements.toml (#18893)
## Summary

Support the existing hooks schema in inline TOML so hooks can be
configured from both `config.toml` and enterprise-managed
`requirements.toml` without requiring a separate `hooks.json` payload.

This gives enterprise admins a way to ship managed hook policy through
the existing requirements channel while still leaving script delivery to
MDM or other device-management tooling, and it keeps `hooks.json`
working unchanged for existing users.

This also lays the groundwork for follow-on managed filtering work such
as #15937, while continuing to respect project trust gating from #14718.
It does **not** implement `allow_managed_hooks_only` itself.

NOTE: yes, it's a bit unfortunate that the toml isn't formatted as
closely as normal to our default styling. This is because we're trying
to stay compatible with the spec for plugins/hooks that we'll need to
support & the main usecase here is embedding into requirements.toml

## What changed

- moved the shared hook serde model out of `codex-rs/hooks` into
`codex-rs/config` so the same schema can power `hooks.json`, inline
`config.toml` hooks, and managed `requirements.toml` hooks
- added `hooks` support to both `ConfigToml` and
`ConfigRequirementsToml`, including requirements-side `managed_dir` /
`windows_managed_dir`
- treated requirements-managed hooks as one constrained value via
`Constrained`, so managed hook policy is merged atomically and cannot
drift across requirement sources
- updated hook discovery to load requirements-managed hooks first, then
per-layer `hooks.json`, then per-layer inline TOML hooks, with a warning
when a single layer defines both representations
- threaded managed hook metadata through discovered handlers and exposed
requirements hooks in app-server responses, generated schemas, and
`/debug-config`
- added hook/config coverage in `codex-rs/config`, `codex-rs/hooks`,
`codex-rs/core/src/config_loader/tests.rs`, and
`codex-rs/core/tests/suite/hooks.rs`

## Testing

- `cargo test -p codex-config`
- `cargo test -p codex-hooks`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server config_api`

## Documentation

Companion updates are needed in the developers website repo for:

- the hooks guide
- the config reference, sample, basic, and advanced pages
- the enterprise managed configuration guide

---------

Co-authored-by: Michael Bolin <mbolin@openai.com>
2026-04-22 21:20:09 -07:00
Michael Bolin
9955eacd22 tui: fix approvals popup disabled shortcut test (#19072)
## Why

This regressed in #19063, which made `GuardianApproval` stable and
enabled by default. That adds an enabled `Auto-review` row to the
permissions popup, but `approvals_popup_navigation_skips_disabled` still
assumed the disabled `Full Access` row lived behind a hard-coded numeric
shortcut, so the test started selecting a different row and closing the
popup instead of verifying disabled-row behavior.

## What

- disable `GuardianApproval` in
`approvals_popup_navigation_skips_disabled` so the popup layout matches
the scenario the test is exercising
- choose the hidden numeric shortcut for the disabled `Full Access` row
by platform (`2` on non-Windows, `3` on Windows where `Read Only` is
shown) before asserting that selecting the disabled row leaves the popup
open

## Testing

- `cargo test -p codex-tui --lib
chatwidget::tests::permissions::approvals_popup_navigation_skips_disabled
-- --exact --nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui --lib chatwidget::tests::permissions --
--nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui`
2026-04-22 21:01:26 -07:00
Michael Bolin
e8ba912fcc test: set Rust test thread stack size (#19067)
## Summary

Set `RUST_MIN_STACK=8388608` for Rust test entry points so
libtest-spawned test threads get an 8 MiB stack.

The Windows BuildBuddy failure on #18893 showed
`//codex-rs/tui:tui-unit-tests` exiting with a stack overflow in a
`#[tokio::test]` even though later test binaries in the shard printed
successful summaries. Default `#[tokio::test]` uses a current-thread
Tokio runtime, which means the async test body is driven on libtest's
std-spawned test thread. Increasing the test thread stack addresses that
failure mode directly.

To date, we have been fixing these stack-pressure problems with
localized future-size reductions, such as #13429, and by adding
`Box::pin()` in specific async wrapper chains. This gives us a baseline
test-runner stack size instead of continuing to patch individual tests
only after CI finds another large async future.

## What changed

- Added `common --test_env=RUST_MIN_STACK=8388608` in `.bazelrc` so
Bazel test actions receive the env var through Bazel's cache-keyed test
environment path.
- Set the same `RUST_MIN_STACK` value for Cargo/nextest CI entry points
and `just test`.
- Annotated the existing Windows Bazel linker stack reserve as 8 MiB so
it stays aligned with the libtest thread stack size.

## Testing

- `just --list`
- parsed `.github/workflows/rust-ci.yml` and
`.github/workflows/rust-ci-full.yml` with Ruby's YAML loader
- compared `bazel aquery` `TestRunner` action keys before/after explicit
`--test_env=RUST_MIN_STACK=...` and after moving the Bazel env to
`.bazelrc`
- `bazel test //codex-rs/tui:tui-unit-tests --test_output=errors`
- failed locally on the existing sandbox-specific status snapshot
permission mismatch, but loaded the Starlark changes and ran the TUI
test shards
2026-04-22 19:51:49 -07:00
Dylan Hurd
5e71da1424 feat(request-permissions) approve with strict review (#19050)
## Summary
Allow the user to approve a request_permissions_tool request with the
condition that all commands in the rest of the turn are reviewed by
guardian, regardless of sandbox status.

## Testing
- [x] Added unit tests
- [x] Ran locally
2026-04-23 01:56:32 +00:00
Dylan Hurd
c6ab601824 chore(auto-review) feature => stable (#19063)
## Summary
Turn on Auto Review

## Testing
- [x] Update unit tests
2026-04-22 18:51:39 -07:00
Matthew Zeng
8f0a92c1e5 Fix relative stdio MCP cwd fallback (#19031) 2026-04-22 17:52:17 -07:00
Michael Bolin
3cc3763e6c core: box multi-agent wrapper futures (#19059)
## Why

While debugging the Windows stack overflows we saw in
[#13429](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/13429) and then again in
[#18893](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18893), I hit another
overflow in
`tools::handlers::multi_agents::tests::tool_handlers_cascade_close_and_resume_and_keep_explicitly_closed_subtrees_closed`.

That test drives the legacy multi-agent spawn / close / resume path. The
behavior was fine, but several thin async wrappers were still inlining
much larger `AgentControl` futures into their callers, which was enough
to overflow the default Windows stack.

## What

- Box the thin `AgentControl` wrappers around `spawn_agent_internal`,
`resume_single_agent_from_rollout`, and `shutdown_agent_tree`.
- Box the corresponding legacy `multi_agents` handler calls in `spawn`,
`resume_agent`, and `close_agent`.
- Keep behavior unchanged while reducing future size on this call path
so the Windows test no longer overflows its stack.

## Testing

- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib
tools::handlers::multi_agents::tests::tool_handlers_cascade_close_and_resume_and_keep_explicitly_closed_subtrees_closed
-- --exact --nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-core` (this still hit unrelated local
integration-test failures because `codex.exe` / `test_stdio_server.exe`
were not present in this shell; the relevant unit tests passed)
2026-04-22 17:48:13 -07:00
Ahmed Ibrahim
0e78ce80ee [3/4] Add executor-backed RMCP HTTP client (#18583)
### Why
The RMCP layer needs a Streamable HTTP client that can talk either
directly over `reqwest` or through the executor HTTP runner without
duplicating MCP session logic higher in the stack. This PR adds that
client-side transport boundary so remote Streamable HTTP MCP can reuse
the same RMCP flow as the local path.

### What
- Add a shared `rmcp-client/src/streamable_http/` module with:
  - `transport_client.rs` for the local-or-remote transport enum
  - `local_client.rs` for the direct `reqwest` implementation
  - `remote_client.rs` for the executor-backed implementation
  - `common.rs` for the small shared Streamable HTTP helpers
- Teach `RmcpClient` to build Streamable HTTP transports in either local
or remote mode while keeping the existing OAuth ownership in RMCP.
- Translate remote POST, GET, and DELETE session operations into
executor `http/request` calls.
- Preserve RMCP session expiry handling and reconnect behavior for the
remote transport.
- Add remote transport coverage in
`rmcp-client/tests/streamable_http_remote.rs` and keep the shared test
support in `rmcp-client/tests/streamable_http_test_support.rs`.

### Verification
- `cargo check -p codex-rmcp-client`
- online CI

### Stack
1. #18581 protocol
2. #18582 runner
3. #18583 RMCP client
4. #18584 manager wiring and local/remote coverage

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-04-22 17:38:04 -07:00
Won Park
83ec1eb5d6 Rename approvals reviewer variant to auto-review (#19056)
## Why

`approvals_reviewer` now uses `auto_review` as the canonical config/API
value after #18504, but the Rust enum variant and nearby helper/test
names still used `GuardianSubagent` / guardian approval wording. That
made follow-up code and reviews confusing even though the external value
had already moved to Auto-review.

## What changed

- Renamed `ApprovalsReviewer::GuardianSubagent` to
`ApprovalsReviewer::AutoReview`.
- Updated protocol, app-server, config, core, TUI, exec, and analytics
test callsites.
- Renamed nearby helper/test names from guardian approval wording to
Auto-review wording where they refer to the approvals reviewer mode.
- Preserved wire compatibility:
  - `auto_review` remains the canonical serialized value.
  - `guardian_subagent` remains accepted as a legacy alias.

This intentionally does not rename the `[features].guardian_approval`
key, `Feature::GuardianApproval`, `core/src/guardian`, analytics event
names, or app-server Guardian review event types.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-protocol
approvals_reviewer_serializes_auto_review_and_accepts_legacy_guardian_subagent`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol
approvals_reviewer_serializes_auto_review_and_accepts_legacy_guardian_subagent`
- `cargo test -p codex-config approvals_reviewer`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui update_feature_flags`
- `cargo test -p codex-core permissions_instructions`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui permissions_selection`
2026-04-22 17:22:35 -07:00
Andrei Eternal
eed0e07825 hooks: emit Bash PostToolUse when exec_command completes via write_stdin (#18888)
Fixes #16246.

## Why

`exec_command` already emits `PreToolUse`, but long-running unified exec
commands that finish on a later `write_stdin` poll could miss the
matching `PostToolUse`. That left the Bash hook lifecycle inconsistent,
broke expectations around `tool_use_id` and `tool_input.command`, and
meant `PostToolUse` block/replacement feedback could fail to replace the
final session output before it reached model context.

This keeps the fix scoped to the `exec_command` / `write_stdin`
lifecycle. Broader non-Bash hook expansion is still out of scope here
and remains tracked separately in #16732.

## What changed

- Compute and store `PostToolUsePayload` while handlers still have
access to their concrete output type, and carry `tool_use_id` through
that payload.
- Preserve the original hook-facing `exec_command` string through
unified exec state (`ExecCommandRequest`, `ProcessEntry`,
`PreparedProcessHandles`, and `ExecCommandToolOutput`) via
`hook_command`, and remove the now-unused `session_command` output
metadata.
- Emit exactly one Bash `PostToolUse` for long-running `exec_command`
sessions when a later `write_stdin` poll observes final completion,
using the original `exec_command` call id and hook-facing command.
- Keep one-shot `exec_command` behavior aligned with the same payload
construction, including interactive completions that return a final
result directly.
- Apply `PostToolUse` block/replacement feedback before the final
`write_stdin` completion output is sent back to the model.
- Keep `write_stdin` itself out of `PreToolUse` matching so it continues
to act as transport/polling for the original Bash tool call.
- Restore plain matcher behavior for tool-name matchers such as `Bash`
and `Edit|Write`, while still treating patterns with regex characters
(for example `mcp__.*`) as regexes.
- Add unit coverage for unified exec payload construction and parallel
session separation, plus a core integration regression that verifies a
blocked `PostToolUse` replaces the final `write_stdin` output in model
context.

## Testing

- `cargo test -p codex-hooks`
- `cargo test -p codex-core post_tool_use_payload`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
post_tool_use_blocks_when_exec_session_completes_via_write_stdin`
2026-04-22 17:14:22 -07:00
Michael Bolin
6ca038bbd1 rollout: persist turn permission profiles (#18281)
## Why

Resume and reconstruction need to preserve the permissions that were
active for each user turn. If rollouts only keep legacy sandbox fields,
replay cannot faithfully represent profile-shaped overrides introduced
earlier in the stack.

## What changed

This records `permission_profile` on user-turn rollout events,
reconstructs it through history/state extraction, and updates rollout
reconstruction and related fixtures to keep the field explicit.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all permissions_messages --
--nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all request_permissions --
--nocapture`











































---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18281).
* #18288
* #18287
* #18286
* #18285
* #18284
* #18283
* #18282
* __->__ #18281
2026-04-22 17:00:29 -07:00
Michael Bolin
bc083e4713 clients: send permission profiles to app-server (#18280)
## Why

After app-server can accept `PermissionProfile`, first-party clients
should stop preferring legacy sandbox fields when canonical permission
information is available. This keeps the migration moving without
removing legacy compatibility yet.

The client side still has mixed surfaces during the stack: embedded
thread start/resume/fork and exec initial turns can derive a profile
directly from local config, while TUI remote sessions and some
turn-start paths only have a legacy/server-context-safe sandbox
projection. Those paths keep sending legacy sandbox fields rather than
synthesizing or sending lossy/local-only profiles.

## What changed

- Sends `permissionProfile` from exec and embedded TUI thread
start/resume/fork requests when config has a representable profile.
- Keeps legacy sandbox fallback for external sandbox policies, TUI
remote thread lifecycle requests, and TUI turn-start requests that do
not yet carry the active profile.
- Sends the actual config-derived `permissionProfile` for exec initial
turns instead of rebuilding one from the legacy sandbox projection.
- Stores response `permissionProfile` as optional in TUI session state
so external sandbox responses and compatibility payloads preserve
`null`.
- Updates tests for request construction and response mapping.

## Verification

- `cargo check --tests -p codex-tui -p codex-exec`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui app_server_session -- --nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-exec thread_start_params -- --nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui
app_server_session::tests::thread_lifecycle_params -- --nocapture`
- `just fix -p codex-tui -p codex-exec`
- `just fix -p codex-tui`












---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18280).
* #18288
* #18287
* #18286
* #18285
* #18284
* #18283
* #18282
* #18281
* __->__ #18280
2026-04-22 16:34:13 -07:00
Michael Bolin
44dbd9e48a exec-server: require explicit filesystem sandbox cwd (#19046)
## Why

This is a cleanup PR for the `PermissionProfile` migration stack. #19016
fixed remote exec-server sandbox contexts so Docker-backed filesystem
requests use a request/container `cwd` instead of leaking the local test
runner `cwd`. That exposed the broader API problem:
`FileSystemSandboxContext::new(SandboxPolicy)` could still reconstruct
filesystem permissions by reading the exec-server process cwd with
`AbsolutePathBuf::current_dir()`.

That made `cwd`-dependent legacy entries, such as `:cwd`,
`:project_roots`, and relative deny globs, depend on ambient process
state instead of the request sandbox `cwd`. As later PRs make
`PermissionProfile` the primary permissions abstraction, sandbox
contexts should be explicit about whether they carry a request `cwd` or
are profile-only. Removing the implicit constructor prevents new call
sites from accidentally rebuilding permissions against the wrong `cwd`.

## What changed

- Removed `FileSystemSandboxContext::new(SandboxPolicy)`.
- Kept production callers on explicit constructors:
`from_legacy_sandbox_policy(..., cwd)`, `from_permission_profile(...)`,
and `from_permission_profile_with_cwd(...)`.
- Updated exec-server test helpers to construct `PermissionProfile`
values directly instead of routing through legacy `SandboxPolicy`
projections.
- Updated the environment regression test to use an explicit restricted
profile with no synthetic `cwd`.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-exec-server`
- `just fix -p codex-exec-server`


---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19046).
* #18288
* #18287
* #18286
* #18285
* #18284
* #18283
* #18282
* #18281
* #18280
* __->__ #19046
2026-04-22 23:05:12 +00:00
Won Park
46142c3cb0 Rebrand approvals reviewer config to auto-review (#18504)
### Why

Auto-review is the user-facing name for the approvals reviewer, but the
config/API value still exposed the old `guardian_subagent` name. That
made new configs and generated schemas point users at Guardian
terminology even though the intended product surface is Auto-review.

This PR updates the external `approvals_reviewer` value while preserving
compatibility for existing configs and clients.

### What changed

- Makes `auto_review` the canonical serialized value for
`approvals_reviewer`.
- Keeps `guardian_subagent` accepted as a legacy alias.
- Keeps `user` accepted and serialized as `user`.
- Updates generated config and app-server schemas so
`approvals_reviewer` includes:
  - `user`
  - `auto_review`
  - `guardian_subagent`
- Updates app-server README docs for the reviewer value.
- Updates analytics and config requirements tests for the canonical
auto_review value.


### Compatibility

Existing configs and API payloads using:

```toml
approvals_reviewer = "guardian_subagent"
```

continue to load and map to the Auto-review reviewer behavior. 

New serialization emits: 
```toml
approvals_reviewer = "auto_review" 
```

This PR intentionally does not rename the [features].guardian_approval
key or broad internal Guardian symbols. Those are split out for a
follow-up PR to keep this migration small and avoid touching large
TUI/internal surfaces.

**Verification**
cargo test -p codex-protocol
approvals_reviewer_serializes_auto_review_and_accepts_legacy_guardian_subagent
cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol
approvals_reviewer_serializes_auto_review_and_accepts_legacy_guardian_subagent
2026-04-22 15:45:35 -07:00
Konstantine Kahadze
0e25c5ff42 Update bundled OpenAI Docs skill freshness check (#19043)
## Summary

Sync the bundled `openai-docs` system skill with the already-merged
`openai/skills` update from https://github.com/openai/skills/pull/360.

Codex bundles system skills from `codex-rs/skills/src/assets/samples`,
so this PR copies the same GPT-5.4 OpenAI Docs skill update into the
Codex app/CLI bundle path.

## Changes

- Add the latest-model resolver script to the bundled `openai-docs`
skill.
- Route model upgrade and prompt-upgrade requests through remote
latest-model metadata when current guidance is needed.
- Rename bundled fallback references to `upgrade-guide.md` and
`prompting-guide.md`.
- Keep the bundled fallback guidance GPT-5.4-only.

## Validation

- Verified this bundled skill is byte-for-byte identical to
`openai/skills@origin/main` `skills/.system/openai-docs`.
- Ran the resolver locally and confirmed it returns `gpt-5.4` /
`gpt-5p4`.
2026-04-22 22:31:04 +00:00
khoi
568cdacc7e [Codex] Register browser requirements feature keys (#18956)
## Summary
- register `in_app_browser` and `browser_use` as stable feature keys
- allow requirements/MDM feature requirements to pin those desktop
browser controls
- add coverage for browser requirements being accepted by config loading

## Testing
- `cargo fmt --all` (`just fmt` unavailable locally; rustfmt warned
about nightly-only `imports_granularity` config)
- `cargo test -p codex-features`
- `cargo test -p codex-core browser_feature_requirements_are_valid`
- Tested manually by setting in `requirements.toml` and seeing after app
restart state to reflect the setting was correct (at the time hiding the
`Browser Use` setting when the enterprise setting was set to false
2026-04-22 15:27:15 -07:00
joeytrasatti-openai
ee70b365ab Overlay state DB git metadata for filtered thread lists (#19036)
## Summary
- Factor the state DB `ThreadMetadata` to rollout `ThreadItem` mapping
into a shared helper used by both DB pages and filesystem overlays
- Generalize filtered filesystem list overlays to fill missing thread
list metadata from the state-derived `ThreadItem`, while preserving
filesystem `path` and `thread_id`
- Add coverage for the merge behavior so existing filesystem values are
not overwritten and future `ThreadItem` fields require an explicit
decision

## Testing
- `just fmt` from `codex-rs`
- `git diff --check -- codex-rs/rollout/src/recorder.rs
codex-rs/rollout/src/recorder_tests.rs`
- Attempted `cargo test -p codex-rollout thread_item_metadata` from
`codex-rs`; blocked in dependency fetch/setup after updating crates.io
and git submodules `https://github.com/livekit/protocol` and
`https://chromium.googlesource.com/libyuv/libyuv`, so the focused tests
did not run
2026-04-22 14:59:20 -07:00
Michael Bolin
d3dd0d759b exec-server: expose arg0 alias root to fs sandbox (#19016)
## Why

The post-merge `rust-ci-full` run for #18999 still failed the Ubuntu
remote `suite::remote_env` sandboxed filesystem tests. That run checked
out merge commit `ddde50c611e4800cb805f243ed3c50bbafe7d011`, so the arg0
guard lifetime fix was present.

The Docker-backed failure had two remaining pieces:

- The sandboxed filesystem helper needs to execute Codex through the
`codex-linux-sandbox` arg0 alias path. The helper sandbox was only
granting read access to the real Codex executable parent, so the alias
parent also has to be visible inside the helper sandbox.
- The remote-env tests were building sandbox contexts with
`FileSystemSandboxContext::new()`, which captures the local test runner
cwd. In the Docker remote exec-server, that host checkout path does not
exist, so spawning the filesystem helper failed with `No such file or
directory` before the helper could process the request.

## What Changed

- Track all helper runtime read roots instead of a single root.
- Add both the real Codex executable parent and the
`codex-linux-sandbox` alias parent to sandbox readable roots.
- Avoid sending an unused local cwd in remote filesystem sandbox
contexts when the permission profile has no cwd-dependent entries.
- Build the Docker remote-env test sandbox contexts with a cwd path that
exists inside the container.
- Add unit coverage for the alias-parent root and remote sandbox cwd
handling.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-exec-server`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
remote_test_env_sandboxed_read_allows_readable_root`
- `just fix -p codex-exec-server`
- `just fix -p codex-core`
2026-04-22 21:34:22 +00:00
Leo Shimonaka
16eeeb534a Fix MCP permission policy sync (#19033)
###### Why/Context/Summary

Repro: start a session outside Full Access, switch permissions to Full
Access, then submit a new turn that triggers MCP/CUA permission
handling.

The turn used the live Full Access `SessionConfiguration`, but the MCP
coordinator was still synced from the stale `original_config_do_not_use`
/ per-turn config copy. That left the coordinator with an old sandbox
policy, so empty MCP permission elicitations could be denied instead of
auto-accepted.

Fix: update/rebuild the MCP connection manager from the live
turn/session approval and sandbox policy fields.

###### Test plan

```sh
just fmt
cargo test -p codex-core --lib
cargo test -p codex-core --lib mcp_tool_call::tests
```
2026-04-22 14:30:29 -07:00
viyatb-oai
2d73bac45f feat: add guardian network approval trigger context (#18197)
## Summary

Give guardian network-access reviews the command context that triggered
a managed-network approval. The prompt JSON now includes the originating
tool call id, tool name, command argv, cwd, sandbox permissions,
additional permissions, justification, and tty state when a single
active tool call can be attributed.

The implementation keeps the trigger shape canonical by serializing
`GuardianNetworkAccessTrigger` directly and lets each runtime build that
trigger from its `ToolCtx`. Non-guardian approval prompts avoid cloning
the full trigger payload.

## UX changes

Guardian network-access reviews now include a `trigger` object that
explains what command caused the network approval. Instead of seeing
only the requested host, the guardian reviewer can also see the
originating tool call, argv, working directory, sandbox mode,
justification, and tty state.

Example payload the guardian reviewer can see:

```json
{
  "tool": "network_access",
  "target": "https://api.github.com:443",
  "host": "api.github.com",
  "protocol": "https",
  "port": 443,
  "trigger": {
    "callId": "call_abc123",
    "toolName": "shell",
    "command": ["gh", "api", "/repos/openai/codex/pulls/18197"],
    "cwd": "/workspace/codex",
    "sandboxPermissions": "require_escalated",
    "justification": "Fetch PR metadata from GitHub.",
    "tty": false
  }
}
```

The network review itself remains scoped to the network decision:
`target_item_id` stays `null`. `trigger.callId` is attribution context
only, so clients can still distinguish network reviews from
item-targeted command reviews.

## Verification

- Added coverage for serializing network trigger context in guardian
approval JSON.
- Added regression coverage that network guardian reviews do not reuse
`trigger.callId` as `target_item_id`.

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-04-22 14:00:53 -07:00
Ahmed Ibrahim
9360f267f3 [2/4] Implement executor HTTP request runner (#18582)
### Why
Remote streamable HTTP MCP needs the executor to perform ordinary HTTP
requests on the executor side. This keeps network placement aligned with
`experimental_environment = "remote"` without adding MCP-specific
executor APIs.

### What
- Add an executor-side `http/request` runner backed by `reqwest`.
- Validate request method and URL scheme, preserving the transport
boundary at plain HTTP.
- Return buffered responses for ordinary calls and emit ordered
`http/request/bodyDelta` notifications for streaming responses.
- Register the request handler in the exec-server router.
- Document the runner entrypoint, conversion helpers, body-stream
bridge, notification sender, timeout behavior, and new integration-test
helpers.
- Add exec-server integration tests with the existing websocket harness
and a local TCP HTTP peer for buffered and streamed responses, with
comments spelling out what each test proves and its
setup/exercise/assert phases.

### Stack
1. #18581 protocol
2. #18582 runner
3. #18583 RMCP client
4. #18584 manager wiring and local/remote coverage

### Verification
- `just fmt`
- `cargo check -p codex-exec-server -p codex-rmcp-client --tests`
- `cargo check -p codex-core --test all` compile-only
- `git diff --check`
- Online full CI is running from the `full-ci` branch, including the
remote Rust test job.

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-04-22 20:36:34 +00:00
Michael Bolin
18a26d7bbc app-server: accept permission profile overrides (#18279)
## Why

`PermissionProfile` is becoming the canonical permissions shape shared
by core and app-server. After app-server responses expose the active
profile, clients need to be able to send that same shape back when
starting, resuming, forking, or overriding a turn instead of translating
through the legacy `sandbox`/`sandboxPolicy` shorthands.

This still needs to preserve the existing requirements/platform
enforcement model. A profile-shaped request can be downgraded or
rejected by constraints, but the server should keep the user's
elevated-access intent for project trust decisions. Turn-level profile
overrides also need to retain existing read protections, including
deny-read entries and bounded glob-scan metadata, so a permission
override cannot accidentally drop configured protections such as
`**/*.env = deny`.

## What changed

- Adds optional `permissionProfile` request fields to `thread/start`,
`thread/resume`, `thread/fork`, and `turn/start`.
- Rejects ambiguous requests that specify both `permissionProfile` and
the legacy `sandbox`/`sandboxPolicy` fields, including running-thread
resume requests.
- Converts profile-shaped overrides into core runtime filesystem/network
permissions while continuing to derive the constrained legacy sandbox
projection used by existing execution paths.
- Preserves project-trust intent for profile overrides that are
equivalent to workspace-write or full-access sandbox requests.
- Preserves existing deny-read entries and `globScanMaxDepth` when
applying turn-level `permissionProfile` overrides.
- Updates app-server docs plus generated JSON/TypeScript schema fixtures
and regression coverage.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol schema_fixtures`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
session_configuration_apply_permission_profile_preserves_existing_deny_read_entries`







---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18279).
* #18288
* #18287
* #18286
* #18285
* #18284
* #18283
* #18282
* #18281
* #18280
* __->__ #18279
2026-04-22 13:34:33 -07:00
Dylan Hurd
ed4def8286 feat(auto-review) short-circuit (#18890)
## Summary
Short circuit the convo if auto-review hits too many denials

## Testing
- [x] Added unit tests

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-04-22 20:34:15 +00:00
xl-openai
b77791c228 feat: Fairly trim skill descriptions within context budget (#18925)
Preserve skill name/path entries whenever possible and trim descriptions
first, using round-robin character allocation so short descriptions do
not waste budget.
2026-04-22 12:33:29 -07:00
Michael Bolin
ddde50c611 arg0: keep dispatch aliases alive during async main (#18999)
## Why

The Ubuntu GNU remote Cargo run has been regularly failing sandboxed
`suite::remote_env` filesystem tests with `No such file or directory`,
while the same cases pass under Bazel. The Cargo remote-env setup starts
`target/debug/codex exec-server` inside Docker via
`scripts/test-remote-env.sh`. That CLI builds `codex-linux-sandbox` and
other arg0 helper aliases in a temporary directory, then passes those
alias paths into the exec-server runtime.

