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14 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Tiffany Citra
980778f529 Fix sandbox retry approvals 2025-10-15 17:04:10 -07:00
Kevin Alwell
6e7d4a4b45 Should fix #751 by adding verbose error message. 2025-04-30 14:55:15 -04:00
Kevin Alwell
841e19b05d fix typescript error 2025-04-29 12:43:52 -04:00
Kevin Alwell
f466a73428 Omit default to fix type errors 2025-04-29 12:30:19 -04:00
Kevin Alwell
1a868d35f3 fix typecheck error 2025-04-29 12:22:41 -04:00
Kevin Alwell
9c563054e0 TypeScript bug bashing 2025-04-29 12:17:31 -04:00
Kevin Alwell
ca7204537c TypeScript bug bashing 2025-04-29 12:14:46 -04:00
Kevin Alwell
132e87cc8c TypeScript bug bashing 2025-04-29 12:13:38 -04:00
Kevin Alwell
8e80716169 fix tests 2025-04-29 12:10:54 -04:00
Kevin Alwell
d28aedb07b fix pipeline errors 2025-04-29 12:05:16 -04:00
Kevin Alwell
586ee0ec71 Merge branch 'main' into issue-726 2025-04-29 11:54:34 -04:00
Kevin Alwell
9065e61455 Ensure disableResponseStorage flag is respected 2025-04-29 11:48:47 -04:00
Kevin Alwell
6686f28338 Ensure disableResponseStorage flag is respected 2025-04-29 11:25:07 -04:00
Kevin Alwell
3818df7ba4 Fixes issue #726 by adding config to configToSave object 2025-04-29 10:12:55 -04:00
36 changed files with 454 additions and 1484 deletions

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@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
{
"outputs": {
"codex-repl": {
"platforms": {
"macos-aarch64": { "regex": "^codex-repl-aarch64-apple-darwin\\.zst$", "path": "codex-repl" },
"macos-x86_64": { "regex": "^codex-repl-x86_64-apple-darwin\\.zst$", "path": "codex-repl" },
"linux-x86_64": { "regex": "^codex-repl-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl\\.zst$", "path": "codex-repl" },
"linux-aarch64": { "regex": "^codex-repl-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu\\.zst$", "path": "codex-repl" }
}
},
"codex-exec": {
"platforms": {
"macos-aarch64": { "regex": "^codex-exec-aarch64-apple-darwin\\.zst$", "path": "codex-exec" },
"macos-x86_64": { "regex": "^codex-exec-x86_64-apple-darwin\\.zst$", "path": "codex-exec" },
"linux-x86_64": { "regex": "^codex-exec-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl\\.zst$", "path": "codex-exec" },
"linux-aarch64": { "regex": "^codex-exec-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu\\.zst$", "path": "codex-exec" }
}
},
"codex": {
"platforms": {
"macos-aarch64": { "regex": "^codex-aarch64-apple-darwin\\.zst$", "path": "codex" },
"macos-x86_64": { "regex": "^codex-x86_64-apple-darwin\\.zst$", "path": "codex" },
"linux-x86_64": { "regex": "^codex-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl\\.zst$", "path": "codex" },
"linux-aarch64": { "regex": "^codex-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu\\.zst$", "path": "codex" }
}
},
"codex-linux-sandbox": {
"platforms": {
"linux-x86_64": { "regex": "^codex-linux-sandbox-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl\\.zst$", "path": "codex-linux-sandbox" },
"linux-aarch64": { "regex": "^codex-linux-sandbox-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu\\.zst$", "path": "codex-linux-sandbox" }
}
}
}
}

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@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
# Release workflow for codex-rs.
# To release, follow a workflow like:
# ```
# git tag -a rust-v0.1.0 -m "Release 0.1.0"
# git push origin rust-v0.1.0
# ```
name: rust-release
on:
push:
tags:
- "rust-v.*.*.*"
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}
cancel-in-progress: true
env:
TAG_REGEX: '^rust-v\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$'
jobs:
tag-check:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Validate tag matches Cargo.toml version
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
echo "::group::Tag validation"
# 1. Must be a tag and match the regex
[[ "${GITHUB_REF_TYPE}" == "tag" ]] \
|| { echo "❌ Not a tag push"; exit 1; }
[[ "${GITHUB_REF_NAME}" =~ ${TAG_REGEX} ]] \
|| { echo "❌ Tag '${GITHUB_REF_NAME}' != ${TAG_REGEX}"; exit 1; }
# 2. Extract versions
tag_ver="${GITHUB_REF_NAME#rust-v.}"
cargo_ver="$(grep -m1 '^version' codex-rs/Cargo.toml \
| sed -E 's/version *= *"([^"]+)".*/\1/')"
# 3. Compare
[[ "${tag_ver}" == "${cargo_ver}" ]] \
|| { echo "❌ Tag ${tag_ver} ≠ Cargo.toml ${cargo_ver}"; exit 1; }
echo "✅ Tag and Cargo.toml agree (${tag_ver})"
echo "::endgroup::"
build:
needs: tag-check
name: ${{ matrix.runner }} - ${{ matrix.target }}
runs-on: ${{ matrix.runner }}
timeout-minutes: 30
defaults:
run:
working-directory: codex-rs
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
include:
- runner: macos-14
target: aarch64-apple-darwin
- runner: macos-14
target: x86_64-apple-darwin
- runner: ubuntu-24.04
target: x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
- runner: ubuntu-24.04
target: x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
- runner: ubuntu-24.04-arm
target: aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
with:
targets: ${{ matrix.target }}
- uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: |
~/.cargo/bin/
~/.cargo/registry/index/
~/.cargo/registry/cache/
~/.cargo/git/db/
${{ github.workspace }}/codex-rs/target/
key: cargo-release-${{ matrix.runner }}-${{ matrix.target }}-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }}
- if: ${{ matrix.target == 'x86_64-unknown-linux-musl' }}
name: Install musl build tools
run: |
sudo apt install -y musl-tools pkg-config
- name: Cargo build
run: cargo build --target ${{ matrix.target }} --release --all-targets --all-features
- name: Stage artifacts
shell: bash
run: |
dest="dist/${{ matrix.target }}"
mkdir -p "$dest"
cp target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/codex-repl "$dest/codex-repl-${{ matrix.target }}"
cp target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/codex-exec "$dest/codex-exec-${{ matrix.target }}"
cp target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/codex "$dest/codex-${{ matrix.target }}"
- if: ${{ matrix.target == 'x86_64-unknown-linux-musl' || matrix.target == 'x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu' || matrix.target == 'aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu' }}
name: Stage Linux-only artifacts
shell: bash
run: |
dest="dist/${{ matrix.target }}"
cp target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/codex-linux-sandbox "$dest/codex-linux-sandbox-${{ matrix.target }}"
- name: Compress artifacts
shell: bash
run: |
dest="dist/${{ matrix.target }}"
zstd -T0 -19 --rm "$dest"/*
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: ${{ matrix.target }}
path: codex-rs/dist/${{ matrix.target }}/*
release:
needs: build
name: release
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
env:
RELEASE_TAG: codex-rs-${{ github.sha }}-${{ github.run_attempt }}-${{ github.ref_name }}
steps:
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
with:
path: dist
- name: List
run: ls -R dist/
- uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2
with:
tag_name: ${{ env.RELEASE_TAG }}
files: dist/**
# TODO(ragona): I'm going to leave these as prerelease/draft for now.
# It gives us 1) clarity that these are not yet a stable version, and
# 2) allows a human step to review the release before publishing the draft.
prerelease: true
draft: true
- uses: facebook/dotslash-publish-release@v2
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
with:
tag: ${{ env.RELEASE_TAG }}
config: .github/dotslash-config.json