`arg0_dispatch_or_else` constructed `Arg0DispatchPaths` from that
temporary alias guard, but then awaited the async CLI entry point
without otherwise keeping the guard live. That allowed the guard to be
dropped while the exec-server was still running, removing the helper
alias directory. Later sandboxed filesystem calls tried to spawn the
now-deleted `codex-linux-sandbox` path and surfaced as `ENOENT`.

The relevant distinction I found is that `core/tests/common` stores the
result of `arg0_dispatch()` in a process-lifetime
`OnceLock<Option<Arg0PathEntryGuard>>` for test binaries. The Cargo
remote-env setup exercises a real `codex exec-server` process instead,
so it depends on the normal CLI lifetime behavior fixed here.

## What Changed

- Keep the arg0 tempdir guard alive until `main_fn(paths).await`
completes.
- Keep the helper on the real `arg0_dispatch()` shape, where alias setup
can fail and return `None` in production.
- Add a regression test that uses an explicit guard, yields once, and
verifies the generated helper alias path still exists while the async
entry point is running.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-arg0`
- `just argument-comment-lint -p codex-arg0`
- `just fix -p codex-arg0`
2026-04-22 11:06:34 -07:00
Won Park
11e5af53c4 Add plumbing to approve stored Auto-Review denials (#18955)
## Summary

This adds the structural plumbing needed for an app-server client to
approve a previously denied Guardian review and carry that approval
context into the next model turn.

This PR does not add the actual `/auto-review-denials` tool 

## What Changed

- Added app-server v2 RPC `thread/approveGuardianDeniedAction`.
- Added generated JSON schema and TypeScript fixtures for
`ThreadApproveGuardianDeniedAction*`.
- Added core `Op::ApproveGuardianDeniedAction`.
- Added a core handler that validates the event is a denied Guardian
assessment and injects a developer message containing the stored denial
event JSON.
- Queues the approval context for the next turn if there is no active
turn yet.
- Added the TUI app-server bridge so `Op::ApproveGuardianDeniedAction {
event }` is routed to the app-server request.

## What This Does Not Do

- Does not add `/auto-review-denials`.
- Does not add chat widget recent-denial state.
- Does not add popup/list UI.
- Does not add a product-facing denial lookup/store.
- Does not change where Guardian denials are originally emitted or
persisted.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-tui thread_approve_guardian_denied_action`
2026-04-22 10:38:19 -07:00
Dylan Hurd
78593d72ea feat(auto-review) policy config (#18959)
## Summary
Allow users to customize their own auto-review policy config.

## Testing
- [x] added config_tests
2026-04-22 10:33:02 -07:00
cassirer-openai
f67383bcba [rollout_trace] Record core session rollout traces (#18877)
## Summary

Wires rollout trace recording into `codex-core` session and turn
execution. This records the core model request/response, compaction, and
session lifecycle boundaries needed for replay without yet tracing every
nested runtime/tool boundary.

## Stack

This is PR 2/5 in the rollout trace stack.

- [#18876](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18876): Add rollout
trace crate
- [#18877](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18877): Record core
session rollout traces
- [#18878](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18878): Trace tool and
code-mode boundaries
- [#18879](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18879): Trace sessions
and multi-agent edges
- [#18880](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18880): Add debug trace
reduction command

## Review Notes

This layer is the first live integration point. The important review
question is whether trace recording is isolated from normal session
behavior: trace failures should not become user-visible execution
failures, and recording should preserve the existing turn/session
lifecycle semantics.

The PR depends on the reducer/data model from the first stack entry and
only introduces the core recorder surface that later PRs use for richer
runtime and relationship events.
2026-04-22 17:00:48 +00:00
Eric Traut
79ea577156 TUI: Keep remote app-server events draining (#18932)
Addresses #18860

Problem: Remote app-server clients could stop draining websocket events
when their bounded local event channel filled, leaving clients stuck on
stale in-progress turns after a disconnect.

Solution: Use an unbounded local event channel for the remote client so
the websocket reader can keep forwarding disconnect and progress events
instead of blocking or dropping them.

Why this is reasonable: This does not make the remote websocket itself
unbounded. The changed queue lives inside the remote client, between the
task that reads the remote websocket and the API consumer in the same
client process. Once an event has been received from the remote server,
preserving it is preferable to blocking websocket reads or dropping
disconnect/lifecycle events; network-level backpressure still happens at
the websocket boundary if the remote side outpaces the client.
2026-04-22 09:29:34 -07:00
Steve Coffey
0127cef5db Stage publishable Python runtime wheels (#18865)
This is PR 2 of the Python SDK PyPI publishing split. [PR
1](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18862) refreshed the generated
SDK bindings; this PR makes the runtime package itself publishable, and
PR 3 will wire the SDK package/version pinning to this runtime package.

## Summary
- Rename the runtime distribution to `openai-codex-cli-bin` while
keeping the import package as `codex_cli_bin`.
- Make the runtime package wheel-only and build `py3-none-<platform>`
wheels instead of interpreter-specific wheels.
- Add `stage-runtime --codex-version` and `--platform-tag` so release
staging can produce the platform wheel matrix from Codex release tags.
- Add focused artifact workflow tests for version normalization,
platform tag injection, and runtime wheel metadata.

## Why Rename
There is already an unofficial PyPI package,
[`codex-bin`](https://pypi.org/project/codex-bin/), distributing OpenAI
Codex binaries. Publishing the official SDK runtime dependency as
`openai-codex-cli-bin` makes the ownership clear, avoids confusing the
SDK-pinned runtime wheel with that unowned wrapper, and keeps the import
package unchanged as `codex_cli_bin`.

## Tests
- `uv run --extra dev pytest
tests/test_artifact_workflow_and_binaries.py` -> 21 passed
- `uv run --extra dev python scripts/update_sdk_artifacts.py
stage-runtime /tmp/codex-python-pr2-rebased/runtime-stage
/tmp/codex-python-pr2-rebased/codex --codex-version
rust-v0.116.0-alpha.1 --platform-tag macosx_11_0_arm64`
- `uv run --with build --extra dev python -m build --wheel
/tmp/codex-python-pr2-rebased/runtime-stage`
- `uv run --with twine --extra dev twine check
/tmp/codex-python-pr2-rebased/runtime-stage/dist/openai_codex_cli_bin-0.116.0a1-py3-none-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl`

## Note
- Full `uv run --extra dev pytest` currently fails because regenerating
from schemas already on `main` adds new DeviceKey Python types. I left
that generated catch-up out of this runtime-only PR.
2026-04-22 08:14:48 -07:00
Vaibhav Srivastav
0ebe69a8c3 [codex] Update imagegen system skill (#18852)
## Summary

This updates the embedded `imagegen` system skill in `codex-rs/skills`
with the ImageGen 2 skill changes from `openai/skills-internal#87`.

The bundled skill now keeps normal image generation/editing on the
built-in `image_gen` path, updates the CLI fallback defaults to
`gpt-image-2`, and routes explicit transparent-output requests through
`gpt-image-1.5` with clear guidance that `gpt-image-2` does not support
transparent backgrounds.

## Details

- Update `SKILL.md` routing guidance for built-in vs CLI fallback
behavior.
- Update CLI/API references for `gpt-image-2` size constraints, quality
options, near-4K sizes, and unsupported options.
- Update `scripts/image_gen.py` defaults and validation:
  - default model `gpt-image-2`
  - default size `auto`
  - default quality `medium`
  - reject transparent backgrounds on `gpt-image-2`
  - reject `input_fidelity` on `gpt-image-2`
- validate flexible `gpt-image-2` sizes and suggest `3824x2160` /
`2160x3824` for near-4K requests
- Update prompt/reference docs with the new model and routing guidance.

## Validation

- `cargo test -p codex-skills`
- `git diff --check`
- Manual CLI dry-runs for:
  - default `gpt-image-2` payload
  - `3824x2160` near-4K size acceptance
  - `3840x2160` rejection with near-4K guidance
  - transparent background rejection on `gpt-image-2`
  - transparent background acceptance on `gpt-image-1.5`
  - `input_fidelity` rejection on `gpt-image-2`

Bazel target check was not run locally because `bazel` is not installed
in this environment.
2026-04-22 15:08:10 +00:00
jif-oai
65420737e8 chore: prep memories for AB (#18973) 2026-04-22 11:46:15 +01:00
jif-oai
ddf65c9647 fix: cargo deny (#18971) 2026-04-22 11:46:11 +01:00
jif-oai
639382609f fix: wait_agent timeout for queued mailbox mail (#18968)
## Why

`wait_agent` can be called while mailbox mail is already pending. The
previous implementation subscribed for future mailbox sequence changes
and then waited for the next notification. If the mail was queued before
that wait started, no new notification arrived, so the tool could sit
until `timeout_ms` even though mail was ready to deliver.

## What Changed

- Added `Session::has_pending_mailbox_items()` for checking pending
mailbox mail through the session API.
- Updated `multi_agents_v2::wait` to return immediately when pending
mailbox mail already exists before sleeping on a new mailbox sequence
update.
- Reworked the regression coverage in `multi_agents_tests.rs` so already
queued mailbox mail must wake `wait_agent` promptly.

Relevant code:
- [`wait_agent` pending-mail
check](aa8ca06e83/codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/multi_agents_v2/wait.rs (L55-L60))
-
[`Session::has_pending_mailbox_items`](aa8ca06e83/codex-rs/core/src/session/mod.rs (L2979-L2981))
-
[`multi_agent_v2_wait_agent_returns_for_already_queued_mail`](aa8ca06e83/codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/multi_agents_tests.rs (L2854))

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-core
multi_agent_v2_wait_agent_returns_for_already_queued_mail`
2026-04-22 11:16:17 +01:00
acrognale-oai
4f8c58f737 Support multiple cwd filters for thread list (#18502)
## Summary

- Teach app-server `thread/list` to accept either a single `cwd` or an
array of cwd filters, returning threads whose recorded session cwd
matches any requested path
- Add `useStateDbOnly` as an explicit opt-in fast path for callers that
want to answer `thread/list` from SQLite without scanning JSONL rollout
files
- Preserve backwards compatibility: by default, `thread/list` still
scans JSONL rollouts and repairs SQLite state
- Wire the new cwd array and SQLite-only options through app-server,
local/remote thread-store, rollout listing, generated TypeScript/schema
fixtures, proto output, and docs

## Test Plan

- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-rollout`
- `cargo test -p codex-thread-store`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server thread_list`
- `just fmt`
- `just fix -p codex-app-server-protocol -p codex-rollout -p
codex-thread-store -p codex-app-server`
- `cargo build -p codex-cli --bin codex`
2026-04-22 06:10:09 -04:00
jif-oai
b04ffeee4c nit: expose lib (#18962)
As a follow-up
2026-04-22 10:06:53 +01:00
rhan-oai
213b17b7a3 [codex-analytics] guardian review TTFT plumbing and emission (#17696)
## Why

Guardian analytics includes time-to-first-token, but the Guardian
reviewer runs as a normal Codex session and `TurnCompleteEvent` did not
expose TTFT. The timing needs to flow through the standard
turn-completion protocol so Guardian review analytics can consume the
same value as the rest of the session machinery.

## What changed

Adds optional `time_to_first_token_ms` to `TurnCompleteEvent` and
populates it from `TurnTiming`. The value is carried through app-server
thread history, rollout reconstruction, TUI/app-server adapters, and
Guardian review session handling.

Guardian review analytics now captures TTFT from the reviewer
turn-complete event when available. Existing tests and fixtures are
updated to set the new optional field to `None` where TTFT is not
relevant.

## Verification

- `cargo clippy -p codex-tui --tests -- -D warnings`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-core --lib --tests -- -D warnings`

---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/17696).
* __->__ #17696
* #17695
* #17693
* #18278
* #18953
2026-04-22 01:52:48 -07:00
rhan-oai
37aadeaa13 [codex-analytics] guardian review truncation (#17695)
## Why

The Guardian review event needs to report whether the action shown to
Guardian was truncated. That field should come from the same truncation
path used to build the Guardian prompt, rather than being inferred after
the fact.

## What changed

Plumbs truncation metadata through Guardian action formatting, prompt
construction, review session execution, and analytics emission.
`guardian_truncate_text` now reports both the rendered text and whether
it inserted the truncation marker, and `reviewed_action_truncated` is
set from that prompt-building result.

This keeps the analytics field aligned with the model-visible reviewed
action while preserving the existing Guardian prompt behavior.

## Verification

- Guardian truncation tests cover both truncated and non-truncated
action payloads.
- Guardian review tests assert the review session metadata and
truncation field are propagated.

---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/17695).
* #17696
* __->__ #17695
* #17693
* #18278
* #18953
2026-04-22 08:35:29 +00:00
rhan-oai
4e7399c6b9 [codex-analytics] guardian review analytics events emission (#17693)
## Why

Guardian approvals now run as review sessions, but Codex analytics did
not have a terminal event for those reviews. That made it hard to
measure approval outcomes, failure modes, Guardian session reuse, model
metadata, token usage, and timing separately from the parent turn.

## What changed

Adds `codex_guardian_review` analytics emission for Guardian approval
reviews. The event is emitted from the Guardian review path with review
identity, target item id, approval request source, a PII-minimized
reviewed-action shape, terminal decision/status, failure reason,
Guardian assessment fields, Guardian session metadata, token usage, and
timing metadata.

The reviewed-action payload intentionally omits high-risk fields such as
shell commands, working directories, argv, file paths, network
targets/hosts, rationale, retry reason, and permission justifications.
It also classifies prompt-build failures separately from Guardian
session/runtime failures so fail-closed cases are distinguishable in
analytics.

## Verification

- Guardian review analytics tests cover terminal success,
timeout/cancel/fail-closed paths, session metadata, and token usage
plumbing.
- `cargo clippy -p codex-core --lib --tests -- -D warnings`

---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/17693).
* #17696
* #17695
* __->__ #17693
2026-04-22 01:02:47 -07:00
Michael Bolin
5eab9ff8ca app-server: expose thread permission profiles (#18278)
## Why

The `PermissionProfile` migration needs app-server clients to see the
same constrained permission model that core is using at runtime. Before
this PR, thread lifecycle responses only exposed the legacy
`SandboxPolicy` shape, so clients still had to infer active permissions
from sandbox fields. That makes downstream resume, fork, and override
flows harder to make `PermissionProfile`-first.

External sandbox policies are intentionally excluded from this canonical
view. External enforcement cannot be round-tripped as a
`PermissionProfile`, and exposing a lossy root-write profile would let
clients accidentally change sandbox semantics if they echo the profile
back later.

## What changed

- Adds the app-server v2 `PermissionProfile` wire shape, including
filesystem permissions and glob scan depth metadata.
- Adds `PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions` so the profile response
does not expose active network state through the older
additional-permissions naming.
- Returns `permissionProfile` from thread start, resume, and fork
responses when the active sandbox can be represented as a
`PermissionProfile`.
- Keeps legacy `sandbox` in those responses for compatibility and
documents `permissionProfile` as canonical when present.
- Makes lifecycle `permissionProfile` nullable and returns `null` for
`ExternalSandbox` to avoid exposing a lossy profile.
- Regenerates the app-server JSON schema and TypeScript fixtures.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server
thread_response_permission_profile_omits_external_sandbox --
--nocapture`
- `cargo check --tests -p codex-analytics -p codex-exec -p codex-tui`
- `just fix -p codex-app-server-protocol -p codex-app-server -p
codex-analytics -p codex-exec -p codex-tui`

---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18278).
* #18279
* __->__ #18278
2026-04-21 23:52:56 -07:00
iceweasel-oai
3a451b6321 use long-lived sessions for codex sandbox windows (#18953)
`codex sandbox windows` previously did a one-shot spawn for all
commands.
This change uses the `unified_exec` session to spawn long-lived
processes instead, and implements a simple bridge to forward stdin to
the spawned session and stdout/stderr from the spawned session back to
the caller.

It also fixes a bug with the new shared spawn context code where the
"no-network env" was being applied to both elevated and unelevated
sandbox spawns. It should only be applied for the unelevated sandbox
because the elevated one uses firewall rules instead of an env-based
network suppression strategy.
2026-04-22 06:39:29 +00:00
efrazer-oai
69c8913e24 feat: add explicit AgentIdentity auth mode (#18785)
## Summary

This PR adds `CodexAuth::AgentIdentity` as an explicit auth mode.

An AgentIdentity auth record is a standalone `auth.json` mode. When
`AuthManager::auth().await` loads that mode, it registers one
process-scoped task and stores it in runtime-only state on the auth
value. Header creation stays synchronous after that because the task is
initialized before callers receive the auth object.

This PR also removes the old feature flag path. AgentIdentity is
selected by explicit auth mode, not by a hidden flag or lazy mutation of
ChatGPT auth records.

Reference old stack: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17387/changes

## Design Decisions

- AgentIdentity is a real auth enum variant because it can be the only
credential in `auth.json`.
- The process task is ephemeral runtime state. It is not serialized and
is not stored in rollout/session data.
- Account/user metadata needed by existing Codex backend checks lives on
the AgentIdentity record for now.
- `is_chatgpt_auth()` remains token-specific.
- `uses_codex_backend()` is the broader predicate for ChatGPT-token auth
and AgentIdentity auth.

## Stack

1. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18757: full revert
2. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18871: isolated Agent Identity
crate
3. This PR: explicit AgentIdentity auth mode and startup task allocation
4. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18811: migrate Codex backend
auth callsites through AuthProvider
5. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18904: accept AgentIdentity JWTs
and load `CODEX_AGENT_IDENTITY`

## Testing

Tests: targeted Rust checks, cargo-shear, Bazel lock check, and CI.
2026-04-21 22:33:24 -07:00
Michael Bolin
0fef35dc3a core: derive active permission profiles (#18277)
## Why

`Permissions` should not store a separate `PermissionProfile` that can
drift from the constrained `SandboxPolicy` and network settings. The
active profile needs to be derived from the same constrained values that
already honor `requirements.toml`.

## What changed

This adds derivation of the active `PermissionProfile` from the
constrained runtime permission settings and exposes that derived value
through config snapshots and thread state. The app-server can then
report the active profile without introducing a second source of truth.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all permissions_messages --
--nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all request_permissions --
--nocapture`



























---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18277).
* #18288
* #18287
* #18286
* #18285
* #18284
* #18283
* #18282
* #18281
* #18280
* #18279
* #18278
* __->__ #18277
2026-04-21 22:11:40 -07:00
Celia Chen
51fdc35945 chore: remove unused Bedrock auth lazy loading (#18948)
## Summary

The Bedrock Mantle SigV4 auth provider currently looks like it can
lazily load `AwsAuthContext`, but the provider is only constructed after
`resolve_auth_method` has already loaded that context. Because
`with_context` always pre-populates the `OnceCell`, the
`get_or_try_init` fallback is unused in normal operation and makes the
provider lifecycle harder to reason about.

This change removes that dead lazy-loading path and makes the actual
behavior explicit:

- `BedrockAuthMethod::AwsSdkAuth` carries only the resolved
`AwsAuthContext`.
- `BedrockMantleSigV4AuthProvider` stores the resolved context directly.
- request signing uses the stored context without going through
`OnceCell`.

The existing eager AWS auth resolution behavior is unchanged; this is a
simplification of the provider state, not a behavior change.

## Testing

- `cargo shear`
- `cargo test -p codex-model-provider`
- `just bazel-lock-check`
2026-04-22 05:01:22 +00:00
Dylan Hurd
34800d717e [codex] Clean guardian instructions (#18934)
## Summary
- Keep the guardian policy installed as guardian base instructions.
- Clear inherited parent `developer_instructions` for guardian review
sessions.
- Update guardian config tests to assert developer instructions are
cleared and policy text is sourced from base instructions.

## Why
Guardian review sessions are intended to run under an isolated guardian
policy. Because the guardian config is cloned from the parent config,
inherited custom or managed developer instructions could otherwise
remain active and conflict with guardian review behavior.

## Validation
- `just fmt`
- `cargo test -p codex-core guardian_review_session_config`

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-04-21 21:47:58 -07:00
Michael Bolin
faed6d5c07 tests: serialize process-heavy Windows CI suites (#18943)
## Why

A [Windows Cargo
build](https://github.com/openai/codex/actions/runs/24754807756/job/72425641062)
on `main` timed out in several unrelated-looking suites at the same
time:

- `codex-app-server` account tests failed before account logic, while
`mcp.initialize()` was waiting for the first JSON-RPC response.
- `codex-core` `apply_patch_cli` tests timed out while running full
Codex/apply_patch turns.
- `codex-windows-sandbox` legacy session tests timed out while creating
restricted-token child processes and private desktops.

The app-server log reached the test harness write path in
[`McpProcess::initialize_with_params`](731b54d08f/codex-rs/app-server/tests/common/mcp_process.rs (L244-L263)),
but never printed the matching stdout read from
[`read_jsonrpc_message`](731b54d08f/codex-rs/app-server/tests/common/mcp_process.rs (L1123-L1128)).
The server initialize handler is a small bookkeeping/response path
([`message_processor.rs`](731b54d08f/codex-rs/app-server/src/message_processor.rs (L601-L728))),
so the failure looks like Windows runner process/pipe scheduling
starvation rather than account-specific behavior.

## What Changed

This updates `.config/nextest.toml` to serialize two process-heavy sets:

- `codex-core` tests matching `package(codex-core) & kind(test) &
test(apply_patch_cli)`
- `codex-windows-sandbox` tests matching `package(codex-windows-sandbox)
& test(legacy_)`

`codex-app-server` integration tests were already serialized inside
their own package; this change reduces overlap with the other suites
that were saturating the runner at the same time.

## Verification

- `cargo nextest list --filterset "package(codex-core) & kind(test) &
test(apply_patch_cli)"`
- `cargo nextest list --filterset "package(codex-windows-sandbox) &
test(legacy_)"`

The Windows sandbox filter naturally lists no tests on macOS, but it
validates the nextest filter/config syntax locally.
2026-04-21 21:14:45 -07:00
Dylan Hurd
0e39614d87 chore(tui) debug-config guardian_policy_config (#18923)
## Summary
List guardian_policy_config_source in `/debug-config` output

## Testing
 - [x] Ran locally
2026-04-21 21:00:23 -07:00
Eric Traut
c7e5a9d95e Keep TUI status surfaces in sync (#18935) 2026-04-21 20:39:23 -07:00
Michael Bolin
03ae4db0f4 ci: keep argument comment lint checks materialized (#18926)
## Why

The fast `rust-ci` workflow decides whether to run the cross-platform
`argument-comment-lint` job based on changed paths. PRs that touch
Rust-adjacent Bazel wrapper files, such as `defs.bzl` or
`workspace_root_test_launcher.*.tpl`, can change how Rust tests and lint
targets behave without changing any `.rs` files.

When that detector returned false, GitHub skipped the matrix job before
expanding it. That produced a single skipped check named `Argument
comment lint - ${{ matrix.name }}` instead of the Linux, macOS, and
Windows check names that branch protection expects, leaving the PR
unable to go green when those matrix checks are required.

## What Changed

- Treat root Bazel wrapper files as `argument-comment-lint` relevant
changes.
- Keep the `argument_comment_lint_prebuilt` matrix job materialized for
every PR so the per-platform check names always exist.
- Add a single gate step that decides whether the real lint work should
run.
- Move the checkout-adjacent Bazel setup and OS-specific lint commands
into `.github/actions/run-argument-comment-lint/action.yml` so the
workflow does not repeat the same path-detection condition on each step.

## Verification

- Parsed `.github/workflows/rust-ci.yml` and
`.github/actions/run-argument-comment-lint/action.yml` with Python YAML
loading.
- Simulated the workflow path-matching shell conditions for the root
Bazel wrapper files and confirmed they set `argument_comment_lint=true`.
2026-04-22 03:36:46 +00:00
Michael Bolin
36f8bb4ffa exec-server: carry filesystem sandbox profiles (#18276)
## Why

The exec-server still needs platform sandbox inputs, but the migration
should preserve the `PermissionProfile` that produced them. Keeping only
the derived legacy sandbox map would keep `SandboxPolicy` as the
effective abstraction and would make full-disk vs. restricted profiles
harder to preserve as the permissions stack starts round-tripping
profiles.

`PermissionProfile` entries can also be cwd-sensitive (`:cwd`,
`:project_roots`, relative globs), so the exec-server must carry the
request sandbox cwd instead of resolving those entries against the
long-lived exec-server process cwd.

## What changed

`FileSystemSandboxContext` now carries `permissions: PermissionProfile`
plus an optional `cwd`:

- removed `sandboxPolicy`, `sandboxPolicyCwd`,
`fileSystemSandboxPolicy`, and `additionalPermissions`
- added `permissions` and `cwd`
- kept the platform knobs `windowsSandboxLevel`,
`windowsSandboxPrivateDesktop`, and `useLegacyLandlock`

Core turn and apply-patch paths populate the context from the active
runtime permissions and request cwd. Exec-server derives platform
`SandboxPolicy`/`FileSystemSandboxPolicy` at the filesystem boundary,
adds helper runtime reads there, and rejects cwd-dependent profiles that
arrive without a cwd.

The legacy `FileSystemSandboxContext::new(SandboxPolicy)` constructor
now preserves the old workspace-write conversion semantics for
compatibility tests/callers.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-exec-server`
- `cargo test -p codex-exec-server sandbox_cwd -- --nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-exec-server
sandbox_context_new_preserves_legacy_workspace_write_read_only_subpaths
-- --nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib
file_system_sandbox_context_uses_active_attempt -- --nocapture`
2026-04-21 20:22:28 -07:00
efrazer-oai
564860e8bd refactor: add agent identity crate (#18871)
## Summary

This PR adds `codex-agent-identity` as an isolated crate for Agent
Identity business logic.

The crate owns:
- AgentAssertion construction.
- Agent task registration.
- private-key assertion signing.
- bounded blocking HTTP for task registration.

It does not wire AgentIdentity into `auth.json`, `AuthManager`, rollout
state, or request callsites. That integration happens in later PRs.

Reference old stack: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17387/changes

## Stack

1. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18757: full revert
2. This PR: isolated Agent Identity crate
3. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18785: explicit AgentIdentity
auth mode and startup task allocation
4. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18811: migrate Codex backend
auth callsites through AuthProvider
5. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18904: accept AgentIdentity JWTs
and load `CODEX_AGENT_IDENTITY`

## Testing

Tests: targeted Rust checks, cargo-shear, Bazel lock check, and CI.
2026-04-21 19:57:49 -07:00
Michael Bolin
8fea372c77 Fix remote app-server shutdown race (#18936)
## Why

A Mac Bazel CI run saw `remote_notifications_arrive_over_websocket` fail
during shutdown with `remote app-server shutdown channel is closed`
(https://app.buildbuddy.io/invocation/9dac05d6-ae20-40f9-b627-fca6e91cf127).
The remote websocket worker can legitimately finish while `shutdown()`
is waiting for the shutdown acknowledgement: after the test server sends
a notification and exits, the worker may deliver the required disconnect
event, observe that the caller has dropped the event receiver, and exit
before it sends the shutdown one-shot.