View File

@@ -2,26 +2,6 @@
set -euo pipefail # Exit on error, undefined vars, and pipeline failures
IFS=$'\n\t' # Stricter word splitting
# Read allowed domains from file
ALLOWED_DOMAINS_FILE="/etc/codex/allowed_domains.txt"
if [ -f "$ALLOWED_DOMAINS_FILE" ]; then
ALLOWED_DOMAINS=()
while IFS= read -r domain; do
ALLOWED_DOMAINS+=("$domain")
done < "$ALLOWED_DOMAINS_FILE"
echo "Using domains from file: ${ALLOWED_DOMAINS[*]}"
else
# Fallback to default domains
ALLOWED_DOMAINS=("api.openai.com")
echo "Domains file not found, using default: ${ALLOWED_DOMAINS[*]}"
fi
# Ensure we have at least one domain
if [ ${#ALLOWED_DOMAINS[@]} -eq 0 ]; then
echo "ERROR: No allowed domains specified"
exit 1
fi
# Flush existing rules and delete existing ipsets
iptables -F
iptables -X
@@ -44,7 +24,8 @@ iptables -A OUTPUT -o lo -j ACCEPT
ipset create allowed-domains hash:net
# Resolve and add other allowed domains
for domain in "${ALLOWED_DOMAINS[@]}"; do
for domain in \
"api.openai.com"; do
echo "Resolving $domain..."
ips=$(dig +short A "$domain")
if [ -z "$ips" ]; then
@@ -106,7 +87,7 @@ else
echo "Firewall verification passed - unable to reach https://example.com as expected"
fi
# Always verify OpenAI API access is working
# Verify OpenAI API access
if ! curl --connect-timeout 5 https://api.openai.com >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "ERROR: Firewall verification failed - unable to reach https://api.openai.com"
exit 1

View File

@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@ set -e
# Default the work directory to WORKSPACE_ROOT_DIR if not provided.
WORK_DIR="${WORKSPACE_ROOT_DIR:-$(pwd)}"
# Default allowed domains - can be overridden with OPENAI_ALLOWED_DOMAINS env var
OPENAI_ALLOWED_DOMAINS="${OPENAI_ALLOWED_DOMAINS:-api.openai.com}"
# Parse optional flag.
if [ "$1" = "--work_dir" ]; then
@@ -47,12 +45,6 @@ if [ -z "$WORK_DIR" ]; then
exit 1
fi
# Verify that OPENAI_ALLOWED_DOMAINS is not empty
if [ -z "$OPENAI_ALLOWED_DOMAINS" ]; then
echo "Error: OPENAI_ALLOWED_DOMAINS is empty."
exit 1
fi
# Kill any existing container for the working directory using cleanup(), centralizing removal logic.
cleanup
@@ -65,25 +57,8 @@ docker run --name "$CONTAINER_NAME" -d \
codex \
sleep infinity
# Write the allowed domains to a file in the container
docker exec --user root "$CONTAINER_NAME" bash -c "mkdir -p /etc/codex"
for domain in $OPENAI_ALLOWED_DOMAINS; do
# Validate domain format to prevent injection
if [[ ! "$domain" =~ ^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}$ ]]; then
echo "Error: Invalid domain format: $domain"
exit 1
fi
echo "$domain" | docker exec --user root -i "$CONTAINER_NAME" bash -c "cat >> /etc/codex/allowed_domains.txt"
done
# Set proper permissions on the domains file
docker exec --user root "$CONTAINER_NAME" bash -c "chmod 444 /etc/codex/allowed_domains.txt && chown root:root /etc/codex/allowed_domains.txt"
# Initialize the firewall inside the container as root user
docker exec --user root "$CONTAINER_NAME" bash -c "/usr/local/bin/init_firewall.sh"
# Remove the firewall script after running it
docker exec --user root "$CONTAINER_NAME" bash -c "rm -f /usr/local/bin/init_firewall.sh"
# Initialize the firewall inside the container with root privileges.
docker exec --user root "$CONTAINER_NAME" /usr/local/bin/init_firewall.sh
# Execute the provided command in the container, ensuring it runs in the work directory.
# We use a parameterized bash command to safely handle the command and directory.

View File

@@ -1137,7 +1137,7 @@ export class AgentLoop {
content: [
{
type: "input_text",
text: "⚠️ Insufficient quota. Please check your billing details and retry.",
text: `\u26a0 Insufficient quota: ${err instanceof Error && err.message ? err.message.trim() : "No remaining quota."} Manage or purchase credits at https://platform.openai.com/account/billing.`,
},
],
});

23
codex-rs/Cargo.lock generated
View File

@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "codex-cli"
version = "0.0.2504292236"
version = "0.1.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"clap",
@@ -504,7 +504,6 @@ dependencies = [
"mime_guess",
"openssl-sys",
"patch",
"path-absolutize",
"predicates",
"rand",
"reqwest",
@@ -524,14 +523,12 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "codex-exec"
version = "0.0.2504292236"
version = "0.1.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"chrono",
"clap",
"codex-core",
"owo-colors 4.2.0",
"shlex",
"owo-colors",
"tokio",
"tracing",
"tracing-subscriber",
@@ -559,12 +556,12 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "codex-repl"
version = "0.0.2504292236"
version = "0.1.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"clap",
"codex-core",
"owo-colors 4.2.0",
"owo-colors",
"rand",
"tokio",
"tracing",
@@ -602,7 +599,7 @@ dependencies = [
"eyre",
"indenter",
"once_cell",
"owo-colors 3.5.0",
"owo-colors",
"tracing-error",
]
@@ -613,7 +610,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "cd6be1b2a7e382e2b98b43b2adcca6bb0e465af0bdd38123873ae61eb17a72c2"
dependencies = [
"once_cell",
"owo-colors 3.5.0",
"owo-colors",
"tracing-core",
"tracing-error",
]
@@ -2228,12 +2225,6 @@ version = "0.1.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "b15813163c1d831bf4a13c3610c05c0d03b39feb07f7e09fa234dac9b15aaf39"
[[package]]
name = "owo-colors"
version = "3.5.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "c1b04fb49957986fdce4d6ee7a65027d55d4b6d2265e5848bbb507b58ccfdb6f"
[[package]]
name = "owo-colors"
version = "4.2.0"