That state is already terminal cleanup, not a failed shutdown, so
callers should not see a `BrokenPipe` from the acknowledgement channel.

## What Changed

- Treat a closed remote shutdown acknowledgement as an already-exited
worker while still propagating websocket close errors when the worker
returns them.
- Added a deterministic regression test for the interleaving where the
shutdown command is received and the worker exits before replying.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-client`
- New test:
`remote::tests::shutdown_tolerates_worker_exit_after_command_is_queued`
2026-04-22 02:41:19 +00:00
xl-openai
a978e411f6 feat: Support remote plugin list/read. (#18452)
Add a temporary internal remote_plugin feature flag that merges remote
marketplaces into plugin/list and routes plugin/read through the remote
APIs when needed, while keeping pure local marketplaces working as
before.

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-04-21 18:39:07 -07:00
Michael Bolin
536952eeee bazel: run wrapped Rust unit test shards (#18913)
## Why

The `codex-tui` Cargo test suite was catching stale snapshot
expectations, but the matching Bazel unit-test target was still green.
The TUI unit target is wrapped by `workspace_root_test` so tests run
from the repository root and Insta can resolve Cargo-like snapshot
paths. After native Bazel sharding was enabled for that wrapped target,
rules_rust also inserted its own sharding wrapper around the Rust test
binary.

Those two wrappers did not compose: rules_rust's sharding wrapper
expects to run from its own runfiles cwd, while `workspace_root_test`
deliberately changes cwd to the repo root before invoking the test. In
that configuration, the inner wrapper could fail to enumerate the Rust
tests and exit successfully with empty shards, so snapshot regressions
were not being exercised by Bazel.

## What Changed

- Stop enabling rules_rust's inner `experimental_enable_sharding` for
unit-test binaries created by `codex_rust_crate`.
- Keep the configured `shard_count` on the outer `workspace_root_test`
target.
- Add libtest sharding directly to `workspace_root_test_launcher.sh.tpl`
and `workspace_root_test_launcher.bat.tpl` after the launcher has
resolved the actual test binary and established the intended
repository-root cwd.
- Partition tests by a stable FNV-1a hash of each libtest test name,
matching the stable-shard behavior we wanted without depending on the
inner rules_rust wrapper.
- Preserve ad-hoc local test filters by running the resolved test binary
directly when explicit test args are supplied.
- On Windows, run selected libtest names from the shard list in bounded
PowerShell batches instead of concatenating every selected test into one
`cmd.exe` command line.

This PR is stacked on top of #18912, which contains only the snapshot
expectation updates exposed once the Bazel target actually runs the TUI
unit tests. It is also the reason #18916 becomes visible: once this
wrapper fix makes Bazel execute the affected `codex-core` test, that
test needs its own executable-path setup fixed.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-tui`
- `bazel test //codex-rs/tui:tui-unit-tests --test_output=errors`
- `bazel test //codex-rs/tui:all --test_output=errors`
- `bash -n workspace_root_test_launcher.sh.tpl`
- Exercised the Windows PowerShell batching fragment locally with a fake
test binary and shard-list file.
2026-04-21 18:35:47 -07:00
Celia Chen
1cd3ad1f49 feat: add AWS SigV4 auth for OpenAI-compatible model providers (#17820)
## Summary

Add first-class Amazon Bedrock Mantle provider support so Codex can keep
using its existing Responses API transport with OpenAI-compatible
AWS-hosted endpoints such as AOA/Mantle.

This is needed for the AWS launch path, where provider traffic should
authenticate with AWS credentials instead of OpenAI bearer credentials.
Requests are authenticated immediately before transport send, so SigV4
signs the final method, URL, headers, and body bytes that `reqwest` will
send.

## What Changed

- Added a new `codex-aws-auth` crate for loading AWS SDK config,
resolving credentials, and signing finalized HTTP requests with AWS
SigV4.
- Added a built-in `amazon-bedrock` provider that targets Bedrock Mantle
Responses endpoints, defaults to `us-east-1`, supports region/profile
overrides, disables WebSockets, and does not require OpenAI auth.
- Added Amazon Bedrock auth resolution in `codex-model-provider`: prefer
`AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK` when set, otherwise use AWS SDK credentials
and SigV4 signing.
- Added `AuthProvider::apply_auth` and `Request::prepare_body_for_send`
so request-signing providers can sign the exact outbound request after
JSON serialization/compression.
- Determine the region by taking the `aws.region` config first (required
for bearer token codepath), and fallback to SDK default region.

## Testing
Amazon Bedrock Mantle Responses paths:

- Built the local Codex binary with `cargo build`.
- Verified the custom proxy-backed `aws` provider using `env_key =
"AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK"` streamed raw `responses` output with
`response.output_text.delta`, `response.completed`, and `mantle-env-ok`.
- Verified a full `codex exec --profile aws` turn returned
`mantle-env-ok`.
- Confirmed the custom provider used the bearer env var, not AWS profile
auth: bogus `AWS_PROFILE` still passed, empty env var failed locally,
and malformed env var reached Mantle and failed with `401
invalid_api_key`.
- Verified built-in `amazon-bedrock` with `AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK` set
passed despite bogus AWS profiles, returning `amazon-bedrock-env-ok`.
- Verified built-in `amazon-bedrock` SDK/SigV4 auth passed with
`AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK` unset and temporary AWS session env
credentials, returning `amazon-bedrock-sdk-env-ok`.
2026-04-22 01:11:17 +00:00
Michael Bolin
e18fe7a07f test(core): move prompt debug coverage to integration suite (#18916)
## Why

`build_prompt_input` now initializes `ExecServerRuntimePaths`, which
requires a configured Codex executable path. The previous inline unit
test in `core/src/prompt_debug.rs` built a bare `test_config()` and then
failed before it could assert anything useful:

```text
Codex executable path is not configured
```

This coverage is also integration-shaped: it drives the public
`build_prompt_input` entry point through config, thread, and session
setup rather than testing a small internal helper in isolation.

Bazel CI did not catch this earlier because the affected test was behind
the same wrapped Rust unit-test path fixed by #18913. Before that
launcher/sharding fix, the outer `workspace_root_test` changed the
working directory for Insta compatibility while the inner `rules_rust`
sharding wrapper still expected its runfiles working directory. In
practice, Bazel could report success without executing the Rust test
cases in that shard. Once #18913 makes the wrapper run the Rust test
binary directly and shard with libtest arguments, this stale unit test
actually runs and exposes the missing `codex_self_exe` setup.

## What Changed

- Moved `build_prompt_input_includes_context_and_user_message` out of
`core/src/prompt_debug.rs`.
- Added `core/tests/suite/prompt_debug_tests.rs` and registered it from
`core/tests/suite/mod.rs`.
- Builds the test config with `ConfigBuilder` and provides
`codex_self_exe` using the current test executable, matching the
runtime-path invariant required by prompt debug setup.
- Preserves the existing assertions that the generated prompt input
includes both the debug user message and project-specific user
instructions.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all
prompt_debug_tests::build_prompt_input_includes_context_and_user_message`
- `bazel test //codex-rs/core:core-all-test
--test_arg=prompt_debug_tests::build_prompt_input_includes_context_and_user_message
--test_output=errors`

---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18916).
* #18913
* __->__ #18916
2026-04-22 01:08:25 +00:00
Felipe Coury
09ebc34f17 fix(core): emit hooks for apply_patch edits (#18391)
Fixes https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/16732.

## Why

`apply_patch` is Codex's primary file edit path, but it was not emitting
`PreToolUse` or `PostToolUse` hook events. That meant hook-based policy,
auditing, and write coordination could observe shell commands while
missing the actual file mutation performed by `apply_patch`.

The issue also exposed that the hook runtime serialized command hook
payloads with `tool_name: "Bash"` unconditionally. Even if `apply_patch`
supplied hook payloads, hooks would either fail to match it directly or
receive misleading stdin that identified the edit as a Bash tool call.

## What Changed

- Added `PreToolUse` and `PostToolUse` payload support to
`ApplyPatchHandler`.
- Exposed the raw patch body as `tool_input.command` for both
JSON/function and freeform `apply_patch` calls.
- Taught tool hook payloads to carry a handler-supplied hook-facing
`tool_name`.
- Preserved existing shell compatibility by continuing to emit `Bash`
for shell-like tools.
- Serialized the selected hook `tool_name` into hook stdin instead of
hardcoding `Bash`.
- Relaxed the generated hook command input schema so `tool_name` can
represent tools other than `Bash`.

## Verification

Added focused handler coverage for:

- JSON/function `apply_patch` calls producing a `PreToolUse` payload.
- Freeform `apply_patch` calls producing a `PreToolUse` payload.
- Successful `apply_patch` output producing a `PostToolUse` payload.
- Shell and `exec_command` handlers continuing to expose `Bash`.

Added end-to-end hook coverage for:

- A `PreToolUse` hook matching `^apply_patch$` blocking the patch before
the target file is created.
- A `PostToolUse` hook matching `^apply_patch$` receiving the patch
input and tool response, then adding context to the follow-up model
request.
- Non-participating tools such as the plan tool continuing not to emit
`PreToolUse`/`PostToolUse` hook events.

Also validated manually with a live `codex exec` smoke test using an
isolated temp workspace and temp `CODEX_HOME`. The smoke test confirmed
that a real `apply_patch` edit emits `PreToolUse`/`PostToolUse` with
`tool_name: "apply_patch"`, a shell command still emits `tool_name:
"Bash"`, and a denying `PreToolUse` hook prevents the blocked patch file
from being created.
2026-04-21 22:00:40 -03:00
starr-openai
1d4cc494c9 Add turn-scoped environment selections (#18416)
## Summary
- add experimental turn/start.environments params for per-turn
environment id + cwd selections
- pass selections through core protocol ops and resolve them with
EnvironmentManager before TurnContext creation
- treat omitted selections as default behavior, empty selections as no
environment, and non-empty selections as first environment/cwd as the
turn primary

## Testing
- ran `just fmt`
- ran `just write-app-server-schema`
- not run: unit tests for this stacked PR

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-04-21 17:48:33 -07:00
Michael Bolin
6368f506b7 fix: windows snapshot for external_agent_config_migration::tests::prompt_snapshot did not match windows output (#18915)
Fix a snapshot test that is failing on Windows, but is currently missed
by Bazel due to https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18913. We see this
failing on Cargo builds on Windows, though.

This Bazel vs. Cargo inconsistency explains why
https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18768 did not fix the Cargo Windows
build.
2026-04-22 00:32:46 +00:00
Michael Bolin
799e50412e sandboxing: materialize cwd-relative permission globs (#18867)
## Why

#18275 anchors session-scoped `:cwd` and `:project_roots` grants to the
request cwd before recording them for reuse. Relative deny glob entries
need the same treatment. Without anchoring, a stored session permission
can keep a pattern such as `**/*.env` relative, then reinterpret that
deny against a later turn cwd. That makes the persisted profile depend
on the cwd at reuse time instead of the cwd that was reviewed and
approved.

## What changed

`intersect_permission_profiles` now materializes retained
`FileSystemPath::GlobPattern` entries against the request cwd, matching
the existing materialization for cwd-sensitive special paths.

Materialized accepted grants are now deduplicated before deny retention
runs. This keeps the sticky-grant preapproval shape stable when a
repeated request is merged with the stored grant and both `:cwd = write`
and the materialized absolute cwd write are present.

The preapproval check compares against the same materialized form, so a
later request for the same cwd-relative deny glob still matches the
stored anchored grant instead of re-prompting or rejecting.

Tests cover both the storage path and the preapproval path: a
session-scoped `:cwd = write` grant with `**/*.env = none` is stored
with both the cwd write and deny glob anchored to the original request
cwd, cannot be reused from a later cwd, and remains preapproved when
re-requested from the original cwd after merging with the stored grant.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing policy_transforms`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib
relative_deny_glob_grants_remain_preapproved_after_materialization`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-sandboxing --tests -- -D
clippy::redundant_clone`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-core --lib -- -D clippy::redundant_clone`

---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18867).
* #18288
* #18287
* #18286
* #18285
* #18284
* #18283
* #18282
* #18281
* #18280
* #18279
* #18278
* #18277
* #18276
* __->__ #18867
2026-04-21 17:28:58 -07:00
canvrno-oai
37701d4654 Update /statusline and /title snapshots (#18909)
Update `/statusline` and `/title` snapshots
2026-04-21 17:16:50 -07:00
alexsong-oai
6bbd710496 [codex] Tighten external migration prompt tests (#18768)
## Summary
- tighten the external migration prompt snapshot around stable synthetic
fixture text
- add focused display_description tests for relative path rewriting and
plugin summaries
- split the path-format assertions into smaller, easier-to-read unit
tests

## Why
The previous prompt snapshot was coupled to path text that came from
detected migration items, which made it noisier and more brittle than
necessary. This change keeps the snapshot focused on stable UI structure
and moves dynamic path formatting checks into targeted unit tests.

## Validation
- cargo test -p codex-tui external_agent_config_migration::tests::
- cargo test -p codex-tui
external_agent_config_migration::tests::display_description_
- just fmt

## Notes
Per the repo instructions, I did not rerun tests after the final `just
fmt` pass.
2026-04-21 16:20:15 -07:00
canvrno-oai
2202675632 Normalize /statusline & /title items (#18886)
This change aligns the `/statusline` and `/title` UIs around the same
normalized item model so both surfaces use consistent ids, labels, and
preview semantics. It keeps the shared preview work from #18435 ,
tightens the remaining mismatches by standardizing item naming, expands
title/status item coverage where appropriate, and makes `/title` preview
use the same title-specific formatting path as the real rendered
terminal title.

- Normalizes persisted item ids and keeps legacy aliases for
compatibility
- Aligns `status-line` and `terminal-title` items with the shared
preview model
- Routes `terminal-title` preview through title-specific formatting and
truncation
- Updates the affected status/title setup snapshots

Added to `/statusline`:
- status
- task-progress
  
Normalized in `/statusline`:
- model-name -> model
- project-root -> project-name

Added to `/title`:
- current-dir
- context-remaining
- context-used
- five-hour-limit
- weekly-limit
- codex-version
- used-tokens
- total-input-tokens
- total-output-tokens
- session-id
- fast-mode
- model-with-reasoning

Normalized in `/title`:
- project -> project-name
- thread -> thread-title
- model-name -> model
2026-04-21 16:13:09 -07:00
maja-openai
ef00014a46 Allow guardian bare allow output (#18797)
## Summary

Allow guardian to skip other fields and output only
`{"outcome":"allow"}` when the command is low risk.
This change lets guardian reviews use a non-strict text format while
keeping the JSON schema itself as plain user-visible schema data, so
transport strictness is carried out-of-band instead of through a schema
marker key.

## What changed

- Add an explicit `output_schema_strict` flag to model prompts and pass
it into `codex-api` text formatting.
- Set guardian reviewer prompts to non-strict schema validation while
preserving strict-by-default behavior for normal callers.
- Update the guardian output contract so definitely-low-risk decisions
may return only `{"outcome":"allow"}`.
- Treat bare allow responses as low-risk approvals in the guardian
parser.
- Add tests and snapshots covering the non-strict guardian request and
optional guardian output fields.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-core guardian::tests::guardian`
- `cargo test -p codex-core guardian::tests::`
- `cargo test -p codex-core client_common::tests::`
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol
user_input_serialization_includes_final_output_json_schema`
- `cargo test -p codex-api`
- `git diff --check`

Note: `cargo test -p codex-core` was also attempted, but this desktop
environment injects ambient config/proxy state that causes unrelated
config/session tests expecting pristine defaults to fail.

---------

Co-authored-by: Dylan Hurd <dylan.hurd@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-04-21 15:37:12 -07:00
starr-openai
ddbe2536be Support multiple managed environments (#18401)
## Summary
- refactor EnvironmentManager to own keyed environments with
default/local lookup helpers
- keep remote exec-server client creation lazy until exec/fs use
- preserve disabled agent environment access separately from internal
local environment access

## Validation
- not run (per Codex worktree instruction to avoid tests/builds unless
requested)

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-04-21 15:29:35 -07:00
cassirer-openai
27d9673273 [rollout_trace] Add rollout trace crate (#18876)
## Summary

Adds the standalone `codex-rollout-trace` crate, which defines the raw
trace event format, replay/reduction model, writer, and reducer logic
for reconstructing model-visible conversation/runtime state from
recorded rollout data.

The crate-level design is documented in
[`codex-rs/rollout-trace/README.md`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/codex/rollout-trace-crate/codex-rs/rollout-trace/README.md).

## Stack

This is PR 1/5 in the rollout trace stack.

- [#18876](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18876): Add rollout
trace crate
- [#18877](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18877): Record core
session rollout traces
- [#18878](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18878): Trace tool and
code-mode boundaries
- [#18879](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18879): Trace sessions
and multi-agent edges
- [#18880](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18880): Add debug trace
reduction command

## Review Notes

This PR intentionally does not wire tracing into live Codex execution.
It establishes the data model and reducer contract first, with
crate-local tests covering conversation reconstruction, compaction
boundaries, tool/session edges, and code-cell lifecycle reduction. Later
PRs emit into this model.

The README is the best entry point for reviewing the intended trace
format and reduction semantics before diving into the reducer modules.
2026-04-21 21:54:05 +00:00
Shijie Rao
c5e9c6f71f Preserve Cloudfare HTTP cookies in codex (#17783)
## Summary
- Adds a process-local, in-memory cookie store for ChatGPT HTTP clients.
- Limits cookie storage and replay to a shared ChatGPT host allowlist.
- Wires the shared store into the default Codex reqwest client and
backend client.
- Shares the ChatGPT host allowlist with remote-control URL validation
to avoid drift.
- Enables reqwest cookie support and updates lockfiles.
2026-04-21 14:40:15 -07:00
efrazer-oai
be75785504 fix: fully revert agent identity runtime wiring (#18757)
## Summary

This PR fully reverts the previously merged Agent Identity runtime
integration from the old stack:
https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17387/changes

It removes the Codex-side task lifecycle wiring, rollout/session
persistence, feature flag plumbing, lazy `auth.json` mutation,
background task auth paths, and request callsite changes introduced by
that stack.

This leaves the repo in a clean pre-AgentIdentity integration state so
the follow-up PRs can reintroduce the pieces in smaller reviewable
layers.

## Stack

1. This PR: full revert
2. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18871: move Agent Identity
business logic into a crate
3. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18785: add explicit
AgentIdentity auth mode and startup task allocation
4. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18811: migrate auth callsites
through AuthProvider

## Testing

Tests: targeted Rust checks, cargo-shear, Bazel lock check, and CI.
2026-04-21 14:30:55 -07:00
Ruslan Nigmatullin
69c3d12274 app-server: implement device key v2 methods (#18430)
## Why

The device-key protocol needs an app-server implementation that keeps
local key operations behind the same request-processing boundary as
other v2 APIs.

app-server owns request dispatch, transport policy, documentation, and
JSON-RPC error shaping. `codex-device-key` owns key binding, validation,
platform provider selection, and signing mechanics. Keeping the adapter
thin makes the boundary easier to review and avoids moving local
key-management details into thread orchestration code.

## What changed

- Added `DeviceKeyApi` as the app-server adapter around
`DeviceKeyStore`.
- Converted protocol protection policies, payload variants, algorithms,
and protection classes to and from the device-key crate types.
- Encoded SPKI public keys and DER signatures as base64 protocol fields.
- Routed `device/key/create`, `device/key/public`, and `device/key/sign`
through `MessageProcessor`.
- Rejected remote transports before provider access while allowing local
`stdio` and in-process callers to reach the device-key API.
- Added stdio, in-process, and websocket tests for device-key validation
and transport policy.
- Documented the device-key methods in the app-server v2 method list.

## Test coverage

- `device_key_create_rejects_empty_account_user_id`
- `in_process_allows_device_key_requests_to_reach_device_key_api`
- `device_key_methods_are_rejected_over_websocket`

## Stack

This is PR 3 of 4 in the device-key app-server stack. It is stacked on
#18429.

## Validation

- `cargo test -p codex-app-server device_key`
- `just fix -p codex-app-server`
2026-04-21 14:07:08 -07:00
Felipe Coury
e502f0b52d feat(tui): shortcuts to change reasoning level temporarily (#18866)
## Summary

Adds main-chat shortcuts for changing reasoning effort one step at a
time:

- `Alt+,` lowers reasoning (has the `<` arrow on the key)
- `Alt+.` raises reasoning (similarly, has the `>` arrow)

The shortcut updates the active session only. It does not persist the
selected reasoning level as the default for future sessions. In Plan
mode, it applies temporarily to Plan mode without opening the
global-vs-Plan scope prompt.

## Details

The shortcut uses the active model preset to decide which reasoning
levels are valid. If the current session has no explicit reasoning
effort, it starts from the model default. Each keypress moves to the
next supported level in the requested direction.

The shortcut only runs from the main chat surface. If a popup or modal
is open, input remains owned by that UI.

In Plan mode, the shortcut updates the in-memory Plan reasoning override
directly. The model/reasoning picker still keeps the existing scope
prompt for explicit picker changes.

## Notes

Ctrl-plus and Ctrl-minus were considered, but terminals do not deliver
those combinations consistently, so this PR uses Alt shortcuts instead.

If the current effort is unsupported by the selected model, the shortcut
skips to the nearest supported level in the requested direction. If
there is no valid step, it shows the existing boundary message.

## Tests

- `cargo test -p codex-tui reasoning_shortcuts`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui reasoning_effort`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui reasoning_shortcut`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui footer_snapshots`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui`
- `just fix -p codex-tui`
- `./tools/argument-comment-lint/run.py -p codex-tui -- --tests`

---------

Co-authored-by: Eric Traut <etraut@openai.com>
2026-04-21 18:04:03 -03:00
pakrym-oai
ffa6944587 Load app-server config through ConfigManager (#18870)
## Summary
- Load app-server startup config through `ConfigManager` instead of
direct `ConfigBuilder` calls.
- Move `ConfigManager` constructor-owned state (`cli_overrides`, runtime
feature map, cloud requirements loader) behind internal manager fields.
- Pass `ConfigManager` into `MessageProcessor` directly instead of
reconstructing it from raw args.

## Tests
- `cargo check -p codex-app-server`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server`
- `just fix -p codex-app-server`
- `just fmt`
2026-04-21 14:01:02 -07:00
jif-oai
15b8cde2a4 chore: default multi-agent v2 fork to all (#18873)
Default sub-agents v2 to `all` for the fork mode
2026-04-21 21:54:58 +01:00
iceweasel-oai
6f6997758a skip busted tests while I fix them (#18885) 2026-04-21 13:40:34 -07:00
Ruslan Nigmatullin
56375712e3 app-server: fix Bazel clippy in tracing tests (#18872)
## Why

PR #18431 exposed a Bazel clippy failure in the app-server unit-test
target across Linux, macOS, and Windows. The failing lint was
`clippy::await_holding_invalid_type`: two tracing tests serialized
access to global tracing state by holding a `tokio::sync::MutexGuard`
across awaited test work.

That serialization is still needed because the tests share
process-global tracing setup and exporter state, but it should not
require holding an async mutex guard through the whole test body.

## What changed

- Replaced the bespoke async `tracing_test_guard` helper with
`serial_test` on the two tracing tests that need global tracing
serialization.
- Removed the `#[expect(clippy::await_holding_invalid_type)]`
annotations and the lock guard callsites that Bazel clippy rejected.

## Validation

- `cargo test -p codex-app-server jsonrpc_span`
- `just fix -p codex-app-server`
- `git diff --check`

I also attempted the exact failing Bazel clippy target locally with
BuildBuddy disabled: `bazel --noexperimental_remote_repo_contents_cache
build --config=clippy --bes_backend= --remote_cache=
--experimental_remote_downloader= --
//codex-rs/app-server:app-server-unit-tests-bin`. That run did not reach
clippy because Bazel timed out downloading `libcap-2.27.tar.gz` from
`kernel.org`.
2026-04-21 13:10:36 -07:00
Ruslan Nigmatullin
5bab04dcd7 app-server: add codex-device-key crate (#18429)
## Why

Device-key storage and signing are local security-sensitive operations
with platform-specific behavior. Keeping the core API in
`codex-device-key` keeps app-server focused on routing and business
logic instead of owning key-management details.

The crate keeps the signing surface intentionally narrow: callers can
create a bound key, fetch its public key, or sign one of the structured
payloads accepted by the crate. It does not expose a generic
arbitrary-byte signing API.

Key IDs cross into platform-specific labels, tags, and metadata paths,
so externally supplied IDs are constrained to the same auditable
namespace created by the crate: `dk_` followed by unpadded base64url for
32 bytes. Remote-control target paths are also tied to each signed
payload shape so connection proofs cannot be reused for enrollment
endpoints, or vice versa.

## What changed

- Added the `codex-device-key` workspace crate.
- Added account/client-bound key creation with stable `dk_` key IDs.
- Added strict `key_id` validation before public-key lookup or signing
reaches a provider.
- Added public-key lookup and structured signing APIs.
- Split remote-control client endpoint allowlists by connection vs
enrollment payload shape.
- Added validation for key bindings, accepted payload fields, token
expiration, and payload/key binding mismatches.
- Added flow-oriented docs on the validation helpers that gate provider
signing.
- Added protection policy and protection-class types without wiring a
platform provider yet.
- Added an unsupported default provider so platforms without an
implementation fail explicitly instead of silently falling back to
software-backed keys.
- Updated Cargo and Bazel lock metadata for the new crate and
non-platform-specific dependencies.

## Stack

This is stacked on #18428.

## Validation

- `cargo test -p codex-device-key`
- Added unit coverage for strict `key_id` validation before provider
use.
- Added unit coverage that rejects remote-control paths from the wrong
signed payload shape.
- `just bazel-lock-update`
- `just bazel-lock-check`
2026-04-21 17:57:00 +00:00
iceweasel-oai
8612714aa6 Add Windows sandbox unified exec runtime support (#15578)
## Summary

This is the runtime/foundation half of the Windows sandbox unified-exec
work.

- add Windows sandbox `unified_exec` session support in
`windows-sandbox-rs` for both:
  - the legacy restricted-token backend
  - the elevated runner backend
- extend the PTY/process runtime so driver-backed sessions can support:
  - stdin streaming
  - stdout/stderr separation
  - exit propagation
  - PTY resize hooks
- add Windows sandbox runtime coverage in `codex-windows-sandbox` /
`codex-utils-pty`

This PR does **not** enable Windows sandbox `UnifiedExec` for product
callers yet because hooking this up to app-server comes in the next PR.

Windows sandbox advertising is intentionally kept aligned with `main`,
so sandboxed Windows callers still fall back to `ShellCommand`.

This PR isolates the runtime/session layer so it can be reviewed
independently from product-surface enablement.

---------

Co-authored-by: jif-oai <jif@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-04-21 10:44:49 -07:00
Steve Coffey
38ba876ea9 Refresh generated Python app-server SDK types (#18862)
This is the first step in splitting the Python SDK PyPI publish work
into reviewable layers: land the generated SDK refresh by itself before
changing packaging mechanics. The next PRs will make the runtime wheel
publishable, then wire the SDK package/version pinning to that runtime.

## Summary
- Refresh generated Python app-server v2 models and notification
registry from the current schema.
- Update the public API signature expectations for the newly generated
kwargs.

## Stack
- PR 1 of 3 for the Python SDK PyPI publishing split.
- Follow-up PRs will handle runtime wheel publishing mechanics, then
SDK/package version pinning.

## Tests
- `uv run --extra dev pytest` in `sdk/python` -> 51 passed, 37 skipped.
2026-04-21 10:23:27 -07:00
Michael Bolin
f8562bd47b sandboxing: intersect permission profiles semantically (#18275)
## Why

Permission approval responses must not be able to grant more access than
the tool requested. Moving this flow to `PermissionProfile` means the
comparison must be profile-shaped instead of `SandboxPolicy`-shaped, and
cwd-relative special paths such as `:cwd` and `:project_roots` must stay
anchored to the turn that produced the request.

## What changed

This implements semantic `PermissionProfile` intersection in
`codex-sandboxing` for file-system and network permissions. The
intersection accepts narrower path grants, rejects broader grants,
preserves deny-read carve-outs and glob scan depth, and materializes
cwd-dependent special-path grants to absolute paths before they can be
recorded for reuse.

The request-permissions response paths now use that intersection
consistently. App-server captures the request turn cwd before waiting
for the client response, includes that cwd in the v2 approval params,
and core stores the requested profile plus cwd for direct TUI/client
responses and Guardian decisions before recording turn- or
session-scoped grants. The TUI app-server bridge now preserves the
app-server request cwd when converting permission approval params into
core events.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing intersect_permission_profiles --
--nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server request_permissions_response --
--nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
request_permissions_response_materializes_session_cwd_grants_before_recording
-- --nocapture`
- `cargo check -p codex-tui --tests`
- `cargo check --tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui
app_server_request_permissions_preserves_file_system_permissions`
2026-04-21 10:23:01 -07:00
pakrym-oai
2a226096f6 Split DeveloperInstructions into individual fragments. (#18813)
Split DeveloperInstructions into individual fragments.
2026-04-21 10:22:36 -07:00
pakrym-oai
5fe767e8e1 Refactor app-server config loading into ConfigManager (#18442)
Localize app-server configuration loading in one place.
2026-04-21 10:22:26 -07:00
Eric Traut
4ed722ab8d Move TUI app tests to modules they cover (#18799)
## Summary

The TUI app refactor in #18753 moved the old `app.rs` tests into a
single `app/tests.rs` file. That kept the split mechanically simple, but
it left several focused unit tests far from the modules they exercise.

This PR is a follow-up that moves tests next to the code they cover.

It also adds `tui/src/app/test_support.rs` for shared fixture
construction.

This is just a mechanical refactoring (no functional changes) and does
not affect any production code.
2026-04-21 10:16:51 -07:00
jif-oai
10e1659d4f Stabilize debug clear memories integration test (#18858)
## Why

`debug_clear_memories_resets_state_and_removes_memory_dir` can be flaky
because the test drops its `sqlx::SqlitePool` immediately before
invoking `codex debug clear-memories`. Dropping the pool does not wait
for all SQLite connections to close, so the CLI can race with still-open
test connections.

## What changed

- Await `pool.close()` before spawning `codex debug clear-memories`.
- Close the reopened verification pool before the temp `CODEX_HOME` is
torn down.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-cli --test debug_clear_memories
debug_clear_memories_resets_state_and_removes_memory_dir`
2026-04-21 18:15:37 +01:00
Eric Traut
b7fec54354 Queue follow-up input during user shell commands (#18820)
Fixes #17954.

## Why
When a manual shell command like `!sleep 10` is running, submitting
plain text such as `hi` currently sends that text as a steer for the
active shell turn. User shell turns are not steerable like model turns,
so the TUI can remain stuck in `Working` after the shell command
finishes.

## What Changed
- Detect when the only active work is one or more
`ExecCommandSource::UserShell` commands.
- Queue plain submitted input in that state so it drains after the shell
command and shell turn complete.
- Preserve `!cmd` submissions during running work so explicit shell
commands keep their existing behavior.
- Add regression coverage for the `!sleep 10` plus `hi` flow in
`chatwidget::tests::exec_flow::user_message_during_user_shell_command_is_queued_not_steered`.

## Verification
- Manually confirmed hang before the fix and no hang after the fix
2026-04-21 10:13:13 -07:00
Casey Chow
41652665f5 [codex] Add tmux-aware OSC 9 notifications (#17836)
## Summary
- wrap OSC 9 notifications in tmux's DCS passthrough so terminal
notifications make it through tmux
- use codex-terminal-detection for OSC 9 auto-selection so tmux sessions
inherit the underlying client terminal support
- add focused notification backend tests for plain OSC 9 and
tmux-wrapped output

## Stack
- base PR: #18479
- review order: #18479, then this PR

## Why
Tmux does not forward OSC 9 notifications directly; the sequence has to
be wrapped in tmux's DCS passthrough envelope. Codex also had local
notification heuristics that could miss supported terminals when running
under tmux, even though codex-terminal-detection already knows how to
attribute tmux sessions to the client terminal.

## Validation
- `just fmt`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui` *(currently blocked by an unrelated existing
compile error in `app-server/src/message_processor.rs:754` referencing
`connection_id` out of scope; not caused by this change)*

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-04-21 17:10:36 +00:00
Rennie
3a9df58d06 Propagate thread id in MCP tool metadata (#18093)
## Summary
- attach the authoritative Codex thread id to MCP tool request
`_meta.threadId` for model-initiated tool calls
- attach the same thread id for manual `mcpServer/tool/call` requests
before invoking the MCP server
- cover both metadata helper behavior and the manual app-server MCP path
in tests


needed because the Rust app-server is the last place that still has
authoritative knowledge of “this model-generated MCP tool call belongs
to conversation/thread X” before the request leaves Codex and reaches
Hoopa. It adds threadId to MCP request metadata in the model-generated
tool-call path, using sess.conversation_id, and also does the same for
the manual mcpServer/tool/call path.

## Test plan
- `cargo test -p codex-core
mcp_tool_call_thread_id_meta_is_added_to_request_meta --lib`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server
mcp_server_tool_call_returns_tool_result`

Paired Hoopa consumer PR: https://github.com/openai/openai/pull/833263
2026-04-21 10:09:46 -07:00
Ruslan Nigmatullin
48f82ca7c5 app-server: define device key v2 protocol (#18428)
## Why

Clients need a stable app-server protocol surface for enrolling a local
device key, retrieving its public key, and producing a device-bound
proof.

The protocol reports `protectionClass` explicitly so clients can
distinguish hardware-backed keys from an explicitly allowed OS-protected
fallback. Signing uses a tagged `DeviceKeySignPayload` enum rather than
arbitrary bytes so each signed statement is auditable at the API
boundary.

## What changed

- Added v2 JSON-RPC methods for `device/key/create`,
`device/key/public`, and `device/key/sign`.
- Added request/response types for device-key metadata, SPKI public
keys, protection classes, and ECDSA signatures.
- Added `DeviceKeyProtectionPolicy` with hardware-only default behavior
and an explicit `allow_os_protected_nonextractable` option.
- Added the initial `remoteControlClientConnection` signing payload
variant.
- Regenerated JSON Schema and TypeScript fixtures for app-server
clients.

## Stack

This is PR 1 of 4 in the device-key app-server stack.

## Validation

- `just write-app-server-schema`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
2026-04-21 10:08:42 -07:00
Michael Bolin
b06fc8bd0d core: make test-log a dev dependency (#18846)
The `test-log` crate is only used by `codex-core` tests, so it does not
need
to be part of the normal `codex-core` dependency graph. Keeping
`test-log` in
`dev-dependencies` removes it from normal `codex-core` builds and keeps
the
production dependency set a little smaller.

Verification:

- `cargo tree -p codex-core --edges normal --invert test-log`
- `cargo check -p codex-core --lib`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib`
2026-04-21 09:48:31 -07:00
jif-oai
bf2a34b4b2 feat: baseline lib (#18848)
This add with 2 entry point:
* `reset_git_repository` that takes a directory and set it as a new git
root
* `diff_since_latest_init` this returns the diff for a given directory
since the last `reset_git_repository`
2026-04-21 17:24:30 +01:00
716 changed files with 56640 additions and 13972 deletions

View File

@@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ common:windows --test_env=PATH
common:windows --test_env=SYSTEMROOT
common:windows --test_env=COMSPEC
common:windows --test_env=WINDIR
# Rust's libtest harness runs test bodies on std-spawned threads. The default
# 2 MiB stack can be too small for large async test futures on Windows CI; see
# https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/19067 for the motivating failure.
common --test_env=RUST_MIN_STACK=8388608 # 8 MiB
common --test_output=errors
common --bes_results_url=https://app.buildbuddy.io/invocation/

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
iTerm
iTerm2
psuedo
SOM
te
TE

View File

@@ -10,3 +10,4 @@ Codex maintains a context (history of messages) that is sent to the model in inf
3. No unbounded items - everything injected in the model context must have a bounded size and a hard cap.
4. No items larger than 10K tokens.
5. Highlight new individual items that can cross >1k tokens as P0. These need an additional manual review.
6. All injected fragments must be defined as structs in `core/context` and implement ContextualUserFragment trait

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
name: Run argument comment lint
description: Run argument-comment-lint on codex-rs via Bazel.
inputs:
target:
description: Runner target passed to setup-bazel-ci.
required: true
buildbuddy-api-key:
description: BuildBuddy API key used by Bazel CI.
required: false
default: ""
runs:
using: composite
steps:
- uses: ./.github/actions/setup-bazel-ci
with:
target: ${{ inputs.target }}
install-test-prereqs: true
- name: Install Linux sandbox build dependencies
if: ${{ runner.os == 'Linux' }}
shell: bash
run: |
sudo DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get update
sudo DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends pkg-config libcap-dev
- name: Run argument comment lint on codex-rs via Bazel
if: ${{ runner.os != 'Windows' }}
env:
BUILDBUDDY_API_KEY: ${{ inputs.buildbuddy-api-key }}
shell: bash
run: |
bazel_targets="$(./tools/argument-comment-lint/list-bazel-targets.sh)"
./.github/scripts/run-bazel-ci.sh \
-- \
build \
--config=argument-comment-lint \
--keep_going \
--build_metadata=COMMIT_SHA=${GITHUB_SHA} \
-- \
${bazel_targets}
- name: Run argument comment lint on codex-rs via Bazel
if: ${{ runner.os == 'Windows' }}
env:
BUILDBUDDY_API_KEY: ${{ inputs.buildbuddy-api-key }}
shell: bash
run: |
./.github/scripts/run-argument-comment-lint-bazel.sh \
--config=argument-comment-lint \
--platforms=//:local_windows \
--keep_going \
--build_metadata=COMMIT_SHA=${GITHUB_SHA}

View File

@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ jobs:
- name: Test argument comment lint package
working-directory: tools/argument-comment-lint
run: cargo test
env:
RUST_MIN_STACK: "8388608" # 8 MiB
argument_comment_lint_prebuilt:
name: Argument comment lint - ${{ matrix.name }}
@@ -671,6 +673,7 @@ jobs:
run: cargo nextest run --no-fail-fast --target ${{ matrix.target }} --cargo-profile ci-test --timings
env:
RUST_BACKTRACE: 1
RUST_MIN_STACK: "8388608" # 8 MiB
NEXTEST_STATUS_LEVEL: leak
- name: Upload Cargo timings (nextest)

View File

@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ jobs:
for f in "${files[@]}"; do
[[ $f == codex-rs/* ]] && codex=true
[[ $f == codex-rs/* || $f == tools/argument-comment-lint/* || $f == justfile ]] && argument_comment_lint=true
[[ $f == defs.bzl || $f == workspace_root_test_launcher.sh.tpl || $f == workspace_root_test_launcher.bat.tpl ]] && argument_comment_lint=true
[[ $f == tools/argument-comment-lint/* || $f == .github/workflows/rust-ci.yml || $f == .github/workflows/rust-ci-full.yml ]] && argument_comment_lint_package=true
[[ $f == .github/* ]] && workflows=true
done
@@ -130,13 +131,14 @@ jobs:
- name: Test argument comment lint package
working-directory: tools/argument-comment-lint
run: cargo test
env:
RUST_MIN_STACK: "8388608" # 8 MiB
argument_comment_lint_prebuilt:
name: Argument comment lint - ${{ matrix.name }}
runs-on: ${{ matrix.runs_on || matrix.runner }}
timeout-minutes: ${{ matrix.timeout_minutes }}
needs: changed
if: ${{ needs.changed.outputs.argument_comment_lint == 'true' || needs.changed.outputs.workflows == 'true' }}
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
@@ -154,43 +156,28 @@ jobs:
group: codex-runners
labels: codex-windows-x64
steps:
- name: Check whether argument comment lint should run
id: argument_comment_lint_gate
shell: bash
env:
ARGUMENT_COMMENT_LINT: ${{ needs.changed.outputs.argument_comment_lint }}
WORKFLOWS: ${{ needs.changed.outputs.workflows }}
run: |
if [[ "$ARGUMENT_COMMENT_LINT" == "true" || "$WORKFLOWS" == "true" ]]; then
echo "run=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
echo "No argument-comment-lint relevant changes."
echo "run=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6
- uses: ./.github/actions/setup-bazel-ci
if: ${{ steps.argument_comment_lint_gate.outputs.run == 'true' }}
- name: Run argument comment lint on codex-rs via Bazel
if: ${{ steps.argument_comment_lint_gate.outputs.run == 'true' }}
uses: ./.github/actions/run-argument-comment-lint
with:
target: ${{ runner.os }}
install-test-prereqs: true
- name: Install Linux sandbox build dependencies
if: ${{ runner.os == 'Linux' }}
shell: bash
run: |
sudo DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get update
sudo DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends pkg-config libcap-dev
- name: Run argument comment lint on codex-rs via Bazel
if: ${{ runner.os != 'Windows' }}
env:
BUILDBUDDY_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.BUILDBUDDY_API_KEY }}
shell: bash
run: |
bazel_targets="$(./tools/argument-comment-lint/list-bazel-targets.sh)"
./.github/scripts/run-bazel-ci.sh \
-- \
build \
--config=argument-comment-lint \
--keep_going \
--build_metadata=COMMIT_SHA=${GITHUB_SHA} \
-- \
${bazel_targets}
- name: Run argument comment lint on codex-rs via Bazel
if: ${{ runner.os == 'Windows' }}
env:
BUILDBUDDY_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.BUILDBUDDY_API_KEY }}
shell: bash
run: |
./.github/scripts/run-argument-comment-lint-bazel.sh \
--config=argument-comment-lint \
--platforms=//:local_windows \
--keep_going \
--build_metadata=COMMIT_SHA=${GITHUB_SHA}
buildbuddy-api-key: ${{ secrets.BUILDBUDDY_API_KEY }}
# --- Gatherer job that you mark as the ONLY required status -----------------
results:

118
MODULE.bazel.lock generated

File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long

View File

@@ -6,5 +6,4 @@ ignore = [
"RUSTSEC-2024-0436", # paste 1.0.15 via starlark/ratatui; upstream crate is unmaintained
"RUSTSEC-2024-0320", # yaml-rust via syntect; remove when syntect drops or updates it
"RUSTSEC-2025-0141", # bincode via syntect; remove when syntect drops or updates it
"RUSTSEC-2026-0097", # rand 0.8.5 via age/codex-secrets and zbus/keyring; remove when transitive deps move to rand >=0.9.3
]

View File

@@ -8,6 +8,11 @@ max-threads = 1
[test-groups.app_server_integration]
max-threads = 1
[test-groups.core_apply_patch_cli_integration]
max-threads = 1
[test-groups.windows_sandbox_legacy_sessions]
max-threads = 1
[[profile.default.overrides]]
# Do not add new tests here
@@ -27,3 +32,15 @@ test-group = 'app_server_protocol_codegen'
# Keep the library unit tests parallel.
filter = 'package(codex-app-server) & kind(test)'
test-group = 'app_server_integration'
[[profile.default.overrides]]
# These tests exercise full Codex turns and apply_patch execution, and they are
# sensitive to Windows runner process-startup stalls when many cases launch at once.
filter = 'package(codex-core) & kind(test) & test(apply_patch_cli)'
test-group = 'core_apply_patch_cli_integration'
[[profile.default.overrides]]
# These tests create restricted-token Windows child processes and private desktops.
# Serialize them to avoid exhausting Windows session/global desktop resources in CI.
filter = 'package(codex-windows-sandbox) & test(legacy_)'
test-group = 'windows_sandbox_legacy_sessions'

1754
codex-rs/Cargo.lock generated

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
[workspace]
members = [
"aws-auth",
"analytics",
"agent-identity",
"backend-client",
"ansi-escape",
"async-utils",
@@ -24,6 +26,7 @@ members = [
"collaboration-mode-templates",
"connectors",
"config",
"device-key",
"shell-command",
"shell-escalation",
"skills",
@@ -51,6 +54,7 @@ members = [
"protocol",
"realtime-webrtc",
"rollout",
"rollout-trace",
"rmcp-client",
"responses-api-proxy",
"response-debug-context",
@@ -97,7 +101,7 @@ members = [
resolver = "2"
[workspace.package]
version = "0.0.0"
version = "0.124.0"
# Track the edition for all workspace crates in one place. Individual
# crates can still override this value, but keeping it here means new
# crates created with `cargo new -w ...` automatically inherit the 2024
@@ -109,8 +113,10 @@ license = "Apache-2.0"
# Internal
app_test_support = { path = "app-server/tests/common" }
codex-analytics = { path = "analytics" }
codex-agent-identity = { path = "agent-identity" }
codex-ansi-escape = { path = "ansi-escape" }
codex-api = { path = "codex-api" }
codex-aws-auth = { path = "aws-auth" }
codex-app-server = { path = "app-server" }
codex-app-server-client = { path = "app-server-client" }
codex-app-server-protocol = { path = "app-server-protocol" }
@@ -132,6 +138,7 @@ codex-connectors = { path = "connectors" }
codex-core = { path = "core" }
codex-core-plugins = { path = "core-plugins" }
codex-core-skills = { path = "core-skills" }
codex-device-key = { path = "device-key" }
codex-exec = { path = "exec" }
codex-exec-server = { path = "exec-server" }
codex-execpolicy = { path = "execpolicy" }
@@ -162,6 +169,7 @@ codex-responses-api-proxy = { path = "responses-api-proxy" }
codex-response-debug-context = { path = "response-debug-context" }
codex-rmcp-client = { path = "rmcp-client" }
codex-rollout = { path = "rollout" }
codex-rollout-trace = { path = "rollout-trace" }
codex-sandboxing = { path = "sandboxing" }
codex-secrets = { path = "secrets" }
codex-shell-command = { path = "shell-command" }
@@ -215,6 +223,10 @@ async-channel = "2.3.1"
async-io = "2.6.0"
async-stream = "0.3.6"
async-trait = "0.1.89"
aws-config = "1"
aws-credential-types = "1"
aws-sigv4 = "1"
aws-types = "1"
axum = { version = "0.8", default-features = false }
base64 = "0.22.1"
bm25 = "2.3.2"
@@ -226,8 +238,8 @@ clap_complete = "4"
color-eyre = "0.6.3"
constant_time_eq = "0.3.1"
crossbeam-channel = "0.5.15"
crossterm = "0.28.1"
crypto_box = { version = "0.9.1", features = ["seal"] }
crossterm = "0.28.1"
csv = "1.3.1"
ctor = "0.6.3"
deno_core_icudata = "0.77.0"
@@ -244,6 +256,7 @@ env_logger = "0.11.9"
eventsource-stream = "0.2.3"
futures = { version = "0.3", default-features = false }
gethostname = "1.1.0"
gix = { version = "0.81.0", default-features = false, features = ["sha1"] }
glob = "0.3"
globset = "0.4"
hmac = "0.12.1"
@@ -282,6 +295,7 @@ os_info = "3.12.0"
owo-colors = "4.3.0"
path-absolutize = "3.1.1"
pathdiff = "0.2"
p256 = "0.13.2"
portable-pty = "0.9.0"
predicates = "3"
pretty_assertions = "1.4.1"
@@ -292,7 +306,7 @@ ratatui = "0.29.0"
ratatui-macros = "0.6.0"
regex = "1.12.3"
regex-lite = "0.1.8"
reqwest = "0.12"
reqwest = { version = "0.12", features = ["cookies"] }
rmcp = { version = "0.15.0", default-features = false }
runfiles = { git = "https://github.com/dzbarsky/rules_rust", rev = "b56cbaa8465e74127f1ea216f813cd377295ad81" }
rustls = { version = "0.23", default-features = false, features = [

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
load("//:defs.bzl", "codex_rust_crate")
codex_rust_crate(
name = "agent-identity",
crate_name = "codex_agent_identity",
)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
[package]
edition.workspace = true
license.workspace = true
name = "codex-agent-identity"
version.workspace = true
[lib]
doctest = false
name = "codex_agent_identity"
path = "src/lib.rs"
[lints]
workspace = true
[dependencies]
anyhow = { workspace = true }
base64 = { workspace = true }
chrono = { workspace = true }
codex-protocol = { workspace = true }
crypto_box = { workspace = true }
ed25519-dalek = { workspace = true }
rand = { workspace = true }
reqwest = { workspace = true, features = ["json"] }
serde = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] }
serde_json = { workspace = true }
sha2 = { workspace = true }
[dev-dependencies]
pretty_assertions = { workspace = true }