View File

@@ -10,12 +10,3 @@ members = [
"repl",
"tui",
]
[workspace.package]
version = "0.0.2504292236"
[profile.release]
lto = "fat"
# Because we bundle some of these executables with the TypeScript CLI, we
# remove everything to make the binary as small as possible.
strip = "symbols"

View File

@@ -1,20 +1,12 @@
[package]
name = "codex-cli"
version = { workspace = true }
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2021"
[[bin]]
name = "codex"
path = "src/main.rs"
[[bin]]
name = "codex-linux-sandbox"
path = "src/linux-sandbox/main.rs"
[lib]
name = "codex_cli"
path = "src/lib.rs"
[dependencies]
anyhow = "1"
clap = { version = "4", features = ["derive"] }

View File

@@ -5,20 +5,34 @@
use codex_core::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use std::os::unix::process::ExitStatusExt;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::process;
use std::process::Command;
use std::process::ExitStatus;
/// Execute `command` in a Linux sandbox (Landlock + seccomp) the way Codex
/// would.
pub fn run_landlock(command: Vec<String>, sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
pub(crate) fn run_landlock(
command: Vec<String>,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
writable_roots: Vec<PathBuf>,
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
if command.is_empty() {
anyhow::bail!("command args are empty");
}
// Spawn a new thread and apply the sandbox policies there.
let handle = std::thread::spawn(move || -> anyhow::Result<ExitStatus> {
codex_core::linux::apply_sandbox_policy_to_current_thread(sandbox_policy)?;
// Apply sandbox policies inside this thread so only the child inherits
// them, not the entire CLI process.
if sandbox_policy.is_network_restricted() {
codex_core::linux::install_network_seccomp_filter_on_current_thread()?;
}
if sandbox_policy.is_file_write_restricted() {
codex_core::linux::install_filesystem_landlock_rules_on_current_thread(writable_roots)?;
}
let status = Command::new(&command[0]).args(&command[1..]).status()?;
Ok(status)
});

View File

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
pub mod landlock;
pub mod proto;
pub mod seatbelt;
use clap::Parser;
use codex_core::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use codex_core::SandboxPermissionOption;
#[derive(Debug, Parser)]
pub struct SeatbeltCommand {
/// Convenience alias for low-friction sandboxed automatic execution (network-disabled sandbox that can write to cwd and TMPDIR)
#[arg(long = "full-auto", default_value_t = false)]
pub full_auto: bool,
#[clap(flatten)]
pub sandbox: SandboxPermissionOption,
/// Full command args to run under seatbelt.
#[arg(trailing_var_arg = true)]
pub command: Vec<String>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Parser)]
pub struct LandlockCommand {
/// Convenience alias for low-friction sandboxed automatic execution (network-disabled sandbox that can write to cwd and TMPDIR)
#[arg(long = "full-auto", default_value_t = false)]
pub full_auto: bool,
#[clap(flatten)]
pub sandbox: SandboxPermissionOption,
/// Full command args to run under landlock.
#[arg(trailing_var_arg = true)]
pub command: Vec<String>,
}
pub fn create_sandbox_policy(full_auto: bool, sandbox: SandboxPermissionOption) -> SandboxPolicy {
if full_auto {
SandboxPolicy::new_full_auto_policy()
} else {
match sandbox.permissions.map(Into::into) {
Some(sandbox_policy) => sandbox_policy,
None => SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
#[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))]
fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
eprintln!("codex-linux-sandbox is not supported on this platform.");
std::process::exit(1);
}
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
use clap::Parser;
use codex_cli::create_sandbox_policy;
use codex_cli::landlock;
use codex_cli::LandlockCommand;
let LandlockCommand {
full_auto,
sandbox,
command,
} = LandlockCommand::parse();
let sandbox_policy = create_sandbox_policy(full_auto, sandbox);
landlock::run_landlock(command, sandbox_policy)?;
Ok(())
}

View File

@@ -1,9 +1,13 @@
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
mod landlock;
mod proto;
mod seatbelt;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use clap::ArgAction;
use clap::Parser;
use codex_cli::create_sandbox_policy;
use codex_cli::proto;
use codex_cli::seatbelt;
use codex_cli::LandlockCommand;
use codex_cli::SeatbeltCommand;
use codex_core::SandboxModeCliArg;
use codex_exec::Cli as ExecCli;
use codex_repl::Cli as ReplCli;
use codex_tui::Cli as TuiCli;
@@ -61,6 +65,36 @@ enum DebugCommand {
Landlock(LandlockCommand),
}
#[derive(Debug, Parser)]
struct SeatbeltCommand {
/// Writable folder for sandbox (can be specified multiple times).
#[arg(long = "writable-root", short = 'w', value_name = "DIR", action = ArgAction::Append, use_value_delimiter = false)]
writable_roots: Vec<PathBuf>,
/// Configure the process restrictions for the command.
#[arg(long = "sandbox", short = 's')]
sandbox_policy: SandboxModeCliArg,
/// Full command args to run under seatbelt.
#[arg(trailing_var_arg = true)]
command: Vec<String>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Parser)]
struct LandlockCommand {
/// Writable folder for sandbox (can be specified multiple times).
#[arg(long = "writable-root", short = 'w', value_name = "DIR", action = ArgAction::Append, use_value_delimiter = false)]
writable_roots: Vec<PathBuf>,
/// Configure the process restrictions for the command.
#[arg(long = "sandbox", short = 's')]
sandbox_policy: SandboxModeCliArg,
/// Full command args to run under landlock.
#[arg(trailing_var_arg = true)]
command: Vec<String>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Parser)]
struct ReplProto {}
@@ -84,20 +118,18 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
Some(Subcommand::Debug(debug_args)) => match debug_args.cmd {
DebugCommand::Seatbelt(SeatbeltCommand {
command,
sandbox,
full_auto,
sandbox_policy,
writable_roots,
}) => {
let sandbox_policy = create_sandbox_policy(full_auto, sandbox);
seatbelt::run_seatbelt(command, sandbox_policy).await?;
seatbelt::run_seatbelt(command, sandbox_policy.into(), writable_roots).await?;
}
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
DebugCommand::Landlock(LandlockCommand {
command,
sandbox,
full_auto,
sandbox_policy,
writable_roots,
}) => {
let sandbox_policy = create_sandbox_policy(full_auto, sandbox);
codex_cli::landlock::run_landlock(command, sandbox_policy)?;
landlock::run_landlock(command, sandbox_policy.into(), writable_roots)?;
}
#[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))]
DebugCommand::Landlock(_) => {