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,414 @@
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
use std::time::Duration;
use anyhow::Context;
use anyhow::Result;
use base64::Engine as _;
use base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as BASE64_STANDARD;
use base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD;
use chrono::SecondsFormat;
use chrono::Utc;
use codex_protocol::protocol::SessionSource;
use crypto_box::SecretKey as Curve25519SecretKey;
use ed25519_dalek::Signer as _;
use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
use ed25519_dalek::pkcs8::DecodePrivateKey;
use ed25519_dalek::pkcs8::EncodePrivateKey;
use rand::TryRngCore;
use rand::rngs::OsRng;
use serde::Deserialize;
use serde::Serialize;
use sha2::Digest as _;
use sha2::Sha512;
const AGENT_TASK_REGISTRATION_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
/// Stored key material for a registered agent identity.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct AgentIdentityKey<'a> {
pub agent_runtime_id: &'a str,
pub private_key_pkcs8_base64: &'a str,
}
/// Task binding to use when constructing a task-scoped AgentAssertion.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct AgentTaskAuthorizationTarget<'a> {
pub agent_runtime_id: &'a str,
pub task_id: &'a str,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct AgentBillOfMaterials {
pub agent_version: String,
pub agent_harness_id: String,
pub running_location: String,
}
pub struct GeneratedAgentKeyMaterial {
pub private_key_pkcs8_base64: String,
pub public_key_ssh: String,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct AgentAssertionEnvelope {
agent_runtime_id: String,
task_id: String,
timestamp: String,
signature: String,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
struct RegisterTaskRequest {
timestamp: String,
signature: String,
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct RegisterTaskResponse {
#[serde(default)]
task_id: Option<String>,
#[serde(default, rename = "taskId")]
task_id_camel: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)]
encrypted_task_id: Option<String>,
#[serde(default, rename = "encryptedTaskId")]
encrypted_task_id_camel: Option<String>,
}
pub fn authorization_header_for_agent_task(
key: AgentIdentityKey<'_>,
target: AgentTaskAuthorizationTarget<'_>,
) -> Result<String> {
anyhow::ensure!(
key.agent_runtime_id == target.agent_runtime_id,
"agent task runtime {} does not match stored agent identity {}",
target.agent_runtime_id,
key.agent_runtime_id
);
let timestamp = Utc::now().to_rfc3339_opts(SecondsFormat::Secs, true);
let envelope = AgentAssertionEnvelope {
agent_runtime_id: target.agent_runtime_id.to_string(),
task_id: target.task_id.to_string(),
timestamp: timestamp.clone(),
signature: sign_agent_assertion_payload(key, target.task_id, &timestamp)?,
};
let serialized_assertion = serialize_agent_assertion(&envelope)?;
Ok(format!("AgentAssertion {serialized_assertion}"))
}
pub fn sign_task_registration_payload(
key: AgentIdentityKey<'_>,
timestamp: &str,
) -> Result<String> {
let signing_key = signing_key_from_private_key_pkcs8_base64(key.private_key_pkcs8_base64)?;
let payload = format!("{}:{timestamp}", key.agent_runtime_id);
Ok(BASE64_STANDARD.encode(signing_key.sign(payload.as_bytes()).to_bytes()))
}
pub async fn register_agent_task(
client: &reqwest::Client,
chatgpt_base_url: &str,
key: AgentIdentityKey<'_>,
) -> Result<String> {
let timestamp = Utc::now().to_rfc3339_opts(SecondsFormat::Secs, true);
let request = RegisterTaskRequest {
signature: sign_task_registration_payload(key, &timestamp)?,
timestamp,
};
let response = client
.post(agent_task_registration_url(
chatgpt_base_url,
key.agent_runtime_id,
))
.timeout(AGENT_TASK_REGISTRATION_TIMEOUT)
.json(&request)
.send()
.await
.context("failed to register agent task")?
.error_for_status()
.context("failed to register agent task")?
.json()
.await
.context("failed to decode agent task registration response")?;
task_id_from_register_task_response(key, response)
}
fn task_id_from_register_task_response(
key: AgentIdentityKey<'_>,
response: RegisterTaskResponse,
) -> Result<String> {
if let Some(task_id) = response.task_id.or(response.task_id_camel) {
return Ok(task_id);
}
let encrypted_task_id = response
.encrypted_task_id
.or(response.encrypted_task_id_camel)
.context("agent task registration response omitted task id")?;
decrypt_task_id_response(key, &encrypted_task_id)
}
pub fn decrypt_task_id_response(
key: AgentIdentityKey<'_>,
encrypted_task_id: &str,
) -> Result<String> {
let signing_key = signing_key_from_private_key_pkcs8_base64(key.private_key_pkcs8_base64)?;
let ciphertext = BASE64_STANDARD
.decode(encrypted_task_id)
.context("encrypted task id is not valid base64")?;
let plaintext = curve25519_secret_key_from_signing_key(&signing_key)
.unseal(&ciphertext)
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("failed to decrypt encrypted task id"))?;
String::from_utf8(plaintext).context("decrypted task id is not valid UTF-8")
}
pub fn generate_agent_key_material() -> Result<GeneratedAgentKeyMaterial> {
let mut secret_key_bytes = [0u8; 32];
OsRng
.try_fill_bytes(&mut secret_key_bytes)
.context("failed to generate agent identity private key bytes")?;
let signing_key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&secret_key_bytes);
let private_key_pkcs8 = signing_key
.to_pkcs8_der()
.context("failed to encode agent identity private key as PKCS#8")?;
Ok(GeneratedAgentKeyMaterial {
private_key_pkcs8_base64: BASE64_STANDARD.encode(private_key_pkcs8.as_bytes()),
public_key_ssh: encode_ssh_ed25519_public_key(&signing_key.verifying_key()),
})
}
pub fn public_key_ssh_from_private_key_pkcs8_base64(
private_key_pkcs8_base64: &str,
) -> Result<String> {
let signing_key = signing_key_from_private_key_pkcs8_base64(private_key_pkcs8_base64)?;
Ok(encode_ssh_ed25519_public_key(&signing_key.verifying_key()))
}
pub fn verifying_key_from_private_key_pkcs8_base64(
private_key_pkcs8_base64: &str,
) -> Result<VerifyingKey> {
let signing_key = signing_key_from_private_key_pkcs8_base64(private_key_pkcs8_base64)?;
Ok(signing_key.verifying_key())
}
pub fn curve25519_secret_key_from_private_key_pkcs8_base64(
private_key_pkcs8_base64: &str,
) -> Result<Curve25519SecretKey> {
let signing_key = signing_key_from_private_key_pkcs8_base64(private_key_pkcs8_base64)?;
Ok(curve25519_secret_key_from_signing_key(&signing_key))
}
pub fn agent_registration_url(chatgpt_base_url: &str) -> String {
let trimmed = chatgpt_base_url.trim_end_matches('/');
format!("{trimmed}/v1/agent/register")
}
pub fn agent_task_registration_url(chatgpt_base_url: &str, agent_runtime_id: &str) -> String {
let trimmed = chatgpt_base_url.trim_end_matches('/');
format!("{trimmed}/v1/agent/{agent_runtime_id}/task/register")
}
pub fn agent_identity_biscuit_url(chatgpt_base_url: &str) -> String {
let trimmed = chatgpt_base_url.trim_end_matches('/');
format!("{trimmed}/authenticate_app_v2")
}
pub fn agent_identity_request_id() -> Result<String> {
let mut request_id_bytes = [0u8; 16];
OsRng
.try_fill_bytes(&mut request_id_bytes)
.context("failed to generate agent identity request id")?;
Ok(format!(
"codex-agent-identity-{}",
URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(request_id_bytes)
))
}
pub fn normalize_chatgpt_base_url(chatgpt_base_url: &str) -> String {
let mut base_url = chatgpt_base_url.trim_end_matches('/').to_string();
for suffix in [
"/wham/remote/control/server/enroll",
"/wham/remote/control/server",
] {
if let Some(stripped) = base_url.strip_suffix(suffix) {
base_url = stripped.to_string();
break;
}
}
if let Some(stripped) = base_url.strip_suffix("/codex") {
base_url = stripped.to_string();
}
if (base_url.starts_with("https://chatgpt.com")
|| base_url.starts_with("https://chat.openai.com"))
&& !base_url.contains("/backend-api")
{
base_url = format!("{base_url}/backend-api");
}
base_url
}
pub fn build_abom(session_source: SessionSource) -> AgentBillOfMaterials {
AgentBillOfMaterials {
agent_version: env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION").to_string(),
agent_harness_id: match &session_source {
SessionSource::VSCode => "codex-app".to_string(),
SessionSource::Cli
| SessionSource::Exec
| SessionSource::Mcp
| SessionSource::Custom(_)
| SessionSource::SubAgent(_)
| SessionSource::Unknown => "codex-cli".to_string(),
},
running_location: format!("{}-{}", session_source, std::env::consts::OS),
}
}
pub fn encode_ssh_ed25519_public_key(verifying_key: &VerifyingKey) -> String {
let mut blob = Vec::with_capacity(4 + 11 + 4 + 32);
append_ssh_string(&mut blob, b"ssh-ed25519");
append_ssh_string(&mut blob, verifying_key.as_bytes());
format!("ssh-ed25519 {}", BASE64_STANDARD.encode(blob))
}
fn sign_agent_assertion_payload(
key: AgentIdentityKey<'_>,
task_id: &str,
timestamp: &str,
) -> Result<String> {
let signing_key = signing_key_from_private_key_pkcs8_base64(key.private_key_pkcs8_base64)?;
let payload = format!("{}:{task_id}:{timestamp}", key.agent_runtime_id);
Ok(BASE64_STANDARD.encode(signing_key.sign(payload.as_bytes()).to_bytes()))
}
fn serialize_agent_assertion(envelope: &AgentAssertionEnvelope) -> Result<String> {
let payload = serde_json::to_vec(&BTreeMap::from([
("agent_runtime_id", envelope.agent_runtime_id.as_str()),
("signature", envelope.signature.as_str()),
("task_id", envelope.task_id.as_str()),
("timestamp", envelope.timestamp.as_str()),
]))
.context("failed to serialize agent assertion envelope")?;
Ok(URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(payload))
}
fn curve25519_secret_key_from_signing_key(signing_key: &SigningKey) -> Curve25519SecretKey {
let digest = Sha512::digest(signing_key.to_bytes());
let mut secret_key = [0u8; 32];
secret_key.copy_from_slice(&digest[..32]);
secret_key[0] &= 248;
secret_key[31] &= 127;
secret_key[31] |= 64;
Curve25519SecretKey::from(secret_key)
}
fn append_ssh_string(buf: &mut Vec<u8>, value: &[u8]) {
buf.extend_from_slice(&(value.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
buf.extend_from_slice(value);
}
fn signing_key_from_private_key_pkcs8_base64(private_key_pkcs8_base64: &str) -> Result<SigningKey> {
let private_key = BASE64_STANDARD
.decode(private_key_pkcs8_base64)
.context("stored agent identity private key is not valid base64")?;
SigningKey::from_pkcs8_der(&private_key)
.context("stored agent identity private key is not valid PKCS#8")
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use base64::Engine as _;
use ed25519_dalek::Signature;
use ed25519_dalek::Verifier as _;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use super::*;
#[test]
fn authorization_header_for_agent_task_serializes_signed_agent_assertion() {
let signing_key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[7u8; 32]);
let private_key = signing_key
.to_pkcs8_der()
.expect("encode test key material");
let key = AgentIdentityKey {
agent_runtime_id: "agent-123",
private_key_pkcs8_base64: &BASE64_STANDARD.encode(private_key.as_bytes()),
};
let target = AgentTaskAuthorizationTarget {
agent_runtime_id: "agent-123",
task_id: "task-123",
};
let header =
authorization_header_for_agent_task(key, target).expect("build agent assertion header");
let token = header
.strip_prefix("AgentAssertion ")
.expect("agent assertion scheme");
let payload = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
.decode(token)
.expect("valid base64url payload");
let envelope: AgentAssertionEnvelope =
serde_json::from_slice(&payload).expect("valid assertion envelope");
assert_eq!(
envelope,
AgentAssertionEnvelope {
agent_runtime_id: "agent-123".to_string(),
task_id: "task-123".to_string(),
timestamp: envelope.timestamp.clone(),
signature: envelope.signature.clone(),
}
);
let signature_bytes = BASE64_STANDARD
.decode(&envelope.signature)
.expect("valid base64 signature");
let signature = Signature::from_slice(&signature_bytes).expect("valid signature bytes");
signing_key
.verifying_key()
.verify(
format!(
"{}:{}:{}",
envelope.agent_runtime_id, envelope.task_id, envelope.timestamp
)
.as_bytes(),
&signature,
)
.expect("signature should verify");
}
#[test]
fn authorization_header_for_agent_task_rejects_mismatched_runtime() {
let signing_key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[7u8; 32]);
let private_key = signing_key
.to_pkcs8_der()
.expect("encode test key material");
let private_key_pkcs8_base64 = BASE64_STANDARD.encode(private_key.as_bytes());
let key = AgentIdentityKey {
agent_runtime_id: "agent-123",
private_key_pkcs8_base64: &private_key_pkcs8_base64,
};
let target = AgentTaskAuthorizationTarget {
agent_runtime_id: "agent-456",
task_id: "task-123",
};
let error = authorization_header_for_agent_task(key, target)
.expect_err("runtime mismatch should fail");
assert_eq!(
error.to_string(),
"agent task runtime agent-456 does not match stored agent identity agent-123"
);
}
#[test]
fn normalize_chatgpt_base_url_strips_codex_before_backend_api() {
assert_eq!(
normalize_chatgpt_base_url("https://chatgpt.com/codex"),
"https://chatgpt.com/backend-api"
);
}
}

View File

@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ use codex_app_server_protocol::InitializeCapabilities;
use codex_app_server_protocol::InitializeParams;
use codex_app_server_protocol::JSONRPCErrorError;
use codex_app_server_protocol::NonSteerableTurnKind;
use codex_app_server_protocol::PermissionProfile as AppServerPermissionProfile;
use codex_app_server_protocol::RequestId;
use codex_app_server_protocol::SandboxPolicy as AppServerSandboxPolicy;
use codex_app_server_protocol::ServerNotification;
@@ -91,6 +92,7 @@ use codex_plugin::PluginTelemetryMetadata;
use codex_protocol::approvals::NetworkApprovalProtocol;
use codex_protocol::config_types::ApprovalsReviewer;
use codex_protocol::config_types::ModeKind;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile as CorePermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::protocol::AskForApproval;
use codex_protocol::protocol::HookEventName;
use codex_protocol::protocol::HookRunStatus;
@@ -152,11 +154,20 @@ fn sample_thread_start_response(thread_id: &str, ephemeral: bool, model: &str) -
approval_policy: AppServerAskForApproval::OnFailure,
approvals_reviewer: AppServerApprovalsReviewer::User,
sandbox: AppServerSandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
permission_profile: Some(sample_permission_profile()),
reasoning_effort: None,
},
}
}
fn sample_permission_profile() -> AppServerPermissionProfile {
CorePermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(
&SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
&test_path_buf("/tmp"),
)
.into()
}
fn sample_app_server_client_metadata() -> CodexAppServerClientMetadata {
CodexAppServerClientMetadata {
product_client_id: DEFAULT_ORIGINATOR.to_string(),
@@ -203,6 +214,7 @@ fn sample_thread_resume_response_with_source(
approval_policy: AppServerAskForApproval::OnFailure,
approvals_reviewer: AppServerApprovalsReviewer::User,
sandbox: AppServerSandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
permission_profile: Some(sample_permission_profile()),
reasoning_effort: None,
},
}
@@ -312,7 +324,7 @@ fn sample_turn_resolved_config(turn_id: &str) -> TurnResolvedConfigFact {
reasoning_summary: None,
service_tier: None,
approval_policy: AskForApproval::OnRequest,
approvals_reviewer: ApprovalsReviewer::GuardianSubagent,
approvals_reviewer: ApprovalsReviewer::AutoReview,
sandbox_network_access: true,
collaboration_mode: ModeKind::Plan,
personality: None,
@@ -1322,7 +1334,7 @@ fn subagent_thread_started_other_serializes_explicit_parent_thread_id() {
},
));
let payload = serde_json::to_value(&event).expect("serialize guardian subagent event");
let payload = serde_json::to_value(&event).expect("serialize auto-review subagent event");
assert_eq!(payload["event_params"]["subagent_source"], "guardian");
assert_eq!(
payload["event_params"]["parent_thread_id"],
@@ -1746,7 +1758,7 @@ fn turn_event_serializes_expected_shape() {
reasoning_summary: Some("detailed".to_string()),
service_tier: "flex".to_string(),
approval_policy: "on-request".to_string(),
approvals_reviewer: "guardian_subagent".to_string(),
approvals_reviewer: "auto_review".to_string(),
sandbox_network_access: true,
collaboration_mode: Some("plan"),
personality: Some("pragmatic".to_string()),
@@ -1807,7 +1819,7 @@ fn turn_event_serializes_expected_shape() {
"reasoning_summary": "detailed",
"service_tier": "flex",
"approval_policy": "on-request",
"approvals_reviewer": "guardian_subagent",
"approvals_reviewer": "auto_review",
"sandbox_network_access": true,
"collaboration_mode": "plan",
"personality": "pragmatic",

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
use crate::events::AppServerRpcTransport;
use crate::events::GuardianReviewEventParams;
use crate::events::GuardianReviewAnalyticsResult;
use crate::events::GuardianReviewTrackContext;
use crate::events::TrackEventRequest;
use crate::events::TrackEventsRequest;
use crate::events::current_runtime_metadata;
@@ -161,9 +162,13 @@ impl AnalyticsEventsClient {
));
}
pub fn track_guardian_review(&self, input: GuardianReviewEventParams) {
pub fn track_guardian_review(
&self,
tracking: &GuardianReviewTrackContext,
result: GuardianReviewAnalyticsResult,
) {
self.record_fact(AnalyticsFact::Custom(CustomAnalyticsFact::GuardianReview(
Box::new(input),
Box::new(tracking.event_params(result)),
)));
}
@@ -297,7 +302,7 @@ impl AnalyticsEventsClient {
}
async fn send_track_events(
auth_manager: &Arc<AuthManager>,
auth_manager: &AuthManager,
base_url: &str,
events: Vec<TrackEventRequest>,
) {
@@ -310,11 +315,9 @@ async fn send_track_events(
if !auth.is_chatgpt_auth() {
return;
}
let Some(authorization_header_value) = auth_manager
.chatgpt_authorization_header_for_auth(&auth)
.await
else {
return;
let access_token = match auth.get_token() {
Ok(token) => token,
Err(_) => return,
};
let Some(account_id) = auth.get_account_id() else {
return;
@@ -324,17 +327,15 @@ async fn send_track_events(
let url = format!("{base_url}/codex/analytics-events/events");
let payload = TrackEventsRequest { events };
let mut request = create_client()
let response = create_client()
.post(&url)
.timeout(ANALYTICS_EVENTS_TIMEOUT)
.header("authorization", authorization_header_value)
.bearer_auth(&access_token)
.header("chatgpt-account-id", &account_id)
.header("Content-Type", "application/json")
.json(&payload);
if auth.is_fedramp_account() {
request = request.header("X-OpenAI-Fedramp", "true");
}
let response = request.send().await;
.json(&payload)
.send()
.await;
match response {
Ok(response) if response.status().is_success() => {}

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
use std::time::Instant;
use crate::facts::AppInvocation;
use crate::facts::CodexCompactionEvent;
use crate::facts::CompactionImplementation;
@@ -16,6 +18,7 @@ use crate::facts::TurnStatus;
use crate::facts::TurnSteerRejectionReason;
use crate::facts::TurnSteerResult;
use crate::facts::TurnSubmissionType;
use crate::now_unix_seconds;
use codex_app_server_protocol::CodexErrorInfo;
use codex_login::default_client::originator;
use codex_plugin::PluginTelemetryMetadata;
@@ -30,6 +33,7 @@ use codex_protocol::protocol::HookEventName;
use codex_protocol::protocol::HookRunStatus;
use codex_protocol::protocol::HookSource;
use codex_protocol::protocol::SubAgentSource;
use codex_protocol::protocol::TokenUsage;
use serde::Serialize;
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Serialize)]
@@ -200,6 +204,7 @@ pub enum GuardianReviewedAction {
connector_name: Option<String>,
tool_title: Option<String>,
},
RequestPermissions {},
}
#[derive(Clone, Serialize)]
@@ -235,6 +240,142 @@ pub struct GuardianReviewEventParams {
pub total_tokens: Option<i64>,
}
pub struct GuardianReviewTrackContext {
thread_id: String,
turn_id: String,
review_id: String,
target_item_id: Option<String>,
approval_request_source: GuardianApprovalRequestSource,
reviewed_action: GuardianReviewedAction,
review_timeout_ms: u64,
started_at: u64,
started_instant: Instant,
}
impl GuardianReviewTrackContext {
pub fn new(
thread_id: String,
turn_id: String,
review_id: String,
target_item_id: Option<String>,
approval_request_source: GuardianApprovalRequestSource,
reviewed_action: GuardianReviewedAction,
review_timeout_ms: u64,
) -> Self {
Self {
thread_id,
turn_id,
review_id,
target_item_id,
approval_request_source,
reviewed_action,
review_timeout_ms,
started_at: now_unix_seconds(),
started_instant: Instant::now(),
}
}
pub(crate) fn event_params(
&self,
result: GuardianReviewAnalyticsResult,
) -> GuardianReviewEventParams {
GuardianReviewEventParams {
thread_id: self.thread_id.clone(),
turn_id: self.turn_id.clone(),
review_id: self.review_id.clone(),
target_item_id: self.target_item_id.clone(),
approval_request_source: self.approval_request_source,
reviewed_action: self.reviewed_action.clone(),
reviewed_action_truncated: result.reviewed_action_truncated,
decision: result.decision,
terminal_status: result.terminal_status,
failure_reason: result.failure_reason,
risk_level: result.risk_level,
user_authorization: result.user_authorization,
outcome: result.outcome,
guardian_thread_id: result.guardian_thread_id,
guardian_session_kind: result.guardian_session_kind,
guardian_model: result.guardian_model,
guardian_reasoning_effort: result.guardian_reasoning_effort,
had_prior_review_context: result.had_prior_review_context,
review_timeout_ms: self.review_timeout_ms,
// TODO(rhan-oai): plumb nested Guardian review session tool-call counts.
tool_call_count: None,
time_to_first_token_ms: result.time_to_first_token_ms,
completion_latency_ms: Some(self.started_instant.elapsed().as_millis() as u64),
started_at: self.started_at,
completed_at: Some(now_unix_seconds()),
input_tokens: result.token_usage.as_ref().map(|usage| usage.input_tokens),
cached_input_tokens: result
.token_usage
.as_ref()
.map(|usage| usage.cached_input_tokens),
output_tokens: result.token_usage.as_ref().map(|usage| usage.output_tokens),
reasoning_output_tokens: result
.token_usage
.as_ref()
.map(|usage| usage.reasoning_output_tokens),
total_tokens: result.token_usage.as_ref().map(|usage| usage.total_tokens),
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct GuardianReviewAnalyticsResult {
pub decision: GuardianReviewDecision,
pub terminal_status: GuardianReviewTerminalStatus,
pub failure_reason: Option<GuardianReviewFailureReason>,
pub risk_level: Option<GuardianRiskLevel>,
pub user_authorization: Option<GuardianUserAuthorization>,
pub outcome: Option<GuardianAssessmentOutcome>,
pub guardian_thread_id: Option<String>,
pub guardian_session_kind: Option<GuardianReviewSessionKind>,
pub guardian_model: Option<String>,
pub guardian_reasoning_effort: Option<String>,
pub had_prior_review_context: Option<bool>,
pub reviewed_action_truncated: bool,
pub token_usage: Option<TokenUsage>,
pub time_to_first_token_ms: Option<u64>,
}
impl GuardianReviewAnalyticsResult {
pub fn without_session() -> Self {
Self {
decision: GuardianReviewDecision::Denied,
terminal_status: GuardianReviewTerminalStatus::FailedClosed,
failure_reason: None,
risk_level: None,
user_authorization: None,
outcome: None,
guardian_thread_id: None,
guardian_session_kind: None,
guardian_model: None,
guardian_reasoning_effort: None,
had_prior_review_context: None,
reviewed_action_truncated: false,
token_usage: None,
time_to_first_token_ms: None,
}
}
pub fn from_session(
guardian_thread_id: String,
guardian_session_kind: GuardianReviewSessionKind,
guardian_model: String,
guardian_reasoning_effort: Option<String>,
had_prior_review_context: bool,
) -> Self {
Self {
guardian_thread_id: Some(guardian_thread_id),
guardian_session_kind: Some(guardian_session_kind),
guardian_model: Some(guardian_model),
guardian_reasoning_effort,
had_prior_review_context: Some(had_prior_review_context),
..Self::without_session()
}
}
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
pub(crate) struct GuardianReviewEventPayload {
pub(crate) app_server_client: CodexAppServerClientMetadata,

View File

@@ -9,11 +9,13 @@ use std::time::UNIX_EPOCH;
pub use client::AnalyticsEventsClient;
pub use events::AppServerRpcTransport;
pub use events::GuardianApprovalRequestSource;
pub use events::GuardianReviewAnalyticsResult;
pub use events::GuardianReviewDecision;
pub use events::GuardianReviewEventParams;
pub use events::GuardianReviewFailureReason;
pub use events::GuardianReviewSessionKind;
pub use events::GuardianReviewTerminalStatus;
pub use events::GuardianReviewTrackContext;
pub use events::GuardianReviewedAction;
pub use facts::AnalyticsJsonRpcError;
pub use facts::AppInvocation;

View File

@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ use codex_core::config::Config;
use codex_core::config_loader::CloudRequirementsLoader;
use codex_core::config_loader::LoaderOverrides;
pub use codex_exec_server::EnvironmentManager;
pub use codex_exec_server::EnvironmentManagerArgs;
pub use codex_exec_server::ExecServerRuntimePaths;
use codex_feedback::CodexFeedback;
use codex_protocol::protocol::SessionSource;
@@ -968,7 +969,7 @@ mod tests {
cloud_requirements: CloudRequirementsLoader::default(),
feedback: CodexFeedback::new(),
log_db: None,
environment_manager: Arc::new(EnvironmentManager::new(/*exec_server_url*/ None)),
environment_manager: Arc::new(EnvironmentManager::default_for_tests()),
config_warnings: Vec::new(),
session_source,
enable_codex_api_key_env: false,
@@ -1969,9 +1970,14 @@ mod tests {
#[tokio::test]
async fn runtime_start_args_forward_environment_manager() {
let config = Arc::new(build_test_config().await);
let environment_manager = Arc::new(EnvironmentManager::new(Some(
"ws://127.0.0.1:8765".to_string(),
)));
let environment_manager = Arc::new(EnvironmentManager::new(EnvironmentManagerArgs {
exec_server_url: Some("ws://127.0.0.1:8765".to_string()),
local_runtime_paths: ExecServerRuntimePaths::new(
std::env::current_exe().expect("current exe"),
/*codex_linux_sandbox_exe*/ None,
)
.expect("runtime paths"),
}));
let runtime_args = InProcessClientStartArgs {
arg0_paths: Arg0DispatchPaths::default(),
@@ -1998,7 +2004,13 @@ mod tests {
&runtime_args.environment_manager,
&environment_manager
));
assert!(runtime_args.environment_manager.is_remote());
assert!(
runtime_args
.environment_manager
.default_environment()
.expect("default environment")
.is_remote()
);
}
#[tokio::test]

View File

@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ use crate::RequestResult;
use crate::SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT;
use crate::TypedRequestError;
use crate::request_method_name;
use crate::server_notification_requires_delivery;
use codex_app_server_protocol::ClientInfo;
use codex_app_server_protocol::ClientNotification;
use codex_app_server_protocol::ClientRequest;
@@ -126,7 +125,7 @@ enum RemoteClientCommand {
pub struct RemoteAppServerClient {
command_tx: mpsc::Sender<RemoteClientCommand>,
event_rx: mpsc::Receiver<AppServerEvent>,
event_rx: mpsc::UnboundedReceiver<AppServerEvent>,
pending_events: VecDeque<AppServerEvent>,
worker_handle: tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>,
}
@@ -195,11 +194,10 @@ impl RemoteAppServerClient {
.await?;
let (command_tx, mut command_rx) = mpsc::channel::<RemoteClientCommand>(channel_capacity);
let (event_tx, event_rx) = mpsc::channel::<AppServerEvent>(channel_capacity);
let (event_tx, event_rx) = mpsc::unbounded_channel::<AppServerEvent>();
let worker_handle = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut pending_requests =
HashMap::<RequestId, oneshot::Sender<IoResult<RequestResult>>>::new();
let mut skipped_events = 0usize;
loop {
tokio::select! {
command = command_rx.recv() => {
@@ -231,15 +229,12 @@ impl RemoteAppServerClient {
}
let _ = deliver_event(
&event_tx,
&mut skipped_events,
AppServerEvent::Disconnected {
message: format!(
"remote app server at `{websocket_url}` write failed: {err_message}"
),
},
&mut stream,
)
.await;
);
break;
}
}
@@ -316,11 +311,8 @@ impl RemoteAppServerClient {
app_server_event_from_notification(notification)
&& let Err(err) = deliver_event(
&event_tx,
&mut skipped_events,
event,
&mut stream,
)
.await
{
warn!(%err, "failed to deliver remote app-server event");
break;
@@ -333,11 +325,8 @@ impl RemoteAppServerClient {
Ok(request) => {
if let Err(err) = deliver_event(
&event_tx,
&mut skipped_events,
AppServerEvent::ServerRequest(request),
&mut stream,
)
.await
{
warn!(%err, "failed to deliver remote app-server server request");
break;
@@ -364,15 +353,12 @@ impl RemoteAppServerClient {
let err_message = reject_err.to_string();
let _ = deliver_event(
&event_tx,
&mut skipped_events,
AppServerEvent::Disconnected {
message: format!(
"remote app server at `{websocket_url}` write failed: {err_message}"
),
},
&mut stream,
)
.await;
);
break;
}
}
@@ -381,15 +367,12 @@ impl RemoteAppServerClient {
Err(err) => {
let _ = deliver_event(
&event_tx,
&mut skipped_events,
AppServerEvent::Disconnected {
message: format!(
"remote app server at `{websocket_url}` sent invalid JSON-RPC: {err}"
),
},
&mut stream,
)
.await;
);
break;
}
}
@@ -402,15 +385,12 @@ impl RemoteAppServerClient {
.unwrap_or_else(|| "connection closed".to_string());
let _ = deliver_event(
&event_tx,
&mut skipped_events,
AppServerEvent::Disconnected {
message: format!(
"remote app server at `{websocket_url}` disconnected: {reason}"
),
},
&mut stream,
)
.await;
);
break;
}
Some(Ok(Message::Binary(_)))
@@ -420,29 +400,23 @@ impl RemoteAppServerClient {
Some(Err(err)) => {
let _ = deliver_event(
&event_tx,
&mut skipped_events,
AppServerEvent::Disconnected {
message: format!(
"remote app server at `{websocket_url}` transport failed: {err}"
),
},
&mut stream,
)
.await;
);
break;
}
None => {
let _ = deliver_event(
&event_tx,
&mut skipped_events,
AppServerEvent::Disconnected {
message: format!(
"remote app server at `{websocket_url}` closed the connection"
),
},
&mut stream,
)
.await;
);
break;
}
}
@@ -612,14 +586,9 @@ impl RemoteAppServerClient {
.send(RemoteClientCommand::Shutdown { response_tx })
.await
.is_ok()
&& let Ok(command_result) = timeout(SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT, response_rx).await
&& let Ok(Ok(close_result)) = timeout(SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT, response_rx).await
{
command_result.map_err(|_| {
IoError::new(
ErrorKind::BrokenPipe,
"remote app-server shutdown channel is closed",
)
})??;
close_result?;
}
if let Err(_elapsed) = timeout(SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT, &mut worker_handle).await {
@@ -806,100 +775,16 @@ fn app_server_event_from_notification(notification: JSONRPCNotification) -> Opti
}
}
async fn deliver_event(
event_tx: &mpsc::Sender<AppServerEvent>,
skipped_events: &mut usize,
fn deliver_event(
event_tx: &mpsc::UnboundedSender<AppServerEvent>,
event: AppServerEvent,
stream: &mut WebSocketStream<MaybeTlsStream<TcpStream>>,
) -> IoResult<()> {
if *skipped_events > 0 {
if event_requires_delivery(&event) {
if event_tx
.send(AppServerEvent::Lagged {
skipped: *skipped_events,
})
.await
.is_err()
{
return Err(IoError::new(
ErrorKind::BrokenPipe,
"remote app-server event consumer channel is closed",
));
}
*skipped_events = 0;
} else {
match event_tx.try_send(AppServerEvent::Lagged {
skipped: *skipped_events,
}) {
Ok(()) => *skipped_events = 0,
Err(mpsc::error::TrySendError::Full(_)) => {
*skipped_events = (*skipped_events).saturating_add(1);
reject_if_server_request_dropped(stream, &event).await?;
return Ok(());
}
Err(mpsc::error::TrySendError::Closed(_)) => {
return Err(IoError::new(
ErrorKind::BrokenPipe,
"remote app-server event consumer channel is closed",
));
}
}
}
}
if event_requires_delivery(&event) {
event_tx.send(event).await.map_err(|_| {
IoError::new(
ErrorKind::BrokenPipe,
"remote app-server event consumer channel is closed",
)
})?;
return Ok(());
}
match event_tx.try_send(event) {
Ok(()) => Ok(()),
Err(mpsc::error::TrySendError::Full(event)) => {
*skipped_events = (*skipped_events).saturating_add(1);
reject_if_server_request_dropped(stream, &event).await
}
Err(mpsc::error::TrySendError::Closed(_)) => Err(IoError::new(
event_tx.send(event).map_err(|_| {
IoError::new(
ErrorKind::BrokenPipe,
"remote app-server event consumer channel is closed",
)),
}
}
async fn reject_if_server_request_dropped(
stream: &mut WebSocketStream<MaybeTlsStream<TcpStream>>,
event: &AppServerEvent,
) -> IoResult<()> {
let AppServerEvent::ServerRequest(request) = event else {
return Ok(());
};
write_jsonrpc_message(
stream,
JSONRPCMessage::Error(JSONRPCError {
error: JSONRPCErrorError {
code: -32001,
message: "remote app-server event queue is full".to_string(),
data: None,
},
id: request.id().clone(),
}),
"<remote-app-server>",
)
.await
}
fn event_requires_delivery(event: &AppServerEvent) -> bool {
match event {
AppServerEvent::ServerNotification(notification) => {
server_notification_requires_delivery(notification)
}
AppServerEvent::Disconnected { .. } => true,
AppServerEvent::Lagged { .. } | AppServerEvent::ServerRequest(_) => false,
}
)
})
}
fn request_id_from_client_request(request: &ClientRequest) -> RequestId {
@@ -945,40 +830,27 @@ async fn write_jsonrpc_message(
))
})
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn event_requires_delivery_marks_transcript_and_disconnect_events() {
assert!(event_requires_delivery(
&AppServerEvent::ServerNotification(ServerNotification::AgentMessageDelta(
codex_app_server_protocol::AgentMessageDeltaNotification {
thread_id: "thread".to_string(),
turn_id: "turn".to_string(),
item_id: "item".to_string(),
delta: "hello".to_string(),
},
),)
));
assert!(event_requires_delivery(
&AppServerEvent::ServerNotification(ServerNotification::ItemCompleted(
codex_app_server_protocol::ItemCompletedNotification {
thread_id: "thread".to_string(),
turn_id: "turn".to_string(),
item: codex_app_server_protocol::ThreadItem::Plan {
id: "item".to_string(),
text: "step".to_string(),
},
}
),)
));
assert!(event_requires_delivery(&AppServerEvent::Disconnected {
message: "closed".to_string(),
}));
assert!(!event_requires_delivery(&AppServerEvent::Lagged {
skipped: 1
}));
#[tokio::test]
async fn shutdown_tolerates_worker_exit_after_command_is_queued() {
let (command_tx, mut command_rx) = mpsc::channel(1);
let (_event_tx, event_rx) = mpsc::unbounded_channel::<AppServerEvent>();
let worker_handle = tokio::spawn(async move {
let _ = command_rx.recv().await;
});
let client = RemoteAppServerClient {
command_tx,
event_rx,
pending_events: VecDeque::new(),
worker_handle,
};
client
.shutdown()
.await
.expect("shutdown should complete when worker exits first");
}
}

View File

@@ -13,9 +13,10 @@
"type": "string"
},
"ApprovalsReviewer": {
"description": "Configures who approval requests are routed to for review. Examples include sandbox escapes, blocked network access, MCP approval prompts, and ARC escalations. Defaults to `user`. `guardian_subagent` uses a carefully prompted subagent to gather relevant context and apply a risk-based decision framework before approving or denying the request.",
"description": "Configures who approval requests are routed to for review. Examples include sandbox escapes, blocked network access, MCP approval prompts, and ARC escalations. Defaults to `user`. `auto_review` uses a carefully prompted subagent to gather relevant context and apply a risk-based decision framework before approving or denying the request. The legacy value `guardian_subagent` is accepted for compatibility.",
"enum": [
"user",
"auto_review",
"guardian_subagent"
],
"type": "string"
@@ -217,6 +218,17 @@
"null"
]
},
"permissionProfile": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfile"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"description": "Optional full permissions profile for this command.\n\nDefaults to the user's configured permissions when omitted. Cannot be combined with `sandboxPolicy`."
},
"processId": {
"description": "Optional client-supplied, connection-scoped process id.\n\nRequired for `tty`, `streamStdin`, `streamStdoutStderr`, and follow-up `command/exec/write`, `command/exec/resize`, and `command/exec/terminate` calls. When omitted, buffered execution gets an internal id that is not exposed to the client.",
"type": [
@@ -233,7 +245,7 @@
"type": "null"
}
],
"description": "Optional sandbox policy for this command.\n\nUses the same shape as thread/turn execution sandbox configuration and defaults to the user's configured policy when omitted."
"description": "Optional sandbox policy for this command.\n\nUses the same shape as thread/turn execution sandbox configuration and defaults to the user's configured policy when omitted. Cannot be combined with `permissionProfile`."
},
"size": {
"anyOf": [
@@ -521,6 +533,200 @@
}
]
},
"DeviceKeyCreateParams": {
"description": "Create a controller-local device key with a random key id.",
"properties": {
"accountUserId": {
"type": "string"
},
"clientId": {
"type": "string"
},
"protectionPolicy": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/DeviceKeyProtectionPolicy"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"description": "Defaults to `hardware_only` when omitted."
}
},
"required": [
"accountUserId",
"clientId"
],
"type": "object"
},
"DeviceKeyProtectionPolicy": {
"description": "Protection policy for creating or loading a controller-local device key.",
"enum": [
"hardware_only",
"allow_os_protected_nonextractable"
],
"type": "string"
},
"DeviceKeyPublicParams": {
"description": "Fetch a controller-local device key public key by id.",
"properties": {
"keyId": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"keyId"
],
"type": "object"
},
"DeviceKeySignParams": {
"description": "Sign an accepted structured payload with a controller-local device key.",
"properties": {
"keyId": {
"type": "string"
},
"payload": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/DeviceKeySignPayload"
}
},
"required": [
"keyId",
"payload"
],
"type": "object"
},
"DeviceKeySignPayload": {
"description": "Structured payloads accepted by `device/key/sign`.",
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Payload bound to one remote-control controller websocket `/client` connection challenge.",
"properties": {
"accountUserId": {
"type": "string"
},
"audience": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/RemoteControlClientConnectionAudience"
},
"clientId": {
"type": "string"
},
"nonce": {
"type": "string"
},
"scopes": {
"description": "Must contain exactly `remote_control_controller_websocket`.",
"items": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": "array"
},
"sessionId": {
"description": "Backend-issued websocket session id that this proof authorizes.",
"type": "string"
},
"targetOrigin": {
"description": "Origin of the backend endpoint that issued the challenge and will verify this proof.",
"type": "string"
},
"targetPath": {
"description": "Websocket route path that this proof authorizes.",
"type": "string"
},
"tokenExpiresAt": {
"description": "Remote-control token expiration as Unix seconds.",
"format": "int64",
"type": "integer"
},
"tokenSha256Base64url": {
"description": "SHA-256 of the controller-scoped remote-control token, encoded as unpadded base64url.",
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"remoteControlClientConnection"
],
"title": "RemoteControlClientConnectionDeviceKeySignPayloadType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"accountUserId",
"audience",
"clientId",
"nonce",
"scopes",
"sessionId",
"targetOrigin",
"targetPath",
"tokenExpiresAt",
"tokenSha256Base64url",
"type"
],
"title": "RemoteControlClientConnectionDeviceKeySignPayload",
"type": "object"
},
{
"description": "Payload bound to a remote-control client `/client/enroll` ownership challenge.",
"properties": {
"accountUserId": {
"type": "string"
},
"audience": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/RemoteControlClientEnrollmentAudience"
},
"challengeExpiresAt": {
"description": "Enrollment challenge expiration as Unix seconds.",
"format": "int64",
"type": "integer"
},
"challengeId": {
"description": "Backend-issued enrollment challenge id that this proof authorizes.",
"type": "string"
},
"clientId": {
"type": "string"
},
"deviceIdentitySha256Base64url": {
"description": "SHA-256 of the requested device identity operation, encoded as unpadded base64url.",
"type": "string"
},
"nonce": {
"type": "string"
},
"targetOrigin": {
"description": "Origin of the backend endpoint that issued the challenge and will verify this proof.",
"type": "string"
},
"targetPath": {
"description": "HTTP route path that this proof authorizes.",
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"remoteControlClientEnrollment"
],
"title": "RemoteControlClientEnrollmentDeviceKeySignPayloadType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"accountUserId",
"audience",
"challengeExpiresAt",
"challengeId",
"clientId",
"deviceIdentitySha256Base64url",
"nonce",
"targetOrigin",
"targetPath",
"type"
],
"title": "RemoteControlClientEnrollmentDeviceKeySignPayload",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"DynamicToolSpec": {
"properties": {
"deferLoading": {
@@ -703,6 +909,217 @@
],
"type": "object"
},
"FileSystemAccessMode": {
"enum": [
"read",
"write",
"none"
],
"type": "string"
},
"FileSystemPath": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"path"
],
"title": "PathFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "PathFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"pattern": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"glob_pattern"
],
"title": "GlobPatternFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"pattern",
"type"
],
"title": "GlobPatternFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"type": {
"enum": [
"special"
],
"title": "SpecialFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
},
"value": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemSpecialPath"
}
},
"required": [
"type",
"value"
],
"title": "SpecialFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"FileSystemSandboxEntry": {
"properties": {
"access": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemAccessMode"
},
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemPath"
}
},
"required": [
"access",
"path"
],
"type": "object"
},
"FileSystemSpecialPath": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"root"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "RootFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"minimal"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "MinimalFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"current_working_directory"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "CurrentWorkingDirectoryFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"project_roots"
],
"type": "string"
},
"subpath": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "KindFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"tmpdir"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "TmpdirFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"slash_tmp"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "SlashTmpFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"unknown"
],
"type": "string"
},
"path": {
"type": "string"
},
"subpath": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"kind",
"path"
],
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"FsCopyParams": {
"description": "Copy a file or directory tree on the host filesystem.",
"properties": {
@@ -1463,6 +1880,64 @@
],
"type": "string"
},
"PermissionProfile": {
"properties": {
"fileSystem": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
]
},
"network": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
]
}
},
"type": "object"
},
"PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions": {
"properties": {
"entries": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemSandboxEntry"
},
"type": "array"
},
"globScanMaxDepth": {
"format": "uint",
"minimum": 1.0,
"type": [
"integer",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"entries"
],
"type": "object"
},
"PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions": {
"properties": {
"enabled": {
"type": [
"boolean",
"null"
]
}
},
"type": "object"
},
"Personality": {
"enum": [
"none",
@@ -1747,6 +2222,20 @@
}
]
},
"RemoteControlClientConnectionAudience": {
"description": "Audience for a remote-control client connection device-key proof.",
"enum": [
"remote_control_client_websocket"
],
"type": "string"
},
"RemoteControlClientEnrollmentAudience": {
"description": "Audience for a remote-control client enrollment device-key proof.",
"enum": [
"remote_control_client_enrollment"
],
"type": "string"
},
"RequestId": {
"anyOf": [
{
@@ -2734,6 +3223,21 @@
],
"type": "object"
},
"ThreadApproveGuardianDeniedActionParams": {
"properties": {
"event": {
"description": "Serialized `codex_protocol::protocol::GuardianAssessmentEvent`."
},
"threadId": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"event",
"threadId"
],
"type": "object"
},
"ThreadArchiveParams": {
"properties": {
"threadId": {
@@ -2821,6 +3325,17 @@
"null"
]
},
"permissionProfile": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfile"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"description": "Full permissions override for the forked thread. Cannot be combined with `sandbox`."
},
"sandbox": {
"anyOf": [
{
@@ -2874,6 +3389,19 @@
],
"type": "object"
},
"ThreadListCwdFilter": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"items": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": "array"
}
]
},
"ThreadListParams": {
"properties": {
"archived": {
@@ -2891,11 +3419,15 @@
]
},
"cwd": {
"description": "Optional cwd filter; when set, only threads whose session cwd exactly matches this path are returned.",
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/ThreadListCwdFilter"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"description": "Optional cwd filter or filters; when set, only threads whose session cwd exactly matches one of these paths are returned."
},
"limit": {
"description": "Optional page size; defaults to a reasonable server-side value.",
@@ -2954,6 +3486,10 @@
"array",
"null"
]
},
"useStateDbOnly": {
"description": "If true, return from the state DB without scanning JSONL rollouts to repair thread metadata. Omitted or false preserves scan-and-repair behavior.",
"type": "boolean"
}
},
"type": "object"
@@ -3192,6 +3728,17 @@
"null"
]
},
"permissionProfile": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfile"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"description": "Full permissions override for the resumed thread. Cannot be combined with `sandbox`."
},
"personality": {
"anyOf": [
{
@@ -3375,6 +3922,17 @@
"null"
]
},
"permissionProfile": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfile"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"description": "Full permissions override for this thread. Cannot be combined with `sandbox`."
},
"personality": {
"anyOf": [
{
@@ -3498,6 +4056,21 @@
],
"type": "object"
},
"TurnEnvironmentParams": {
"properties": {
"cwd": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"environmentId": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"cwd",
"environmentId"
],
"type": "object"
},
"TurnInterruptParams": {
"properties": {
"threadId": {
@@ -3571,6 +4144,17 @@
"outputSchema": {
"description": "Optional JSON Schema used to constrain the final assistant message for this turn."
},
"permissionProfile": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfile"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"description": "Override the full permissions profile for this turn and subsequent turns. Cannot be combined with `sandboxPolicy`."
},
"personality": {
"anyOf": [
{
@@ -4071,6 +4655,30 @@
"title": "Thread/shellCommandRequest",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"id": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/RequestId"
},
"method": {
"enum": [
"thread/approveGuardianDeniedAction"
],
"title": "Thread/approveGuardianDeniedActionRequestMethod",
"type": "string"
},
"params": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/ThreadApproveGuardianDeniedActionParams"
}
},
"required": [
"id",
"method",
"params"
],
"title": "Thread/approveGuardianDeniedActionRequest",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"id": {
@@ -4360,6 +4968,78 @@
"title": "App/listRequest",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"id": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/RequestId"
},
"method": {
"enum": [
"device/key/create"
],
"title": "Device/key/createRequestMethod",
"type": "string"
},
"params": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/DeviceKeyCreateParams"
}
},
"required": [
"id",
"method",
"params"
],
"title": "Device/key/createRequest",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"id": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/RequestId"
},
"method": {
"enum": [
"device/key/public"
],
"title": "Device/key/publicRequestMethod",
"type": "string"
},
"params": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/DeviceKeyPublicParams"
}
},
"required": [
"id",
"method",
"params"
],
"title": "Device/key/publicRequest",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"id": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/RequestId"
},
"method": {
"enum": [
"device/key/sign"
],
"title": "Device/key/signRequestMethod",
"type": "string"
},
"params": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/DeviceKeySignParams"
}
},
"required": [
"id",
"method",
"params"
],
"title": "Device/key/signRequest",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"id": {

View File

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
]
},
"read": {
"description": "This will be removed in favor of `entries`.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@
]
},
"write": {
"description": "This will be removed in favor of `entries`.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},

View File

@@ -30,4 +30,4 @@
],
"title": "DynamicToolCallParams",
"type": "object"
}
}

View File

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
]
},
"read": {
"description": "This will be removed in favor of `entries`.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@
]
},
"write": {
"description": "This will be removed in favor of `entries`.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
@@ -295,6 +297,9 @@
}
},
"properties": {
"cwd": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"itemId": {
"type": "string"
},
@@ -315,6 +320,7 @@
}
},
"required": [
"cwd",
"itemId",
"permissions",
"threadId",

View File

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
]
},
"read": {
"description": "This will be removed in favor of `entries`.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@
]
},
"write": {
"description": "This will be removed in favor of `entries`.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
@@ -311,6 +313,13 @@
}
],
"default": "turn"
},
"strictAutoReview": {
"description": "Review every subsequent command in this turn before normal sandboxed execution.",
"type": [
"boolean",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [

View File

@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@
]
},
"read": {
"description": "This will be removed in favor of `entries`.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
@@ -93,6 +94,7 @@
]
},
"write": {
"description": "This will be removed in favor of `entries`.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
@@ -436,6 +438,13 @@
"chatgptAuthTokens"
],
"type": "string"
},
{
"description": "Programmatic Codex auth backed by a registered Agent Identity.",
"enum": [
"agentIdentity"
],
"type": "string"
}
]
},
@@ -473,6 +482,7 @@
"contextWindowExceeded",
"usageLimitExceeded",
"serverOverloaded",
"cyberPolicy",
"internalServerError",
"unauthorized",
"badRequest",
@@ -1697,6 +1707,23 @@
],
"type": "string"
},
"GuardianWarningNotification": {
"properties": {
"message": {
"description": "Concise guardian warning message for the user.",
"type": "string"
},
"threadId": {
"description": "Thread target for the guardian warning.",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"message",
"threadId"
],
"type": "object"
},
"HookCompletedNotification": {
"properties": {
"run": {
@@ -2236,6 +2263,34 @@
],
"type": "object"
},
"ModelVerification": {
"enum": [
"trustedAccessForCyber"
],
"type": "string"
},
"ModelVerificationNotification": {
"properties": {
"threadId": {
"type": "string"
},
"turnId": {
"type": "string"
},
"verifications": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/ModelVerification"
},
"type": "array"
}
},
"required": [
"threadId",
"turnId",
"verifications"
],
"type": "object"
},
"NetworkApprovalProtocol": {
"enum": [
"http",
@@ -5315,6 +5370,26 @@
"title": "Model/reroutedNotification",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"method": {
"enum": [
"model/verification"
],
"title": "Model/verificationNotificationMethod",
"type": "string"
},
"params": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/ModelVerificationNotification"
}
},
"required": [
"method",
"params"
],
"title": "Model/verificationNotification",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"method": {
@@ -5335,6 +5410,26 @@
"title": "WarningNotification",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"method": {
"enum": [
"guardianWarning"
],
"title": "GuardianWarningNotificationMethod",
"type": "string"
},
"params": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/GuardianWarningNotification"
}
},
"required": [
"method",
"params"
],
"title": "GuardianWarningNotification",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"method": {

View File

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
]
},
"read": {
"description": "This will be removed in favor of `entries`.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@
]
},
"write": {
"description": "This will be removed in favor of `entries`.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
@@ -1584,6 +1586,9 @@
},
"PermissionsRequestApprovalParams": {
"properties": {
"cwd": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"itemId": {
"type": "string"
},
@@ -1604,6 +1609,7 @@
}
},
"required": [
"cwd",
"itemId",
"permissions",
"threadId",

View File

@@ -24,6 +24,13 @@
"chatgptAuthTokens"
],
"type": "string"
},
{
"description": "Programmatic Codex auth backed by a registered Agent Identity.",
"enum": [
"agentIdentity"
],
"type": "string"
}
]
},

View File

@@ -27,6 +27,217 @@
],
"type": "object"
},
"FileSystemAccessMode": {
"enum": [
"read",
"write",
"none"
],
"type": "string"
},
"FileSystemPath": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"path"
],
"title": "PathFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "PathFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"pattern": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"glob_pattern"
],
"title": "GlobPatternFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"pattern",
"type"
],
"title": "GlobPatternFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"type": {
"enum": [
"special"
],
"title": "SpecialFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
},
"value": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemSpecialPath"
}
},
"required": [
"type",
"value"
],
"title": "SpecialFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"FileSystemSandboxEntry": {
"properties": {
"access": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemAccessMode"
},
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemPath"
}
},
"required": [
"access",
"path"
],
"type": "object"
},
"FileSystemSpecialPath": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"root"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "RootFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"minimal"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "MinimalFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"current_working_directory"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "CurrentWorkingDirectoryFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"project_roots"
],
"type": "string"
},
"subpath": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "KindFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"tmpdir"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "TmpdirFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"slash_tmp"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "SlashTmpFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"unknown"
],
"type": "string"
},
"path": {
"type": "string"
},
"subpath": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"kind",
"path"
],
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"NetworkAccess": {
"enum": [
"restricted",
@@ -34,6 +245,64 @@
],
"type": "string"
},
"PermissionProfile": {
"properties": {
"fileSystem": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
]
},
"network": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
]
}
},
"type": "object"
},
"PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions": {
"properties": {
"entries": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemSandboxEntry"
},
"type": "array"
},
"globScanMaxDepth": {
"format": "uint",
"minimum": 1.0,
"type": [
"integer",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"entries"
],
"type": "object"
},
"PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions": {
"properties": {
"enabled": {
"type": [
"boolean",
"null"
]
}
},
"type": "object"
},
"ReadOnlyAccess": {
"oneOf": [
{
@@ -247,6 +516,17 @@
"null"
]
},
"permissionProfile": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfile"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"description": "Optional full permissions profile for this command.\n\nDefaults to the user's configured permissions when omitted. Cannot be combined with `sandboxPolicy`."
},
"processId": {
"description": "Optional client-supplied, connection-scoped process id.\n\nRequired for `tty`, `streamStdin`, `streamStdoutStderr`, and follow-up `command/exec/write`, `command/exec/resize`, and `command/exec/terminate` calls. When omitted, buffered execution gets an internal id that is not exposed to the client.",
"type": [
@@ -263,7 +543,7 @@
"type": "null"
}
],
"description": "Optional sandbox policy for this command.\n\nUses the same shape as thread/turn execution sandbox configuration and defaults to the user's configured policy when omitted."
"description": "Optional sandbox policy for this command.\n\nUses the same shape as thread/turn execution sandbox configuration and defaults to the user's configured policy when omitted. Cannot be combined with `permissionProfile`."
},
"size": {
"anyOf": [

View File

@@ -97,9 +97,10 @@
"type": "object"
},
"ApprovalsReviewer": {
"description": "Configures who approval requests are routed to for review. Examples include sandbox escapes, blocked network access, MCP approval prompts, and ARC escalations. Defaults to `user`. `guardian_subagent` uses a carefully prompted subagent to gather relevant context and apply a risk-based decision framework before approving or denying the request.",
"description": "Configures who approval requests are routed to for review. Examples include sandbox escapes, blocked network access, MCP approval prompts, and ARC escalations. Defaults to `user`. `auto_review` uses a carefully prompted subagent to gather relevant context and apply a risk-based decision framework before approving or denying the request. The legacy value `guardian_subagent` is accepted for compatibility.",
"enum": [
"user",
"auto_review",
"guardian_subagent"
],
"type": "string"

View File

@@ -2,9 +2,10 @@
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"ApprovalsReviewer": {
"description": "Configures who approval requests are routed to for review. Examples include sandbox escapes, blocked network access, MCP approval prompts, and ARC escalations. Defaults to `user`. `guardian_subagent` uses a carefully prompted subagent to gather relevant context and apply a risk-based decision framework before approving or denying the request.",
"description": "Configures who approval requests are routed to for review. Examples include sandbox escapes, blocked network access, MCP approval prompts, and ARC escalations. Defaults to `user`. `auto_review` uses a carefully prompted subagent to gather relevant context and apply a risk-based decision framework before approving or denying the request. The legacy value `guardian_subagent` is accepted for compatibility.",
"enum": [
"user",
"auto_review",
"guardian_subagent"
],
"type": "string"
@@ -110,6 +111,161 @@
},
"type": "object"
},
"ConfiguredHookHandler": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"async": {
"type": "boolean"
},
"command": {
"type": "string"
},
"statusMessage": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
},
"timeoutSec": {
"format": "uint64",
"minimum": 0.0,
"type": [
"integer",
"null"
]
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"command"
],
"title": "CommandConfiguredHookHandlerType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"async",
"command",
"type"
],
"title": "CommandConfiguredHookHandler",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"type": {
"enum": [
"prompt"
],
"title": "PromptConfiguredHookHandlerType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"type"
],
"title": "PromptConfiguredHookHandler",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"type": {
"enum": [
"agent"
],
"title": "AgentConfiguredHookHandlerType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"type"
],
"title": "AgentConfiguredHookHandler",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"ConfiguredHookMatcherGroup": {
"properties": {
"hooks": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/ConfiguredHookHandler"
},
"type": "array"
},
"matcher": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"hooks"
],
"type": "object"
},
"ManagedHooksRequirements": {
"properties": {
"PermissionRequest": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/ConfiguredHookMatcherGroup"
},
"type": "array"
},
"PostToolUse": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/ConfiguredHookMatcherGroup"
},
"type": "array"
},
"PreToolUse": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/ConfiguredHookMatcherGroup"
},
"type": "array"
},
"SessionStart": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/ConfiguredHookMatcherGroup"
},
"type": "array"
},
"Stop": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/ConfiguredHookMatcherGroup"
},
"type": "array"
},
"UserPromptSubmit": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/ConfiguredHookMatcherGroup"
},
"type": "array"
},
"managedDir": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
},
"windowsManagedDir": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"PermissionRequest",
"PostToolUse",
"PreToolUse",
"SessionStart",
"Stop",
"UserPromptSubmit"
],
"type": "object"
},
"NetworkDomainPermission": {
"enum": [
"allow",