View File

@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
use codex_core::exec::create_seatbelt_command;
use codex_core::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use std::path::PathBuf;
pub async fn run_seatbelt(
pub(crate) async fn run_seatbelt(
command: Vec<String>,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
writable_roots: Vec<PathBuf>,
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let seatbelt_command = create_seatbelt_command(command, &sandbox_policy);
let seatbelt_command = create_seatbelt_command(command, sandbox_policy, &writable_roots);
let status = tokio::process::Command::new(seatbelt_command[0].clone())
.args(&seatbelt_command[1..])
.spawn()

View File

@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ fs-err = "3.1.0"
futures = "0.3"
mime_guess = "2.0"
patch = "0.7"
path-absolutize = "3.1.1"
rand = "0.9"
reqwest = { version = "0.12", features = ["json", "stream"] }
serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }

View File

@@ -1,14 +1,10 @@
//! Standard type to use with the `--approval-mode` CLI option.
//! Available when the `cli` feature is enabled for the crate.
use std::path::PathBuf;
use clap::ArgAction;
use clap::Parser;
use clap::ValueEnum;
use crate::protocol::AskForApproval;
use crate::protocol::SandboxPermission;
use crate::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, ValueEnum)]
#[value(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
@@ -28,6 +24,19 @@ pub enum ApprovalModeCliArg {
Never,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, ValueEnum)]
#[value(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
pub enum SandboxModeCliArg {
/// Network syscalls will be blocked
NetworkRestricted,
/// Filesystem writes will be restricted
FileWriteRestricted,
/// Network and filesystem writes will be restricted
NetworkAndFileWriteRestricted,
/// No restrictions; full "unsandboxed" mode
DangerousNoRestrictions,
}
impl From<ApprovalModeCliArg> for AskForApproval {
fn from(value: ApprovalModeCliArg) -> Self {
match value {
@@ -38,83 +47,15 @@ impl From<ApprovalModeCliArg> for AskForApproval {
}
}
#[derive(Parser, Debug)]
pub struct SandboxPermissionOption {
/// Specify this flag multiple times to specify the full set of permissions
/// to grant to Codex.
///
/// ```shell
/// codex -s disk-full-read-access \
/// -s disk-write-cwd \
/// -s disk-write-platform-user-temp-folder \
/// -s disk-write-platform-global-temp-folder
/// ```
///
/// Note disk-write-folder takes a value:
///
/// ```shell
/// -s disk-write-folder=$HOME/.pyenv/shims
/// ```
///
/// These permissions are quite broad and should be used with caution:
///
/// ```shell
/// -s disk-full-write-access
/// -s network-full-access
/// ```
#[arg(long = "sandbox-permission", short = 's', action = ArgAction::Append, value_parser = parse_sandbox_permission)]
pub permissions: Option<Vec<SandboxPermission>>,
}
/// Custom value-parser so we can keep the CLI surface small *and*
/// still handle the parameterised `disk-write-folder` case.
fn parse_sandbox_permission(raw: &str) -> std::io::Result<SandboxPermission> {
let base_path = std::env::current_dir()?;
parse_sandbox_permission_with_base_path(raw, base_path)
}
pub(crate) fn parse_sandbox_permission_with_base_path(
raw: &str,
base_path: PathBuf,
) -> std::io::Result<SandboxPermission> {
use SandboxPermission::*;
if let Some(path) = raw.strip_prefix("disk-write-folder=") {
return if path.is_empty() {
Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
"--sandbox-permission disk-write-folder=<PATH> requires a non-empty PATH",
))
} else {
use path_absolutize::*;
let file = PathBuf::from(path);
let absolute_path = if file.is_relative() {
file.absolutize_from(base_path)
} else {
file.absolutize()
impl From<SandboxModeCliArg> for SandboxPolicy {
fn from(value: SandboxModeCliArg) -> Self {
match value {
SandboxModeCliArg::NetworkRestricted => SandboxPolicy::NetworkRestricted,
SandboxModeCliArg::FileWriteRestricted => SandboxPolicy::FileWriteRestricted,
SandboxModeCliArg::NetworkAndFileWriteRestricted => {
SandboxPolicy::NetworkAndFileWriteRestricted
}
.map(|path| path.into_owned())?;
Ok(DiskWriteFolder {
folder: absolute_path,
})
};
}
match raw {
"disk-full-read-access" => Ok(DiskFullReadAccess),
"disk-write-platform-user-temp-folder" => Ok(DiskWritePlatformUserTempFolder),
"disk-write-platform-global-temp-folder" => Ok(DiskWritePlatformGlobalTempFolder),
"disk-write-cwd" => Ok(DiskWriteCwd),
"disk-full-write-access" => Ok(DiskFullWriteAccess),
"network-full-access" => Ok(NetworkFullAccess),
_ => Err(
std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
format!(
"`{raw}` is not a recognised permission.\nRun with `--help` to see the accepted values."
),
)
),
SandboxModeCliArg::DangerousNoRestrictions => SandboxPolicy::DangerousNoRestrictions,
}
}
}

View File

@@ -861,7 +861,7 @@ async fn handle_function_call(
assess_command_safety(
&params.command,
sess.approval_policy,
&sess.sandbox_policy,
sess.sandbox_policy,
&state.approved_commands,
)
};
@@ -916,11 +916,14 @@ async fn handle_function_call(
)
.await;
let roots_snapshot = { sess.writable_roots.lock().unwrap().clone() };
let output_result = process_exec_tool_call(
params.clone(),
sandbox_type,
&roots_snapshot,
sess.ctrl_c.clone(),
&sess.sandbox_policy,
sess.sandbox_policy,
)
.await;
@@ -979,13 +982,17 @@ async fn handle_function_call(
)
.await;
match rx_approve.await.unwrap_or_default() {
let decision = rx_approve.await.unwrap_or_default();
if matches!(decision, ReviewDecision::ApprovedForSession) {
// Persist this command as pre-approved for the
// remainder of the session so future executions
// can skip the sandbox directly.
sess.add_approved_command(params.command.clone());
}
match decision {
ReviewDecision::Approved | ReviewDecision::ApprovedForSession => {
// Persist this command as preapproved for the
// remainder of the session so future
// executions skip the sandbox directly.
// TODO(ragona): Isn't this a bug? It always saves the command in an | fork?
sess.add_approved_command(params.command.clone());
// Inform UI we are retrying without sandbox.
sess.notify_background_event(
&sub_id,
@@ -1003,13 +1010,16 @@ async fn handle_function_call(
)
.await;
let retry_roots = { sess.writable_roots.lock().unwrap().clone() };
// This is an escalated retry; the policy will not be
// examined and the sandbox has been set to `None`.
let retry_output_result = process_exec_tool_call(
params.clone(),
SandboxType::None,
&retry_roots,
sess.ctrl_c.clone(),
&sess.sandbox_policy,
sess.sandbox_policy,
)
.await;

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
use crate::approval_mode_cli_arg::parse_sandbox_permission_with_base_path;
use crate::flags::OPENAI_DEFAULT_MODEL;
use crate::protocol::AskForApproval;
use crate::protocol::SandboxPermission;
use crate::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use dirs::home_dir;
use serde::Deserialize;
@@ -13,98 +11,27 @@ use std::path::PathBuf;
const EMBEDDED_INSTRUCTIONS: &str = include_str!("../prompt.md");
/// Application configuration loaded from disk and merged with overrides.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
#[derive(Deserialize, Debug, Clone)]
pub struct Config {
/// Optional override of model selection.
#[serde(default = "default_model")]
pub model: String,
/// Approval policy for executing commands.
/// Default approval policy for executing commands.
#[serde(default)]
pub approval_policy: AskForApproval,
#[serde(default)]
pub sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
/// Disable server-side response storage (sends the full conversation
/// context with every request). Currently necessary for OpenAI customers
/// who have opted into Zero Data Retention (ZDR).
#[serde(default)]
pub disable_response_storage: bool,
/// System instructions.
pub instructions: Option<String>,
}
/// Base config deserialized from ~/.codex/config.toml.
#[derive(Deserialize, Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct ConfigToml {
/// Optional override of model selection.
pub model: Option<String>,
/// Default approval policy for executing commands.
pub approval_policy: Option<AskForApproval>,
// The `default` attribute ensures that the field is treated as `None` when
// the key is omitted from the TOML. Without it, Serde treats the field as
// required because we supply a custom deserializer.
#[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deserialize_sandbox_permissions")]
pub sandbox_permissions: Option<Vec<SandboxPermission>>,
/// Disable server-side response storage (sends the full conversation
/// context with every request). Currently necessary for OpenAI customers
/// who have opted into Zero Data Retention (ZDR).
pub disable_response_storage: Option<bool>,
/// System instructions.
pub instructions: Option<String>,
}
impl ConfigToml {
/// Attempt to parse the file at `~/.codex/config.toml`. If it does not
/// exist, return a default config. Though if it exists and cannot be
/// parsed, report that to the user and force them to fix it.
fn load_from_toml() -> std::io::Result<Self> {
let config_toml_path = codex_dir()?.join("config.toml");
match std::fs::read_to_string(&config_toml_path) {
Ok(contents) => toml::from_str::<Self>(&contents).map_err(|e| {
tracing::error!("Failed to parse config.toml: {e}");
std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, e)
}),
Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {
tracing::info!("config.toml not found, using defaults");
Ok(Self::default())
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::error!("Failed to read config.toml: {e}");
Err(e)
}
}
}
}
fn deserialize_sandbox_permissions<'de, D>(
deserializer: D,
) -> Result<Option<Vec<SandboxPermission>>, D::Error>
where
D: serde::Deserializer<'de>,
{
let permissions: Option<Vec<String>> = Option::deserialize(deserializer)?;
match permissions {
Some(raw_permissions) => {
let base_path = codex_dir().map_err(serde::de::Error::custom)?;
let converted = raw_permissions
.into_iter()
.map(|raw| {
parse_sandbox_permission_with_base_path(&raw, base_path.clone())
.map_err(serde::de::Error::custom)
})
.collect::<Result<Vec<_>, D::Error>>()?;
Ok(Some(converted))
}
None => Ok(None),
}
}
/// Optional overrides for user configuration (e.g., from CLI flags).
#[derive(Default, Debug, Clone)]
pub struct ConfigOverrides {
@@ -119,14 +46,11 @@ impl Config {
/// ~/.codex/config.toml, ~/.codex/instructions.md, embedded defaults, and
/// any values provided in `overrides` (highest precedence).
pub fn load_with_overrides(overrides: ConfigOverrides) -> std::io::Result<Self> {
let cfg: ConfigToml = ConfigToml::load_from_toml()?;
let mut cfg: Config = Self::load_from_toml()?;
tracing::warn!("Config parsed from config.toml: {cfg:?}");
Ok(Self::load_from_base_config_with_overrides(cfg, overrides))
}
fn load_from_base_config_with_overrides(cfg: ConfigToml, overrides: ConfigOverrides) -> Self {
// Instructions: user-provided instructions.md > embedded default.
let instructions =
cfg.instructions =
Self::load_instructions().or_else(|| Some(EMBEDDED_INSTRUCTIONS.to_string()));
// Destructure ConfigOverrides fully to ensure all overrides are applied.
@@ -137,32 +61,50 @@ impl Config {
disable_response_storage,
} = overrides;
let sandbox_policy = match sandbox_policy {
Some(sandbox_policy) => sandbox_policy,
None => {
// Derive a SandboxPolicy from the permissions in the config.
match cfg.sandbox_permissions {
// Note this means the user can explicitly set permissions
// to the empty list in the config file, granting it no
// permissions whatsoever.
Some(permissions) => SandboxPolicy::from(permissions),
// Default to read only rather than completely locked down.
None => SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
}
}
};
Self {
model: model.or(cfg.model).unwrap_or_else(default_model),
approval_policy: approval_policy
.or(cfg.approval_policy)
.unwrap_or_else(AskForApproval::default),
sandbox_policy,
disable_response_storage: disable_response_storage
.or(cfg.disable_response_storage)
.unwrap_or(false),
instructions,
if let Some(model) = model {
cfg.model = model;
}
if let Some(approval_policy) = approval_policy {
cfg.approval_policy = approval_policy;
}
if let Some(sandbox_policy) = sandbox_policy {
cfg.sandbox_policy = sandbox_policy;
}
if let Some(disable_response_storage) = disable_response_storage {
cfg.disable_response_storage = disable_response_storage;
}
Ok(cfg)
}
/// Attempt to parse the file at `~/.codex/config.toml` into a Config.
fn load_from_toml() -> std::io::Result<Self> {
let config_toml_path = codex_dir()?.join("config.toml");
match std::fs::read_to_string(&config_toml_path) {
Ok(contents) => toml::from_str::<Self>(&contents).map_err(|e| {
tracing::error!("Failed to parse config.toml: {e}");
std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, e)
}),
Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {
tracing::info!("config.toml not found, using defaults");
Ok(Self::load_default_config())
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::error!("Failed to read config.toml: {e}");
Err(e)
}
}
}
/// Meant to be used exclusively for tests: load_with_overrides() should be
/// used in all other cases.
pub fn load_default_config_for_test() -> Self {
Self::load_default_config()
}
fn load_default_config() -> Self {
// Load from an empty string to exercise #[serde(default)] to
// get the default values for each field.
toml::from_str::<Self>("").expect("empty string should parse as TOML")
}
fn load_instructions() -> Option<String> {
@@ -170,15 +112,6 @@ impl Config {
p.push("instructions.md");
std::fs::read_to_string(&p).ok()
}
/// Meant to be used exclusively for tests: `load_with_overrides()` should
/// be used in all other cases.
pub fn load_default_config_for_test() -> Self {
Self::load_from_base_config_with_overrides(
ConfigToml::default(),
ConfigOverrides::default(),
)
}
}
fn default_model() -> String {
@@ -205,60 +138,3 @@ pub fn log_dir() -> std::io::Result<PathBuf> {
p.push("log");
Ok(p)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
/// Verify that the `sandbox_permissions` field on `ConfigToml` correctly
/// differentiates between a value that is completely absent in the
/// provided TOML (i.e. `None`) and one that is explicitly specified as an
/// empty array (i.e. `Some(vec![])`). This ensures that downstream logic
/// that treats these two cases differently (default read-only policy vs a
/// fully locked-down sandbox) continues to function.
#[test]
fn test_sandbox_permissions_none_vs_empty_vec() {
// Case 1: `sandbox_permissions` key is *absent* from the TOML source.
let toml_source_without_key = "";
let cfg_without_key: ConfigToml = toml::from_str(toml_source_without_key)
.expect("TOML deserialization without key should succeed");
assert!(cfg_without_key.sandbox_permissions.is_none());
// Case 2: `sandbox_permissions` is present but set to an *empty array*.
let toml_source_with_empty = "sandbox_permissions = []";
let cfg_with_empty: ConfigToml = toml::from_str(toml_source_with_empty)
.expect("TOML deserialization with empty array should succeed");
assert_eq!(Some(vec![]), cfg_with_empty.sandbox_permissions);
// Case 3: `sandbox_permissions` contains a non-empty list of valid values.
let toml_source_with_values = r#"
sandbox_permissions = ["disk-full-read-access", "network-full-access"]
"#;
let cfg_with_values: ConfigToml = toml::from_str(toml_source_with_values)
.expect("TOML deserialization with valid permissions should succeed");
assert_eq!(
Some(vec![
SandboxPermission::DiskFullReadAccess,
SandboxPermission::NetworkFullAccess
]),
cfg_with_values.sandbox_permissions
);
}
/// Deserializing a TOML string containing an *invalid* permission should
/// fail with a helpful error rather than silently defaulting or
/// succeeding.
#[test]
fn test_sandbox_permissions_illegal_value() {
let toml_bad = r#"sandbox_permissions = ["not-a-real-permission"]"#;
let err = toml::from_str::<ConfigToml>(toml_bad)
.expect_err("Deserialization should fail for invalid permission");
// Make sure the error message contains the invalid value so users have
// useful feedback.
let msg = err.to_string();
assert!(msg.contains("not-a-real-permission"));
}
}