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
{
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"DeviceKeyProtectionPolicy": {
"description": "Protection policy for creating or loading a controller-local device key.",
"enum": [
"hardware_only",
"allow_os_protected_nonextractable"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"description": "Create a controller-local device key with a random key id.",
"properties": {
"accountUserId": {
"type": "string"
},
"clientId": {
"type": "string"
},
"protectionPolicy": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/DeviceKeyProtectionPolicy"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"description": "Defaults to `hardware_only` when omitted."
}
},
"required": [
"accountUserId",
"clientId"
],
"title": "DeviceKeyCreateParams",
"type": "object"
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
{
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"DeviceKeyAlgorithm": {
"description": "Device-key algorithm reported at enrollment and signing boundaries.",
"enum": [
"ecdsa_p256_sha256"
],
"type": "string"
},
"DeviceKeyProtectionClass": {
"description": "Platform protection class for a controller-local device key.",
"enum": [
"hardware_secure_enclave",
"hardware_tpm",
"os_protected_nonextractable"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"description": "Device-key metadata and public key returned by create/public APIs.",
"properties": {
"algorithm": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/DeviceKeyAlgorithm"
},
"keyId": {
"type": "string"
},
"protectionClass": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/DeviceKeyProtectionClass"
},
"publicKeySpkiDerBase64": {
"description": "SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER encoded as base64.",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"algorithm",
"keyId",
"protectionClass",
"publicKeySpkiDerBase64"
],
"title": "DeviceKeyCreateResponse",
"type": "object"
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
{
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"description": "Fetch a controller-local device key public key by id.",
"properties": {
"keyId": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"keyId"
],
"title": "DeviceKeyPublicParams",
"type": "object"
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
{
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"DeviceKeyAlgorithm": {
"description": "Device-key algorithm reported at enrollment and signing boundaries.",
"enum": [
"ecdsa_p256_sha256"
],
"type": "string"
},
"DeviceKeyProtectionClass": {
"description": "Platform protection class for a controller-local device key.",
"enum": [
"hardware_secure_enclave",
"hardware_tpm",
"os_protected_nonextractable"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"description": "Device-key public metadata returned by `device/key/public`.",
"properties": {
"algorithm": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/DeviceKeyAlgorithm"
},
"keyId": {
"type": "string"
},
"protectionClass": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/DeviceKeyProtectionClass"
},
"publicKeySpkiDerBase64": {
"description": "SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER encoded as base64.",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"algorithm",
"keyId",
"protectionClass",
"publicKeySpkiDerBase64"
],
"title": "DeviceKeyPublicResponse",
"type": "object"
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
{
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"DeviceKeySignPayload": {
"description": "Structured payloads accepted by `device/key/sign`.",
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Payload bound to one remote-control controller websocket `/client` connection challenge.",
"properties": {
"accountUserId": {
"type": "string"
},
"audience": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/RemoteControlClientConnectionAudience"
},
"clientId": {
"type": "string"
},
"nonce": {
"type": "string"
},
"scopes": {
"description": "Must contain exactly `remote_control_controller_websocket`.",
"items": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": "array"
},
"sessionId": {
"description": "Backend-issued websocket session id that this proof authorizes.",
"type": "string"
},
"targetOrigin": {
"description": "Origin of the backend endpoint that issued the challenge and will verify this proof.",
"type": "string"
},
"targetPath": {
"description": "Websocket route path that this proof authorizes.",
"type": "string"
},
"tokenExpiresAt": {
"description": "Remote-control token expiration as Unix seconds.",
"format": "int64",
"type": "integer"
},
"tokenSha256Base64url": {
"description": "SHA-256 of the controller-scoped remote-control token, encoded as unpadded base64url.",
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"remoteControlClientConnection"
],
"title": "RemoteControlClientConnectionDeviceKeySignPayloadType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"accountUserId",
"audience",
"clientId",
"nonce",
"scopes",
"sessionId",
"targetOrigin",
"targetPath",
"tokenExpiresAt",
"tokenSha256Base64url",
"type"
],
"title": "RemoteControlClientConnectionDeviceKeySignPayload",
"type": "object"
},
{
"description": "Payload bound to a remote-control client `/client/enroll` ownership challenge.",
"properties": {
"accountUserId": {
"type": "string"
},
"audience": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/RemoteControlClientEnrollmentAudience"
},
"challengeExpiresAt": {
"description": "Enrollment challenge expiration as Unix seconds.",
"format": "int64",
"type": "integer"
},
"challengeId": {
"description": "Backend-issued enrollment challenge id that this proof authorizes.",
"type": "string"
},
"clientId": {
"type": "string"
},
"deviceIdentitySha256Base64url": {
"description": "SHA-256 of the requested device identity operation, encoded as unpadded base64url.",
"type": "string"
},
"nonce": {
"type": "string"
},
"targetOrigin": {
"description": "Origin of the backend endpoint that issued the challenge and will verify this proof.",
"type": "string"
},
"targetPath": {
"description": "HTTP route path that this proof authorizes.",
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"remoteControlClientEnrollment"
],
"title": "RemoteControlClientEnrollmentDeviceKeySignPayloadType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"accountUserId",
"audience",
"challengeExpiresAt",
"challengeId",
"clientId",
"deviceIdentitySha256Base64url",
"nonce",
"targetOrigin",
"targetPath",
"type"
],
"title": "RemoteControlClientEnrollmentDeviceKeySignPayload",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"RemoteControlClientConnectionAudience": {
"description": "Audience for a remote-control client connection device-key proof.",
"enum": [
"remote_control_client_websocket"
],
"type": "string"
},
"RemoteControlClientEnrollmentAudience": {
"description": "Audience for a remote-control client enrollment device-key proof.",
"enum": [
"remote_control_client_enrollment"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"description": "Sign an accepted structured payload with a controller-local device key.",
"properties": {
"keyId": {
"type": "string"
},
"payload": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/DeviceKeySignPayload"
}
},
"required": [
"keyId",
"payload"
],
"title": "DeviceKeySignParams",
"type": "object"
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
{
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"DeviceKeyAlgorithm": {
"description": "Device-key algorithm reported at enrollment and signing boundaries.",
"enum": [
"ecdsa_p256_sha256"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"description": "ASN.1 DER signature returned by `device/key/sign`.",
"properties": {
"algorithm": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/DeviceKeyAlgorithm"
},
"signatureDerBase64": {
"description": "ECDSA signature DER encoded as base64.",
"type": "string"
},
"signedPayloadBase64": {
"description": "Exact bytes signed by the device key, encoded as base64. Verifiers must verify this byte string directly and must not reserialize `payload`.",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"algorithm",
"signatureDerBase64",
"signedPayloadBase64"
],
"title": "DeviceKeySignResponse",
"type": "object"
}

View File

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
"contextWindowExceeded",
"usageLimitExceeded",
"serverOverloaded",
"cyberPolicy",
"internalServerError",
"unauthorized",
"badRequest",

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
{
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"properties": {
"message": {
"description": "Concise guardian warning message for the user.",
"type": "string"
},
"threadId": {
"description": "Thread target for the guardian warning.",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"message",
"threadId"
],
"title": "GuardianWarningNotification",
"type": "object"
}

View File

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
]
},
"read": {
"description": "This will be removed in favor of `entries`.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@
]
},
"write": {
"description": "This will be removed in favor of `entries`.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},

View File

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
]
},
"read": {
"description": "This will be removed in favor of `entries`.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@
]
},
"write": {
"description": "This will be removed in favor of `entries`.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
{
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"ModelVerification": {
"enum": [
"trustedAccessForCyber"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"properties": {
"threadId": {
"type": "string"
},
"turnId": {
"type": "string"
},
"verifications": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/ModelVerification"
},
"type": "array"
}
},
"required": [
"threadId",
"turnId",
"verifications"
],
"title": "ModelVerificationNotification",
"type": "object"
}

View File

@@ -62,7 +62,14 @@
"type": "string"
},
"marketplacePath": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
]
},
"mcpServers": {
"items": {
@@ -83,7 +90,6 @@
"required": [
"apps",
"marketplaceName",
"marketplacePath",
"mcpServers",
"skills",
"summary"
@@ -423,7 +429,14 @@
"type": "string"
},
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
]
},
"shortDescription": {
"type": [
@@ -435,8 +448,7 @@
"required": [
"description",
"enabled",
"name",
"path"
"name"
],
"type": "object"
}

View File

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
"contextWindowExceeded",
"usageLimitExceeded",
"serverOverloaded",
"cyberPolicy",
"internalServerError",
"unauthorized",
"badRequest",

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
{
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"properties": {
"event": {
"description": "Serialized `codex_protocol::protocol::GuardianAssessmentEvent`."
},
"threadId": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"event",
"threadId"
],
"title": "ThreadApproveGuardianDeniedActionParams",
"type": "object"
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
{
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"title": "ThreadApproveGuardianDeniedActionResponse",
"type": "object"
}

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,15 @@
{
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"AbsolutePathBuf": {
"description": "A path that is guaranteed to be absolute and normalized (though it is not guaranteed to be canonicalized or exist on the filesystem).\n\nIMPORTANT: When deserializing an `AbsolutePathBuf`, a base path must be set using [AbsolutePathBufGuard::new]. If no base path is set, the deserialization will fail unless the path being deserialized is already absolute.",
"type": "string"
},
"ApprovalsReviewer": {
"description": "Configures who approval requests are routed to for review. Examples include sandbox escapes, blocked network access, MCP approval prompts, and ARC escalations. Defaults to `user`. `guardian_subagent` uses a carefully prompted subagent to gather relevant context and apply a risk-based decision framework before approving or denying the request.",
"description": "Configures who approval requests are routed to for review. Examples include sandbox escapes, blocked network access, MCP approval prompts, and ARC escalations. Defaults to `user`. `auto_review` uses a carefully prompted subagent to gather relevant context and apply a risk-based decision framework before approving or denying the request. The legacy value `guardian_subagent` is accepted for compatibility.",
"enum": [
"user",
"auto_review",
"guardian_subagent"
],
"type": "string"
@@ -59,6 +64,275 @@
}
]
},
"FileSystemAccessMode": {
"enum": [
"read",
"write",
"none"
],
"type": "string"
},
"FileSystemPath": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"path"
],
"title": "PathFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "PathFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"pattern": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"glob_pattern"
],
"title": "GlobPatternFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"pattern",
"type"
],
"title": "GlobPatternFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"type": {
"enum": [
"special"
],
"title": "SpecialFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
},
"value": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemSpecialPath"
}
},
"required": [
"type",
"value"
],
"title": "SpecialFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"FileSystemSandboxEntry": {
"properties": {
"access": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemAccessMode"
},
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemPath"
}
},
"required": [
"access",
"path"
],
"type": "object"
},
"FileSystemSpecialPath": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"root"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "RootFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"minimal"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "MinimalFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"current_working_directory"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "CurrentWorkingDirectoryFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"project_roots"
],
"type": "string"
},
"subpath": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "KindFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"tmpdir"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "TmpdirFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"slash_tmp"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "SlashTmpFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"unknown"
],
"type": "string"
},
"path": {
"type": "string"
},
"subpath": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"kind",
"path"
],
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"PermissionProfile": {
"properties": {
"fileSystem": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
]
},
"network": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
]
}
},
"type": "object"
},
"PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions": {
"properties": {
"entries": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemSandboxEntry"
},
"type": "array"
},
"globScanMaxDepth": {
"format": "uint",
"minimum": 1.0,
"type": [
"integer",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"entries"
],
"type": "object"
},
"PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions": {
"properties": {
"enabled": {
"type": [
"boolean",
"null"
]
}
},
"type": "object"
},
"SandboxMode": {
"enum": [
"read-only",
@@ -139,6 +413,17 @@
"null"
]
},
"permissionProfile": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfile"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"description": "Full permissions override for the forked thread. Cannot be combined with `sandbox`."
},
"sandbox": {
"anyOf": [
{

View File

@@ -9,9 +9,10 @@
"type": "string"
},
"ApprovalsReviewer": {
"description": "Configures who approval requests are routed to for review. Examples include sandbox escapes, blocked network access, MCP approval prompts, and ARC escalations. Defaults to `user`. `guardian_subagent` uses a carefully prompted subagent to gather relevant context and apply a risk-based decision framework before approving or denying the request.",
"description": "Configures who approval requests are routed to for review. Examples include sandbox escapes, blocked network access, MCP approval prompts, and ARC escalations. Defaults to `user`. `auto_review` uses a carefully prompted subagent to gather relevant context and apply a risk-based decision framework before approving or denying the request. The legacy value `guardian_subagent` is accepted for compatibility.",
"enum": [
"user",
"auto_review",
"guardian_subagent"
],
"type": "string"
@@ -93,6 +94,7 @@
"contextWindowExceeded",
"usageLimitExceeded",
"serverOverloaded",
"cyberPolicy",
"internalServerError",
"unauthorized",
"badRequest",
@@ -448,6 +450,217 @@
],
"type": "string"
},
"FileSystemAccessMode": {
"enum": [
"read",
"write",
"none"
],
"type": "string"
},
"FileSystemPath": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"path"
],
"title": "PathFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "PathFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"pattern": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"glob_pattern"
],
"title": "GlobPatternFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"pattern",
"type"
],
"title": "GlobPatternFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"type": {
"enum": [
"special"
],
"title": "SpecialFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
},
"value": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemSpecialPath"
}
},
"required": [
"type",
"value"
],
"title": "SpecialFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"FileSystemSandboxEntry": {
"properties": {
"access": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemAccessMode"
},
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemPath"
}
},
"required": [
"access",
"path"
],
"type": "object"
},
"FileSystemSpecialPath": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"root"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "RootFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"minimal"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "MinimalFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"current_working_directory"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "CurrentWorkingDirectoryFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"project_roots"
],
"type": "string"
},
"subpath": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "KindFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"tmpdir"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "TmpdirFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"slash_tmp"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "SlashTmpFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"unknown"
],
"type": "string"
},
"path": {
"type": "string"
},
"subpath": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"kind",
"path"
],
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"FileUpdateChange": {
"properties": {
"diff": {
@@ -686,6 +899,64 @@
}
]
},
"PermissionProfile": {
"properties": {
"fileSystem": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
]
},
"network": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
]
}
},
"type": "object"
},
"PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions": {
"properties": {
"entries": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemSandboxEntry"
},
"type": "array"
},
"globScanMaxDepth": {
"format": "uint",
"minimum": 1.0,
"type": [
"integer",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"entries"
],
"type": "object"
},
"PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions": {
"properties": {
"enabled": {
"type": [
"boolean",
"null"
]
}
},
"type": "object"
},
"ReadOnlyAccess": {
"oneOf": [
{
@@ -2225,6 +2496,18 @@
"modelProvider": {
"type": "string"
},
"permissionProfile": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfile"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Canonical active permissions view for this thread when representable. This is `null` for external sandbox policies because external enforcement cannot be round-tripped as a `PermissionProfile`."
},
"reasoningEffort": {
"anyOf": [
{
@@ -2236,7 +2519,12 @@
]
},
"sandbox": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/SandboxPolicy"
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/SandboxPolicy"
}
],
"description": "Legacy sandbox policy retained for compatibility. New clients should use `permissionProfile` when present as the canonical active permissions view."
},
"serviceTier": {
"anyOf": [

View File

@@ -8,6 +8,19 @@
],
"type": "string"
},
"ThreadListCwdFilter": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"items": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": "array"
}
]
},
"ThreadSortKey": {
"enum": [
"created_at",
@@ -47,11 +60,15 @@
]
},
"cwd": {
"description": "Optional cwd filter; when set, only threads whose session cwd exactly matches this path are returned.",
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/ThreadListCwdFilter"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"description": "Optional cwd filter or filters; when set, only threads whose session cwd exactly matches one of these paths are returned."
},
"limit": {
"description": "Optional page size; defaults to a reasonable server-side value.",
@@ -110,6 +127,10 @@
"array",
"null"
]
},
"useStateDbOnly": {
"description": "If true, return from the state DB without scanning JSONL rollouts to repair thread metadata. Omitted or false preserves scan-and-repair behavior.",
"type": "boolean"
}
},
"title": "ThreadListParams",

View File

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
"contextWindowExceeded",
"usageLimitExceeded",
"serverOverloaded",
"cyberPolicy",
"internalServerError",
"unauthorized",
"badRequest",

View File

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
"contextWindowExceeded",
"usageLimitExceeded",
"serverOverloaded",
"cyberPolicy",
"internalServerError",
"unauthorized",
"badRequest",

View File

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
"contextWindowExceeded",
"usageLimitExceeded",
"serverOverloaded",
"cyberPolicy",
"internalServerError",
"unauthorized",
"badRequest",

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,15 @@
{
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"AbsolutePathBuf": {
"description": "A path that is guaranteed to be absolute and normalized (though it is not guaranteed to be canonicalized or exist on the filesystem).\n\nIMPORTANT: When deserializing an `AbsolutePathBuf`, a base path must be set using [AbsolutePathBufGuard::new]. If no base path is set, the deserialization will fail unless the path being deserialized is already absolute.",
"type": "string"
},
"ApprovalsReviewer": {
"description": "Configures who approval requests are routed to for review. Examples include sandbox escapes, blocked network access, MCP approval prompts, and ARC escalations. Defaults to `user`. `guardian_subagent` uses a carefully prompted subagent to gather relevant context and apply a risk-based decision framework before approving or denying the request.",
"description": "Configures who approval requests are routed to for review. Examples include sandbox escapes, blocked network access, MCP approval prompts, and ARC escalations. Defaults to `user`. `auto_review` uses a carefully prompted subagent to gather relevant context and apply a risk-based decision framework before approving or denying the request. The legacy value `guardian_subagent` is accepted for compatibility.",
"enum": [
"user",
"auto_review",
"guardian_subagent"
],
"type": "string"
@@ -133,6 +138,217 @@
}
]
},
"FileSystemAccessMode": {
"enum": [
"read",
"write",
"none"
],
"type": "string"
},
"FileSystemPath": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"path"
],
"title": "PathFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "PathFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"pattern": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"glob_pattern"
],
"title": "GlobPatternFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"pattern",
"type"
],
"title": "GlobPatternFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"type": {
"enum": [
"special"
],
"title": "SpecialFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
},
"value": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemSpecialPath"
}
},
"required": [
"type",
"value"
],
"title": "SpecialFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"FileSystemSandboxEntry": {
"properties": {
"access": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemAccessMode"
},
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemPath"
}
},
"required": [
"access",
"path"
],
"type": "object"
},
"FileSystemSpecialPath": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"root"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "RootFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"minimal"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "MinimalFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"current_working_directory"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "CurrentWorkingDirectoryFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"project_roots"
],
"type": "string"
},
"subpath": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "KindFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"tmpdir"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "TmpdirFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"slash_tmp"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "SlashTmpFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"unknown"
],
"type": "string"
},
"path": {
"type": "string"
},
"subpath": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"kind",
"path"
],
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"FunctionCallOutputBody": {
"anyOf": [
{
@@ -325,6 +541,64 @@
}
]
},
"PermissionProfile": {
"properties": {
"fileSystem": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
]
},
"network": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
]
}
},
"type": "object"
},
"PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions": {
"properties": {
"entries": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemSandboxEntry"
},
"type": "array"
},
"globScanMaxDepth": {
"format": "uint",
"minimum": 1.0,
"type": [
"integer",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"entries"
],
"type": "object"
},
"PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions": {
"properties": {
"enabled": {
"type": [
"boolean",
"null"
]
}
},
"type": "object"
},
"Personality": {
"enum": [
"none",
@@ -1052,6 +1326,17 @@
"null"
]
},
"permissionProfile": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfile"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"description": "Full permissions override for the resumed thread. Cannot be combined with `sandbox`."
},
"personality": {
"anyOf": [
{

View File

@@ -9,9 +9,10 @@
"type": "string"
},
"ApprovalsReviewer": {
"description": "Configures who approval requests are routed to for review. Examples include sandbox escapes, blocked network access, MCP approval prompts, and ARC escalations. Defaults to `user`. `guardian_subagent` uses a carefully prompted subagent to gather relevant context and apply a risk-based decision framework before approving or denying the request.",
"description": "Configures who approval requests are routed to for review. Examples include sandbox escapes, blocked network access, MCP approval prompts, and ARC escalations. Defaults to `user`. `auto_review` uses a carefully prompted subagent to gather relevant context and apply a risk-based decision framework before approving or denying the request. The legacy value `guardian_subagent` is accepted for compatibility.",
"enum": [
"user",
"auto_review",
"guardian_subagent"
],
"type": "string"
@@ -93,6 +94,7 @@
"contextWindowExceeded",
"usageLimitExceeded",
"serverOverloaded",
"cyberPolicy",
"internalServerError",
"unauthorized",
"badRequest",
@@ -448,6 +450,217 @@
],
"type": "string"
},
"FileSystemAccessMode": {
"enum": [
"read",
"write",
"none"
],
"type": "string"
},
"FileSystemPath": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"path"
],
"title": "PathFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "PathFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"pattern": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"glob_pattern"
],
"title": "GlobPatternFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"pattern",
"type"
],
"title": "GlobPatternFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"type": {
"enum": [
"special"
],
"title": "SpecialFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
},
"value": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemSpecialPath"
}
},
"required": [
"type",
"value"
],
"title": "SpecialFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"FileSystemSandboxEntry": {
"properties": {
"access": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemAccessMode"
},
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemPath"
}
},
"required": [
"access",
"path"
],
"type": "object"
},
"FileSystemSpecialPath": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"root"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "RootFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"minimal"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "MinimalFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"current_working_directory"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "CurrentWorkingDirectoryFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"project_roots"
],
"type": "string"
},
"subpath": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "KindFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"tmpdir"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "TmpdirFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"slash_tmp"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "SlashTmpFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"unknown"
],
"type": "string"
},
"path": {
"type": "string"
},
"subpath": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"kind",
"path"
],
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"FileUpdateChange": {
"properties": {
"diff": {
@@ -686,6 +899,64 @@
}
]
},
"PermissionProfile": {
"properties": {
"fileSystem": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
]
},
"network": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
]
}
},
"type": "object"
},
"PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions": {
"properties": {
"entries": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemSandboxEntry"
},
"type": "array"
},
"globScanMaxDepth": {
"format": "uint",
"minimum": 1.0,
"type": [
"integer",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"entries"
],
"type": "object"
},
"PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions": {
"properties": {
"enabled": {
"type": [
"boolean",
"null"
]
}
},
"type": "object"
},
"ReadOnlyAccess": {
"oneOf": [
{
@@ -2225,6 +2496,18 @@
"modelProvider": {
"type": "string"
},
"permissionProfile": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfile"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Canonical active permissions view for this thread when representable. This is `null` for external sandbox policies because external enforcement cannot be round-tripped as a `PermissionProfile`."
},
"reasoningEffort": {
"anyOf": [
{
@@ -2236,7 +2519,12 @@
]
},
"sandbox": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/SandboxPolicy"
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/SandboxPolicy"
}
],
"description": "Legacy sandbox policy retained for compatibility. New clients should use `permissionProfile` when present as the canonical active permissions view."
},
"serviceTier": {
"anyOf": [

View File

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
"contextWindowExceeded",
"usageLimitExceeded",
"serverOverloaded",
"cyberPolicy",
"internalServerError",
"unauthorized",
"badRequest",

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,15 @@
{
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"AbsolutePathBuf": {
"description": "A path that is guaranteed to be absolute and normalized (though it is not guaranteed to be canonicalized or exist on the filesystem).\n\nIMPORTANT: When deserializing an `AbsolutePathBuf`, a base path must be set using [AbsolutePathBufGuard::new]. If no base path is set, the deserialization will fail unless the path being deserialized is already absolute.",
"type": "string"
},
"ApprovalsReviewer": {
"description": "Configures who approval requests are routed to for review. Examples include sandbox escapes, blocked network access, MCP approval prompts, and ARC escalations. Defaults to `user`. `guardian_subagent` uses a carefully prompted subagent to gather relevant context and apply a risk-based decision framework before approving or denying the request.",
"description": "Configures who approval requests are routed to for review. Examples include sandbox escapes, blocked network access, MCP approval prompts, and ARC escalations. Defaults to `user`. `auto_review` uses a carefully prompted subagent to gather relevant context and apply a risk-based decision framework before approving or denying the request. The legacy value `guardian_subagent` is accepted for compatibility.",
"enum": [
"user",
"auto_review",
"guardian_subagent"
],
"type": "string"
@@ -85,6 +90,275 @@
],
"type": "object"
},
"FileSystemAccessMode": {
"enum": [
"read",
"write",
"none"
],
"type": "string"
},
"FileSystemPath": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"path"
],
"title": "PathFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "PathFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"pattern": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"glob_pattern"
],
"title": "GlobPatternFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"pattern",
"type"
],
"title": "GlobPatternFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"type": {
"enum": [
"special"
],
"title": "SpecialFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
},
"value": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemSpecialPath"
}
},
"required": [
"type",
"value"
],
"title": "SpecialFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"FileSystemSandboxEntry": {
"properties": {
"access": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemAccessMode"
},
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemPath"
}
},
"required": [
"access",
"path"
],
"type": "object"
},
"FileSystemSpecialPath": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"root"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "RootFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"minimal"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "MinimalFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"current_working_directory"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "CurrentWorkingDirectoryFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"project_roots"
],
"type": "string"
},
"subpath": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "KindFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"tmpdir"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "TmpdirFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"slash_tmp"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "SlashTmpFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"unknown"
],
"type": "string"
},
"path": {
"type": "string"
},
"subpath": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"kind",
"path"
],
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"PermissionProfile": {
"properties": {
"fileSystem": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
]
},
"network": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
]
}
},
"type": "object"
},
"PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions": {
"properties": {
"entries": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemSandboxEntry"
},
"type": "array"
},
"globScanMaxDepth": {
"format": "uint",
"minimum": 1.0,
"type": [
"integer",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"entries"
],
"type": "object"
},
"PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions": {
"properties": {
"enabled": {
"type": [
"boolean",
"null"
]
}
},
"type": "object"
},
"Personality": {
"enum": [
"none",
@@ -181,6 +455,17 @@
"null"
]
},
"permissionProfile": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfile"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"description": "Full permissions override for this thread. Cannot be combined with `sandbox`."
},
"personality": {
"anyOf": [
{

View File

@@ -9,9 +9,10 @@
"type": "string"
},
"ApprovalsReviewer": {
"description": "Configures who approval requests are routed to for review. Examples include sandbox escapes, blocked network access, MCP approval prompts, and ARC escalations. Defaults to `user`. `guardian_subagent` uses a carefully prompted subagent to gather relevant context and apply a risk-based decision framework before approving or denying the request.",
"description": "Configures who approval requests are routed to for review. Examples include sandbox escapes, blocked network access, MCP approval prompts, and ARC escalations. Defaults to `user`. `auto_review` uses a carefully prompted subagent to gather relevant context and apply a risk-based decision framework before approving or denying the request. The legacy value `guardian_subagent` is accepted for compatibility.",
"enum": [
"user",
"auto_review",
"guardian_subagent"
],
"type": "string"
@@ -93,6 +94,7 @@
"contextWindowExceeded",
"usageLimitExceeded",
"serverOverloaded",
"cyberPolicy",
"internalServerError",
"unauthorized",
"badRequest",
@@ -448,6 +450,217 @@
],
"type": "string"
},
"FileSystemAccessMode": {
"enum": [
"read",
"write",
"none"
],
"type": "string"
},
"FileSystemPath": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"path"
],
"title": "PathFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "PathFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"pattern": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"glob_pattern"
],
"title": "GlobPatternFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"pattern",
"type"
],
"title": "GlobPatternFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"type": {
"enum": [
"special"
],
"title": "SpecialFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
},
"value": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemSpecialPath"
}
},
"required": [
"type",
"value"
],
"title": "SpecialFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"FileSystemSandboxEntry": {
"properties": {
"access": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemAccessMode"
},
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemPath"
}
},
"required": [
"access",
"path"
],
"type": "object"
},
"FileSystemSpecialPath": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"root"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "RootFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"minimal"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "MinimalFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"current_working_directory"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "CurrentWorkingDirectoryFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"project_roots"
],
"type": "string"
},
"subpath": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "KindFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"tmpdir"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "TmpdirFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"slash_tmp"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "SlashTmpFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"unknown"
],
"type": "string"
},
"path": {
"type": "string"
},
"subpath": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"kind",
"path"
],
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"FileUpdateChange": {
"properties": {
"diff": {
@@ -686,6 +899,64 @@
}
]
},
"PermissionProfile": {
"properties": {
"fileSystem": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
]
},
"network": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
]
}
},
"type": "object"
},
"PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions": {
"properties": {
"entries": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemSandboxEntry"
},
"type": "array"
},
"globScanMaxDepth": {
"format": "uint",
"minimum": 1.0,
"type": [
"integer",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"entries"
],
"type": "object"
},
"PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions": {
"properties": {
"enabled": {
"type": [
"boolean",
"null"
]
}
},
"type": "object"
},
"ReadOnlyAccess": {
"oneOf": [
{
@@ -2225,6 +2496,18 @@
"modelProvider": {
"type": "string"
},
"permissionProfile": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfile"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Canonical active permissions view for this thread when representable. This is `null` for external sandbox policies because external enforcement cannot be round-tripped as a `PermissionProfile`."
},
"reasoningEffort": {
"anyOf": [
{
@@ -2236,7 +2519,12 @@
]
},
"sandbox": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/SandboxPolicy"
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/SandboxPolicy"
}
],
"description": "Legacy sandbox policy retained for compatibility. New clients should use `permissionProfile` when present as the canonical active permissions view."
},
"serviceTier": {
"anyOf": [

View File

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
"contextWindowExceeded",
"usageLimitExceeded",
"serverOverloaded",
"cyberPolicy",
"internalServerError",
"unauthorized",
"badRequest",

View File

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
"contextWindowExceeded",
"usageLimitExceeded",
"serverOverloaded",
"cyberPolicy",
"internalServerError",
"unauthorized",
"badRequest",

View File

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
"contextWindowExceeded",
"usageLimitExceeded",
"serverOverloaded",
"cyberPolicy",
"internalServerError",
"unauthorized",
"badRequest",

View File

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
"contextWindowExceeded",
"usageLimitExceeded",
"serverOverloaded",
"cyberPolicy",
"internalServerError",
"unauthorized",
"badRequest",

View File

@@ -6,9 +6,10 @@
"type": "string"
},
"ApprovalsReviewer": {
"description": "Configures who approval requests are routed to for review. Examples include sandbox escapes, blocked network access, MCP approval prompts, and ARC escalations. Defaults to `user`. `guardian_subagent` uses a carefully prompted subagent to gather relevant context and apply a risk-based decision framework before approving or denying the request.",
"description": "Configures who approval requests are routed to for review. Examples include sandbox escapes, blocked network access, MCP approval prompts, and ARC escalations. Defaults to `user`. `auto_review` uses a carefully prompted subagent to gather relevant context and apply a risk-based decision framework before approving or denying the request. The legacy value `guardian_subagent` is accepted for compatibility.",
"enum": [
"user",
"auto_review",
"guardian_subagent"
],
"type": "string"
@@ -98,6 +99,217 @@
],
"type": "object"
},
"FileSystemAccessMode": {
"enum": [
"read",
"write",
"none"
],
"type": "string"
},
"FileSystemPath": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"path"
],
"title": "PathFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "PathFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"pattern": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"glob_pattern"
],
"title": "GlobPatternFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"pattern",
"type"
],
"title": "GlobPatternFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"type": {
"enum": [
"special"
],
"title": "SpecialFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
},
"value": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemSpecialPath"
}
},
"required": [
"type",
"value"
],
"title": "SpecialFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"FileSystemSandboxEntry": {
"properties": {
"access": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemAccessMode"
},
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemPath"
}
},
"required": [
"access",
"path"
],
"type": "object"
},
"FileSystemSpecialPath": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"root"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "RootFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"minimal"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "MinimalFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"current_working_directory"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "CurrentWorkingDirectoryFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"project_roots"
],
"type": "string"
},
"subpath": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "KindFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"tmpdir"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "TmpdirFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"slash_tmp"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "SlashTmpFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"unknown"
],
"type": "string"
},
"path": {
"type": "string"
},
"subpath": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"kind",
"path"
],
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"ModeKind": {
"description": "Initial collaboration mode to use when the TUI starts.",
"enum": [
@@ -113,6 +325,64 @@
],
"type": "string"
},
"PermissionProfile": {
"properties": {
"fileSystem": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
]
},
"network": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
]
}
},
"type": "object"
},
"PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions": {
"properties": {
"entries": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemSandboxEntry"
},
"type": "array"
},
"globScanMaxDepth": {
"format": "uint",
"minimum": 1.0,
"type": [
"integer",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"entries"
],
"type": "object"
},
"PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions": {
"properties": {
"enabled": {
"type": [
"boolean",
"null"
]
}
},
"type": "object"
},
"Personality": {
"enum": [
"none",
@@ -377,6 +647,21 @@
],
"type": "object"
},
"TurnEnvironmentParams": {
"properties": {
"cwd": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"environmentId": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"cwd",
"environmentId"
],
"type": "object"
},
"UserInput": {
"oneOf": [
{
@@ -555,6 +840,17 @@
"outputSchema": {
"description": "Optional JSON Schema used to constrain the final assistant message for this turn."
},
"permissionProfile": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfile"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"description": "Override the full permissions profile for this turn and subsequent turns. Cannot be combined with `sandboxPolicy`."
},
"personality": {
"anyOf": [
{

View File

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
"contextWindowExceeded",
"usageLimitExceeded",
"serverOverloaded",
"cyberPolicy",
"internalServerError",
"unauthorized",
"badRequest",

View File

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
"contextWindowExceeded",
"usageLimitExceeded",
"serverOverloaded",
"cyberPolicy",
"internalServerError",
"unauthorized",
"badRequest",

View File

@@ -5,4 +5,4 @@
/**
* Authentication mode for OpenAI-backed providers.
*/
export type AuthMode = "apikey" | "chatgpt" | "chatgptAuthTokens";
export type AuthMode = "apikey" | "chatgpt" | "chatgptAuthTokens" | "agentIdentity";

File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long

View File

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import type { ExternalAgentConfigImportCompletedNotification } from "./v2/Extern
import type { FileChangeOutputDeltaNotification } from "./v2/FileChangeOutputDeltaNotification";
import type { FileChangePatchUpdatedNotification } from "./v2/FileChangePatchUpdatedNotification";
import type { FsChangedNotification } from "./v2/FsChangedNotification";
import type { GuardianWarningNotification } from "./v2/GuardianWarningNotification";
import type { HookCompletedNotification } from "./v2/HookCompletedNotification";
import type { HookStartedNotification } from "./v2/HookStartedNotification";
import type { ItemCompletedNotification } from "./v2/ItemCompletedNotification";
@@ -28,6 +29,7 @@ import type { McpServerOauthLoginCompletedNotification } from "./v2/McpServerOau
import type { McpServerStatusUpdatedNotification } from "./v2/McpServerStatusUpdatedNotification";
import type { McpToolCallProgressNotification } from "./v2/McpToolCallProgressNotification";
import type { ModelReroutedNotification } from "./v2/ModelReroutedNotification";
import type { ModelVerificationNotification } from "./v2/ModelVerificationNotification";
import type { PlanDeltaNotification } from "./v2/PlanDeltaNotification";
import type { RawResponseItemCompletedNotification } from "./v2/RawResponseItemCompletedNotification";
import type { ReasoningSummaryPartAddedNotification } from "./v2/ReasoningSummaryPartAddedNotification";
@@ -62,4 +64,4 @@ import type { WindowsWorldWritableWarningNotification } from "./v2/WindowsWorldW
/**
* Notification sent from the server to the client.
*/
export type ServerNotification = { "method": "error", "params": ErrorNotification } | { "method": "thread/started", "params": ThreadStartedNotification } | { "method": "thread/status/changed", "params": ThreadStatusChangedNotification } | { "method": "thread/archived", "params": ThreadArchivedNotification } | { "method": "thread/unarchived", "params": ThreadUnarchivedNotification } | { "method": "thread/closed", "params": ThreadClosedNotification } | { "method": "skills/changed", "params": SkillsChangedNotification } | { "method": "thread/name/updated", "params": ThreadNameUpdatedNotification } | { "method": "thread/tokenUsage/updated", "params": ThreadTokenUsageUpdatedNotification } | { "method": "turn/started", "params": TurnStartedNotification } | { "method": "hook/started", "params": HookStartedNotification } | { "method": "turn/completed", "params": TurnCompletedNotification } | { "method": "hook/completed", "params": HookCompletedNotification } | { "method": "turn/diff/updated", "params": TurnDiffUpdatedNotification } | { "method": "turn/plan/updated", "params": TurnPlanUpdatedNotification } | { "method": "item/started", "params": ItemStartedNotification } | { "method": "item/autoApprovalReview/started", "params": ItemGuardianApprovalReviewStartedNotification } | { "method": "item/autoApprovalReview/completed", "params": ItemGuardianApprovalReviewCompletedNotification } | { "method": "item/completed", "params": ItemCompletedNotification } | { "method": "rawResponseItem/completed", "params": RawResponseItemCompletedNotification } | { "method": "item/agentMessage/delta", "params": AgentMessageDeltaNotification } | { "method": "item/plan/delta", "params": PlanDeltaNotification } | { "method": "command/exec/outputDelta", "params": CommandExecOutputDeltaNotification } | { "method": "item/commandExecution/outputDelta", "params": CommandExecutionOutputDeltaNotification } | { "method": "item/commandExecution/terminalInteraction", "params": TerminalInteractionNotification } | { "method": "item/fileChange/outputDelta", "params": FileChangeOutputDeltaNotification } | { "method": "item/fileChange/patchUpdated", "params": FileChangePatchUpdatedNotification } | { "method": "serverRequest/resolved", "params": ServerRequestResolvedNotification } | { "method": "item/mcpToolCall/progress", "params": McpToolCallProgressNotification } | { "method": "mcpServer/oauthLogin/completed", "params": McpServerOauthLoginCompletedNotification } | { "method": "mcpServer/startupStatus/updated", "params": McpServerStatusUpdatedNotification } | { "method": "account/updated", "params": AccountUpdatedNotification } | { "method": "account/rateLimits/updated", "params": AccountRateLimitsUpdatedNotification } | { "method": "app/list/updated", "params": AppListUpdatedNotification } | { "method": "externalAgentConfig/import/completed", "params": ExternalAgentConfigImportCompletedNotification } | { "method": "fs/changed", "params": FsChangedNotification } | { "method": "item/reasoning/summaryTextDelta", "params": ReasoningSummaryTextDeltaNotification } | { "method": "item/reasoning/summaryPartAdded", "params": ReasoningSummaryPartAddedNotification } | { "method": "item/reasoning/textDelta", "params": ReasoningTextDeltaNotification } | { "method": "thread/compacted", "params": ContextCompactedNotification } | { "method": "model/rerouted", "params": ModelReroutedNotification } | { "method": "warning", "params": WarningNotification } | { "method": "deprecationNotice", "params": DeprecationNoticeNotification } | { "method": "configWarning", "params": ConfigWarningNotification } | { "method": "fuzzyFileSearch/sessionUpdated", "params": FuzzyFileSearchSessionUpdatedNotification } | { "method": "fuzzyFileSearch/sessionCompleted", "params": FuzzyFileSearchSessionCompletedNotification } | { "method": "thread/realtime/started", "params": ThreadRealtimeStartedNotification } | { "method": "thread/realtime/itemAdded", "params": ThreadRealtimeItemAddedNotification } | { "method": "thread/realtime/transcript/delta", "params": ThreadRealtimeTranscriptDeltaNotification } | { "method": "thread/realtime/transcript/done", "params": ThreadRealtimeTranscriptDoneNotification } | { "method": "thread/realtime/outputAudio/delta", "params": ThreadRealtimeOutputAudioDeltaNotification } | { "method": "thread/realtime/sdp", "params": ThreadRealtimeSdpNotification } | { "method": "thread/realtime/error", "params": ThreadRealtimeErrorNotification } | { "method": "thread/realtime/closed", "params": ThreadRealtimeClosedNotification } | { "method": "windows/worldWritableWarning", "params": WindowsWorldWritableWarningNotification } | { "method": "windowsSandbox/setupCompleted", "params": WindowsSandboxSetupCompletedNotification } | { "method": "account/login/completed", "params": AccountLoginCompletedNotification };
export type ServerNotification = { "method": "error", "params": ErrorNotification } | { "method": "thread/started", "params": ThreadStartedNotification } | { "method": "thread/status/changed", "params": ThreadStatusChangedNotification } | { "method": "thread/archived", "params": ThreadArchivedNotification } | { "method": "thread/unarchived", "params": ThreadUnarchivedNotification } | { "method": "thread/closed", "params": ThreadClosedNotification } | { "method": "skills/changed", "params": SkillsChangedNotification } | { "method": "thread/name/updated", "params": ThreadNameUpdatedNotification } | { "method": "thread/tokenUsage/updated", "params": ThreadTokenUsageUpdatedNotification } | { "method": "turn/started", "params": TurnStartedNotification } | { "method": "hook/started", "params": HookStartedNotification } | { "method": "turn/completed", "params": TurnCompletedNotification } | { "method": "hook/completed", "params": HookCompletedNotification } | { "method": "turn/diff/updated", "params": TurnDiffUpdatedNotification } | { "method": "turn/plan/updated", "params": TurnPlanUpdatedNotification } | { "method": "item/started", "params": ItemStartedNotification } | { "method": "item/autoApprovalReview/started", "params": ItemGuardianApprovalReviewStartedNotification } | { "method": "item/autoApprovalReview/completed", "params": ItemGuardianApprovalReviewCompletedNotification } | { "method": "item/completed", "params": ItemCompletedNotification } | { "method": "rawResponseItem/completed", "params": RawResponseItemCompletedNotification } | { "method": "item/agentMessage/delta", "params": AgentMessageDeltaNotification } | { "method": "item/plan/delta", "params": PlanDeltaNotification } | { "method": "command/exec/outputDelta", "params": CommandExecOutputDeltaNotification } | { "method": "item/commandExecution/outputDelta", "params": CommandExecutionOutputDeltaNotification } | { "method": "item/commandExecution/terminalInteraction", "params": TerminalInteractionNotification } | { "method": "item/fileChange/outputDelta", "params": FileChangeOutputDeltaNotification } | { "method": "item/fileChange/patchUpdated", "params": FileChangePatchUpdatedNotification } | { "method": "serverRequest/resolved", "params": ServerRequestResolvedNotification } | { "method": "item/mcpToolCall/progress", "params": McpToolCallProgressNotification } | { "method": "mcpServer/oauthLogin/completed", "params": McpServerOauthLoginCompletedNotification } | { "method": "mcpServer/startupStatus/updated", "params": McpServerStatusUpdatedNotification } | { "method": "account/updated", "params": AccountUpdatedNotification } | { "method": "account/rateLimits/updated", "params": AccountRateLimitsUpdatedNotification } | { "method": "app/list/updated", "params": AppListUpdatedNotification } | { "method": "externalAgentConfig/import/completed", "params": ExternalAgentConfigImportCompletedNotification } | { "method": "fs/changed", "params": FsChangedNotification } | { "method": "item/reasoning/summaryTextDelta", "params": ReasoningSummaryTextDeltaNotification } | { "method": "item/reasoning/summaryPartAdded", "params": ReasoningSummaryPartAddedNotification } | { "method": "item/reasoning/textDelta", "params": ReasoningTextDeltaNotification } | { "method": "thread/compacted", "params": ContextCompactedNotification } | { "method": "model/rerouted", "params": ModelReroutedNotification } | { "method": "model/verification", "params": ModelVerificationNotification } | { "method": "warning", "params": WarningNotification } | { "method": "guardianWarning", "params": GuardianWarningNotification } | { "method": "deprecationNotice", "params": DeprecationNoticeNotification } | { "method": "configWarning", "params": ConfigWarningNotification } | { "method": "fuzzyFileSearch/sessionUpdated", "params": FuzzyFileSearchSessionUpdatedNotification } | { "method": "fuzzyFileSearch/sessionCompleted", "params": FuzzyFileSearchSessionCompletedNotification } | { "method": "thread/realtime/started", "params": ThreadRealtimeStartedNotification } | { "method": "thread/realtime/itemAdded", "params": ThreadRealtimeItemAddedNotification } | { "method": "thread/realtime/transcript/delta", "params": ThreadRealtimeTranscriptDeltaNotification } | { "method": "thread/realtime/transcript/done", "params": ThreadRealtimeTranscriptDoneNotification } | { "method": "thread/realtime/outputAudio/delta", "params": ThreadRealtimeOutputAudioDeltaNotification } | { "method": "thread/realtime/sdp", "params": ThreadRealtimeSdpNotification } | { "method": "thread/realtime/error", "params": ThreadRealtimeErrorNotification } | { "method": "thread/realtime/closed", "params": ThreadRealtimeClosedNotification } | { "method": "windows/worldWritableWarning", "params": WindowsWorldWritableWarningNotification } | { "method": "windowsSandbox/setupCompleted", "params": WindowsSandboxSetupCompletedNotification } | { "method": "account/login/completed", "params": AccountLoginCompletedNotification };

View File

@@ -4,4 +4,12 @@
import type { AbsolutePathBuf } from "../AbsolutePathBuf";
import type { FileSystemSandboxEntry } from "./FileSystemSandboxEntry";
export type AdditionalFileSystemPermissions = { read: Array<AbsolutePathBuf> | null, write: Array<AbsolutePathBuf> | null, globScanMaxDepth?: number, entries?: Array<FileSystemSandboxEntry>, };
export type AdditionalFileSystemPermissions = {
/**
* This will be removed in favor of `entries`.
*/
read: Array<AbsolutePathBuf> | null,
/**
* This will be removed in favor of `entries`.
*/
write: Array<AbsolutePathBuf> | null, globScanMaxDepth?: number, entries?: Array<FileSystemSandboxEntry>, };

View File

@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@
/**
* Configures who approval requests are routed to for review. Examples
* include sandbox escapes, blocked network access, MCP approval prompts, and
* ARC escalations. Defaults to `user`. `guardian_subagent` uses a carefully
* ARC escalations. Defaults to `user`. `auto_review` uses a carefully
* prompted subagent to gather relevant context and apply a risk-based
* decision framework before approving or denying the request.
*/
export type ApprovalsReviewer = "user" | "guardian_subagent";
export type ApprovalsReviewer = "user" | "auto_review" | "guardian_subagent";

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@@ -9,4 +9,4 @@ import type { NonSteerableTurnKind } from "./NonSteerableTurnKind";
* When an upstream HTTP status is available (for example, from the Responses API or a provider),
* it is forwarded in `httpStatusCode` on the relevant `codexErrorInfo` variant.
*/
export type CodexErrorInfo = "contextWindowExceeded" | "usageLimitExceeded" | "serverOverloaded" | { "httpConnectionFailed": { httpStatusCode: number | null, } } | { "responseStreamConnectionFailed": { httpStatusCode: number | null, } } | "internalServerError" | "unauthorized" | "badRequest" | "threadRollbackFailed" | "sandboxError" | { "responseStreamDisconnected": { httpStatusCode: number | null, } } | { "responseTooManyFailedAttempts": { httpStatusCode: number | null, } } | { "activeTurnNotSteerable": { turnKind: NonSteerableTurnKind, } } | "other";
export type CodexErrorInfo = "contextWindowExceeded" | "usageLimitExceeded" | "serverOverloaded" | "cyberPolicy" | { "httpConnectionFailed": { httpStatusCode: number | null, } } | { "responseStreamConnectionFailed": { httpStatusCode: number | null, } } | "internalServerError" | "unauthorized" | "badRequest" | "threadRollbackFailed" | "sandboxError" | { "responseStreamDisconnected": { httpStatusCode: number | null, } } | { "responseTooManyFailedAttempts": { httpStatusCode: number | null, } } | { "activeTurnNotSteerable": { turnKind: NonSteerableTurnKind, } } | "other";

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@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
import type { CommandExecTerminalSize } from "./CommandExecTerminalSize";
import type { PermissionProfile } from "./PermissionProfile";
import type { SandboxPolicy } from "./SandboxPolicy";
/**
@@ -92,6 +93,14 @@ size?: CommandExecTerminalSize | null,
* Optional sandbox policy for this command.
*
* Uses the same shape as thread/turn execution sandbox configuration and
* defaults to the user's configured policy when omitted.
* defaults to the user's configured policy when omitted. Cannot be
* combined with `permissionProfile`.
*/
sandboxPolicy?: SandboxPolicy | null, };
sandboxPolicy?: SandboxPolicy | null,
/**
* Optional full permissions profile for this command.
*
* Defaults to the user's configured permissions when omitted. Cannot be
* combined with `sandboxPolicy`.
*/
permissionProfile?: PermissionProfile | null, };

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@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
export type ConfiguredHookHandler = { "type": "command", command: string, timeoutSec: bigint | null, async: boolean, statusMessage: string | null, } | { "type": "prompt", } | { "type": "agent", };

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
import type { ConfiguredHookHandler } from "./ConfiguredHookHandler";
export type ConfiguredHookMatcherGroup = { matcher: string | null, hooks: Array<ConfiguredHookHandler>, };

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@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
/**
* Device-key algorithm reported at enrollment and signing boundaries.
*/
export type DeviceKeyAlgorithm = "ecdsa_p256_sha256";

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
import type { DeviceKeyProtectionPolicy } from "./DeviceKeyProtectionPolicy";
/**
* Create a controller-local device key with a random key id.
*/
export type DeviceKeyCreateParams = {
/**
* Defaults to `hardware_only` when omitted.
*/
protectionPolicy?: DeviceKeyProtectionPolicy | null, accountUserId: string, clientId: string, };

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
import type { DeviceKeyAlgorithm } from "./DeviceKeyAlgorithm";
import type { DeviceKeyProtectionClass } from "./DeviceKeyProtectionClass";
/**
* Device-key metadata and public key returned by create/public APIs.
*/
export type DeviceKeyCreateResponse = { keyId: string,
/**
* SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER encoded as base64.
*/
publicKeySpkiDerBase64: string, algorithm: DeviceKeyAlgorithm, protectionClass: DeviceKeyProtectionClass, };

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
/**
* Platform protection class for a controller-local device key.
*/
export type DeviceKeyProtectionClass = "hardware_secure_enclave" | "hardware_tpm" | "os_protected_nonextractable";

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
/**
* Protection policy for creating or loading a controller-local device key.
*/
export type DeviceKeyProtectionPolicy = "hardware_only" | "allow_os_protected_nonextractable";

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
/**
* Fetch a controller-local device key public key by id.
*/
export type DeviceKeyPublicParams = { keyId: string, };

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
import type { DeviceKeyAlgorithm } from "./DeviceKeyAlgorithm";
import type { DeviceKeyProtectionClass } from "./DeviceKeyProtectionClass";
/**
* Device-key public metadata returned by `device/key/public`.
*/
export type DeviceKeyPublicResponse = { keyId: string,
/**
* SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER encoded as base64.
*/
publicKeySpkiDerBase64: string, algorithm: DeviceKeyAlgorithm, protectionClass: DeviceKeyProtectionClass, };

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
import type { DeviceKeySignPayload } from "./DeviceKeySignPayload";
/**
* Sign an accepted structured payload with a controller-local device key.
*/
export type DeviceKeySignParams = { keyId: string, payload: DeviceKeySignPayload, };

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
import type { RemoteControlClientConnectionAudience } from "./RemoteControlClientConnectionAudience";
import type { RemoteControlClientEnrollmentAudience } from "./RemoteControlClientEnrollmentAudience";
/**
* Structured payloads accepted by `device/key/sign`.
*/
export type DeviceKeySignPayload = { "type": "remoteControlClientConnection", nonce: string, audience: RemoteControlClientConnectionAudience,
/**
* Backend-issued websocket session id that this proof authorizes.
*/
sessionId: string,
/**
* Origin of the backend endpoint that issued the challenge and will verify this proof.
*/
targetOrigin: string,
/**
* Websocket route path that this proof authorizes.
*/
targetPath: string, accountUserId: string, clientId: string,
/**
* Remote-control token expiration as Unix seconds.
*/
tokenExpiresAt: number,
/**
* SHA-256 of the controller-scoped remote-control token, encoded as unpadded base64url.
*/
tokenSha256Base64url: string,
/**
* Must contain exactly `remote_control_controller_websocket`.
*/
scopes: Array<string>, } | { "type": "remoteControlClientEnrollment", nonce: string, audience: RemoteControlClientEnrollmentAudience,
/**
* Backend-issued enrollment challenge id that this proof authorizes.
*/
challengeId: string,
/**
* Origin of the backend endpoint that issued the challenge and will verify this proof.
*/
targetOrigin: string,
/**
* HTTP route path that this proof authorizes.
*/
targetPath: string, accountUserId: string, clientId: string,
/**
* SHA-256 of the requested device identity operation, encoded as unpadded base64url.
*/
deviceIdentitySha256Base64url: string,
/**
* Enrollment challenge expiration as Unix seconds.
*/
challengeExpiresAt: number, };

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
import type { DeviceKeyAlgorithm } from "./DeviceKeyAlgorithm";
/**
* ASN.1 DER signature returned by `device/key/sign`.
*/
export type DeviceKeySignResponse = {
/**
* ECDSA signature DER encoded as base64.
*/
signatureDerBase64: string,
/**
* Exact bytes signed by the device key, encoded as base64. Verifiers must verify this byte
* string directly and must not reserialize `payload`.
*/
signedPayloadBase64: string, algorithm: DeviceKeyAlgorithm, };

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
export type GuardianWarningNotification = {
/**
* Thread target for the guardian warning.
*/
threadId: string,
/**
* Concise guardian warning message for the user.
*/
message: string, };

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
import type { ConfiguredHookMatcherGroup } from "./ConfiguredHookMatcherGroup";
export type ManagedHooksRequirements = { managedDir: string | null, windowsManagedDir: string | null, PreToolUse: Array<ConfiguredHookMatcherGroup>, PermissionRequest: Array<ConfiguredHookMatcherGroup>, PostToolUse: Array<ConfiguredHookMatcherGroup>, SessionStart: Array<ConfiguredHookMatcherGroup>, UserPromptSubmit: Array<ConfiguredHookMatcherGroup>, Stop: Array<ConfiguredHookMatcherGroup>, };

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
export type ModelVerification = "trustedAccessForCyber";

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
import type { ModelVerification } from "./ModelVerification";
export type ModelVerificationNotification = { threadId: string, turnId: string, verifications: Array<ModelVerification>, };

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
import type { PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions } from "./PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions";
import type { PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions } from "./PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions";
export type PermissionProfile = { network: PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions | null, fileSystem: PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions | null, };

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
import type { FileSystemSandboxEntry } from "./FileSystemSandboxEntry";
export type PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions = { entries: Array<FileSystemSandboxEntry>, globScanMaxDepth?: number, };

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
export type PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions = { enabled: boolean | null, };

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
import type { AbsolutePathBuf } from "../AbsolutePathBuf";
import type { RequestPermissionProfile } from "./RequestPermissionProfile";
export type PermissionsRequestApprovalParams = { threadId: string, turnId: string, itemId: string, reason: string | null, permissions: RequestPermissionProfile, };
export type PermissionsRequestApprovalParams = { threadId: string, turnId: string, itemId: string, cwd: AbsolutePathBuf, reason: string | null, permissions: RequestPermissionProfile, };

View File

@@ -4,4 +4,8 @@
import type { GrantedPermissionProfile } from "./GrantedPermissionProfile";
import type { PermissionGrantScope } from "./PermissionGrantScope";
export type PermissionsRequestApprovalResponse = { permissions: GrantedPermissionProfile, scope: PermissionGrantScope, };
export type PermissionsRequestApprovalResponse = { permissions: GrantedPermissionProfile, scope: PermissionGrantScope,
/**
* Review every subsequent command in this turn before normal sandboxed execution.
*/
strictAutoReview?: boolean, };

View File

@@ -6,4 +6,4 @@ import type { AppSummary } from "./AppSummary";
import type { PluginSummary } from "./PluginSummary";
import type { SkillSummary } from "./SkillSummary";
export type PluginDetail = { marketplaceName: string, marketplacePath: AbsolutePathBuf, summary: PluginSummary, description: string | null, skills: Array<SkillSummary>, apps: Array<AppSummary>, mcpServers: Array<string>, };
export type PluginDetail = { marketplaceName: string, marketplacePath: AbsolutePathBuf | null, summary: PluginSummary, description: string | null, skills: Array<SkillSummary>, apps: Array<AppSummary>, mcpServers: Array<string>, };

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
/**
* Audience for a remote-control client connection device-key proof.
*/
export type RemoteControlClientConnectionAudience = "remote_control_client_websocket";

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
/**
* Audience for a remote-control client enrollment device-key proof.
*/
export type RemoteControlClientEnrollmentAudience = "remote_control_client_enrollment";

View File

@@ -4,4 +4,4 @@
import type { AbsolutePathBuf } from "../AbsolutePathBuf";
import type { SkillInterface } from "./SkillInterface";
export type SkillSummary = { name: string, description: string, shortDescription: string | null, interface: SkillInterface | null, path: AbsolutePathBuf, enabled: boolean, };
export type SkillSummary = { name: string, description: string, shortDescription: string | null, interface: SkillInterface | null, path: AbsolutePathBuf | null, enabled: boolean, };

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
import type { JsonValue } from "../serde_json/JsonValue";
export type ThreadApproveGuardianDeniedActionParams = { threadId: string,
/**
* Serialized `codex_protocol::protocol::GuardianAssessmentEvent`.
*/
event: JsonValue, };

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
export type ThreadApproveGuardianDeniedActionResponse = Record<string, never>;

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