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
use std::io;
#[cfg(target_family = "unix")]
use std::os::unix::process::ExitStatusExt;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::process::ExitStatus;
use std::process::Stdio;
use std::sync::Arc;
@@ -32,7 +33,7 @@ const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 10_000;
const SIGKILL_CODE: i32 = 9;
const TIMEOUT_CODE: i32 = 64;
const MACOS_SEATBELT_BASE_POLICY: &str = include_str!("seatbelt_base_policy.sbpl");
const MACOS_SEATBELT_READONLY_POLICY: &str = include_str!("seatbelt_readonly_policy.sbpl");
/// When working with `sandbox-exec`, only consider `sandbox-exec` in `/usr/bin`
/// to defend against an attacker trying to inject a malicious version on the
@@ -66,17 +67,19 @@ pub enum SandboxType {
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
async fn exec_linux(
params: ExecParams,
writable_roots: &[PathBuf],
ctrl_c: Arc<Notify>,
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
) -> Result<RawExecToolCallOutput> {
crate::linux::exec_linux(params, ctrl_c, sandbox_policy).await
crate::linux::exec_linux(params, writable_roots, ctrl_c, sandbox_policy).await
}
#[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))]
async fn exec_linux(
_params: ExecParams,
_writable_roots: &[PathBuf],
_ctrl_c: Arc<Notify>,
_sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
_sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
) -> Result<RawExecToolCallOutput> {
Err(CodexErr::Io(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
@@ -87,8 +90,9 @@ async fn exec_linux(
pub async fn process_exec_tool_call(
params: ExecParams,
sandbox_type: SandboxType,
writable_roots: &[PathBuf],
ctrl_c: Arc<Notify>,
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
) -> Result<ExecToolCallOutput> {
let start = Instant::now();
@@ -100,7 +104,7 @@ pub async fn process_exec_tool_call(
workdir,
timeout_ms,
} = params;
let seatbelt_command = create_seatbelt_command(command, sandbox_policy);
let seatbelt_command = create_seatbelt_command(command, sandbox_policy, writable_roots);
exec(
ExecParams {
command: seatbelt_command,
@@ -111,7 +115,9 @@ pub async fn process_exec_tool_call(
)
.await
}
SandboxType::LinuxSeccomp => exec_linux(params, ctrl_c, sandbox_policy).await,
SandboxType::LinuxSeccomp => {
exec_linux(params, writable_roots, ctrl_c, sandbox_policy).await
}
};
let duration = start.elapsed();
match raw_output_result {
@@ -156,61 +162,41 @@ pub async fn process_exec_tool_call(
pub fn create_seatbelt_command(
command: Vec<String>,
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
writable_roots: &[PathBuf],
) -> Vec<String> {
let (file_write_policy, extra_cli_args) = {
if sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access() {
// Allegedly, this is more permissive than `(allow file-write*)`.
(
r#"(allow file-write* (regex #"^/"))"#.to_string(),
Vec::<String>::new(),
)
} else {
let writable_roots = sandbox_policy.get_writable_roots();
let (writable_folder_policies, cli_args): (Vec<String>, Vec<String>) = writable_roots
.iter()
.enumerate()
.map(|(index, root)| {
let param_name = format!("WRITABLE_ROOT_{index}");
let policy: String = format!("(subpath (param \"{param_name}\"))");
let cli_arg = format!("-D{param_name}={}", root.to_string_lossy());
(policy, cli_arg)
})
.unzip();
if writable_folder_policies.is_empty() {
("".to_string(), Vec::<String>::new())
} else {
let file_write_policy = format!(
"(allow file-write*\n{}\n)",
writable_folder_policies.join(" ")
);
(file_write_policy, cli_args)
}
}
};
let file_read_policy = if sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_read_access() {
"; allow read-only file operations\n(allow file-read*)"
} else {
""
};
let (policies, cli_args): (Vec<String>, Vec<String>) = writable_roots
.iter()
.enumerate()
.map(|(index, root)| {
let param_name = format!("WRITABLE_ROOT_{index}");
let policy: String = format!("(subpath (param \"{param_name}\"))");
let cli_arg = format!("-D{param_name}={}", root.to_string_lossy());
(policy, cli_arg)
})
.unzip();
// TODO(ragona): The seatbelt policy should reflect the SandboxPolicy that
// is passed, but everything is currently hardcoded to use
// MACOS_SEATBELT_READONLY_POLICY.
// TODO(mbolin): apply_patch calls must also honor the SandboxPolicy.
let network_policy = if sandbox_policy.has_full_network_access() {
"(allow network-outbound)\n(allow network-inbound)\n(allow system-socket)"
if !matches!(sandbox_policy, SandboxPolicy::NetworkRestricted) {
tracing::error!("specified sandbox policy {sandbox_policy:?} will not be honroed");
}
let full_policy = if policies.is_empty() {
MACOS_SEATBELT_READONLY_POLICY.to_string()
} else {
""
let scoped_write_policy = format!("(allow file-write*\n{}\n)", policies.join(" "));
format!("{MACOS_SEATBELT_READONLY_POLICY}\n{scoped_write_policy}")
};
let full_policy = format!(
"{MACOS_SEATBELT_BASE_POLICY}\n{file_read_policy}\n{file_write_policy}\n{network_policy}"
);
let mut seatbelt_command: Vec<String> = vec![
MACOS_PATH_TO_SEATBELT_EXECUTABLE.to_string(),
"-p".to_string(),
full_policy,
full_policy.to_string(),
];
seatbelt_command.extend(extra_cli_args);
seatbelt_command.extend(cli_args);
seatbelt_command.push("--".to_string());
seatbelt_command.extend(command);
seatbelt_command

View File

@@ -28,4 +28,4 @@ mod approval_mode_cli_arg;
#[cfg(feature = "cli")]
pub use approval_mode_cli_arg::ApprovalModeCliArg;
#[cfg(feature = "cli")]
pub use approval_mode_cli_arg::SandboxPermissionOption;
pub use approval_mode_cli_arg::SandboxModeCliArg;

View File

@@ -32,13 +32,14 @@ use tokio::sync::Notify;
pub async fn exec_linux(
params: ExecParams,
writable_roots: &[PathBuf],
ctrl_c: Arc<Notify>,
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
) -> Result<RawExecToolCallOutput> {
// Allow READ on /
// Allow WRITE on /dev/null
let ctrl_c_copy = ctrl_c.clone();
let sandbox_policy = sandbox_policy.clone();
let writable_roots_copy = writable_roots.to_vec();
// Isolate thread to run the sandbox from
let tool_call_output = std::thread::spawn(move || {
@@ -48,7 +49,14 @@ pub async fn exec_linux(
.expect("Failed to create runtime");
rt.block_on(async {
apply_sandbox_policy_to_current_thread(sandbox_policy)?;
if sandbox_policy.is_network_restricted() {
install_network_seccomp_filter_on_current_thread()?;
}
if sandbox_policy.is_file_write_restricted() {
install_filesystem_landlock_rules_on_current_thread(writable_roots_copy)?;
}
exec(params, ctrl_c_copy).await
})
})
@@ -64,31 +72,15 @@ pub async fn exec_linux(
}
}
/// Apply sandbox policies inside this thread so only the child inherits
/// them, not the entire CLI process.
pub fn apply_sandbox_policy_to_current_thread(sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy) -> Result<()> {
if !sandbox_policy.has_full_network_access() {
install_network_seccomp_filter_on_current_thread()?;
}
if !sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access() {
let writable_roots = sandbox_policy.get_writable_roots();
install_filesystem_landlock_rules_on_current_thread(writable_roots)?;
}
// TODO(ragona): Add appropriate restrictions if
// `sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_read_access()` is `false`.
Ok(())
}
/// Installs Landlock file-system rules on the current thread allowing read
/// access to the entire file-system while restricting write access to
/// `/dev/null` and the provided list of `writable_roots`.
///
/// # Errors
/// Returns [`CodexErr::Sandbox`] variants when the ruleset fails to apply.
fn install_filesystem_landlock_rules_on_current_thread(writable_roots: Vec<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
pub fn install_filesystem_landlock_rules_on_current_thread(
writable_roots: Vec<PathBuf>,
) -> Result<()> {
let abi = ABI::V5;
let access_rw = AccessFs::from_all(abi);
let access_ro = AccessFs::from_read(abi);
@@ -116,7 +108,7 @@ fn install_filesystem_landlock_rules_on_current_thread(writable_roots: Vec<PathB
/// Installs a seccomp filter that blocks outbound network access except for
/// AF_UNIX domain sockets.
fn install_network_seccomp_filter_on_current_thread() -> std::result::Result<(), SandboxErr> {
pub fn install_network_seccomp_filter_on_current_thread() -> std::result::Result<(), SandboxErr> {
// Build rule map.
let mut rules: BTreeMap<i64, Vec<SeccompRule>> = BTreeMap::new();
@@ -192,14 +184,15 @@ mod tests_linux {
workdir: None,
timeout_ms: Some(timeout_ms),
};
let sandbox_policy =
SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy_with_writable_roots(writable_roots);
let ctrl_c = Arc::new(Notify::new());
let res =
process_exec_tool_call(params, SandboxType::LinuxSeccomp, ctrl_c, &sandbox_policy)
.await
.unwrap();
let res = process_exec_tool_call(
params,
SandboxType::LinuxSeccomp,
writable_roots,
Arc::new(Notify::new()),
SandboxPolicy::NetworkAndFileWriteRestricted,
)
.await
.unwrap();
if res.exit_code != 0 {
println!("stdout:\n{}", res.stdout);
@@ -268,11 +261,14 @@ mod tests_linux {
timeout_ms: Some(2_000),
};
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let ctrl_c = Arc::new(Notify::new());
let result =
process_exec_tool_call(params, SandboxType::LinuxSeccomp, ctrl_c, &sandbox_policy)
.await;
let result = process_exec_tool_call(
params,
SandboxType::LinuxSeccomp,
&[],
Arc::new(Notify::new()),
SandboxPolicy::NetworkRestricted,
)
.await;
let (exit_code, stdout, stderr) = match result {
Ok(output) => (output.exit_code, output.stdout, output.stderr),

View File

@@ -93,159 +93,44 @@ pub enum AskForApproval {
}
/// Determines execution restrictions for model shell commands
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Deserialize, Serialize)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
pub struct SandboxPolicy {
permissions: Vec<SandboxPermission>,
}
impl From<Vec<SandboxPermission>> for SandboxPolicy {
fn from(permissions: Vec<SandboxPermission>) -> Self {
Self { permissions }
}
pub enum SandboxPolicy {
/// Network syscalls will be blocked
NetworkRestricted,
/// Filesystem writes will be restricted
FileWriteRestricted,
/// Network and filesystem writes will be restricted
#[default]
NetworkAndFileWriteRestricted,
/// No restrictions; full "unsandboxed" mode
DangerousNoRestrictions,
}
impl SandboxPolicy {
pub fn new_read_only_policy() -> Self {
Self {
permissions: vec![SandboxPermission::DiskFullReadAccess],
pub fn is_dangerous(&self) -> bool {
match self {
SandboxPolicy::NetworkRestricted => false,
SandboxPolicy::FileWriteRestricted => false,
SandboxPolicy::NetworkAndFileWriteRestricted => false,
SandboxPolicy::DangerousNoRestrictions => true,
}
}
pub fn new_read_only_policy_with_writable_roots(writable_roots: &[PathBuf]) -> Self {
let mut permissions = Self::new_read_only_policy().permissions;
permissions.extend(writable_roots.iter().map(|folder| {
SandboxPermission::DiskWriteFolder {
folder: folder.clone(),
}
}));
Self { permissions }
pub fn is_network_restricted(&self) -> bool {
matches!(
self,
SandboxPolicy::NetworkRestricted | SandboxPolicy::NetworkAndFileWriteRestricted
)
}
pub fn new_full_auto_policy() -> Self {
Self {
permissions: vec![
SandboxPermission::DiskFullReadAccess,
SandboxPermission::DiskWritePlatformUserTempFolder,
SandboxPermission::DiskWriteCwd,
],
}
}
pub fn has_full_disk_read_access(&self) -> bool {
self.permissions
.iter()
.any(|perm| matches!(perm, SandboxPermission::DiskFullReadAccess))
}
pub fn has_full_disk_write_access(&self) -> bool {
self.permissions
.iter()
.any(|perm| matches!(perm, SandboxPermission::DiskFullWriteAccess))
}
pub fn has_full_network_access(&self) -> bool {
self.permissions
.iter()
.any(|perm| matches!(perm, SandboxPermission::NetworkFullAccess))
}
pub fn get_writable_roots(&self) -> Vec<PathBuf> {
let mut writable_roots = Vec::<PathBuf>::new();
for perm in &self.permissions {
use SandboxPermission::*;
match perm {
DiskWritePlatformUserTempFolder => {
if cfg!(target_os = "macos") {
if let Some(tempdir) = std::env::var_os("TMPDIR") {
// Likely something that starts with /var/folders/...
let tmpdir_path = PathBuf::from(&tempdir);
if tmpdir_path.is_absolute() {
writable_roots.push(tmpdir_path.clone());
match tmpdir_path.canonicalize() {
Ok(canonicalized) => {
// Likely something that starts with /private/var/folders/...
if canonicalized != tmpdir_path {
writable_roots.push(canonicalized);
}
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::error!("Failed to canonicalize TMPDIR: {e}");
}
}
} else {
tracing::error!("TMPDIR is not an absolute path: {tempdir:?}");
}
}
}
// For Linux, should this be XDG_RUNTIME_DIR, /run/user/<uid>, or something else?
}
DiskWritePlatformGlobalTempFolder => {
if cfg!(unix) {
writable_roots.push(PathBuf::from("/tmp"));
}
}
DiskWriteCwd => match std::env::current_dir() {
Ok(cwd) => writable_roots.push(cwd),
Err(err) => {
tracing::error!("Failed to get current working directory: {err}");
}
},
DiskWriteFolder { folder } => {
writable_roots.push(folder.clone());
}
DiskFullReadAccess | NetworkFullAccess => {}
DiskFullWriteAccess => {
// Currently, we expect callers to only invoke this method
// after verifying has_full_disk_write_access() is false.
}
}
}
writable_roots
}
pub fn is_unrestricted(&self) -> bool {
self.has_full_disk_read_access()
&& self.has_full_disk_write_access()
&& self.has_full_network_access()
pub fn is_file_write_restricted(&self) -> bool {
matches!(
self,
SandboxPolicy::FileWriteRestricted | SandboxPolicy::NetworkAndFileWriteRestricted
)
}
}
/// Permissions that should be granted to the sandbox in which the agent
/// operates.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
pub enum SandboxPermission {
/// Is allowed to read all files on disk.
DiskFullReadAccess,
/// Is allowed to write to the operating system's temp dir that
/// is restricted to the user the agent is running as. For
/// example, on macOS, this is generally something under
/// `/var/folders` as opposed to `/tmp`.
DiskWritePlatformUserTempFolder,
/// Is allowed to write to the operating system's shared temp
/// dir. On UNIX, this is generally `/tmp`.
DiskWritePlatformGlobalTempFolder,
/// Is allowed to write to the current working directory (in practice, this
/// is the `cwd` where `codex` was spawned).
DiskWriteCwd,
/// Is allowed to the specified folder. `PathBuf` must be an
/// absolute path, though it is up to the caller to canonicalize
/// it if the path contains symlinks.
DiskWriteFolder { folder: PathBuf },
/// Is allowed to write to any file on disk.
DiskFullWriteAccess,
/// Can make arbitrary network requests.
NetworkFullAccess,
}
/// User input
#[non_exhaustive]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize)]

View File

@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ pub fn assess_patch_safety(
pub fn assess_command_safety(
command: &[String],
approval_policy: AskForApproval,
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
approved: &HashSet<Vec<String>>,
) -> SafetyCheck {
let approve_without_sandbox = || SafetyCheck::AutoApprove {
@@ -81,10 +81,11 @@ pub fn assess_command_safety(
}
// Command was not known-safe or allow-listed
if sandbox_policy.is_unrestricted() {
approve_without_sandbox()
} else {
match get_platform_sandbox() {
match sandbox_policy {
// Only the dangerous sandbox policy will run arbitrary commands outside a sandbox
SandboxPolicy::DangerousNoRestrictions => approve_without_sandbox(),
// All other policies try to run the command in a sandbox if it is available
_ => match get_platform_sandbox() {
// We have a sandbox, so we can approve the command in all modes
Some(sandbox_type) => SafetyCheck::AutoApprove { sandbox_type },
None => {
@@ -98,7 +99,7 @@ pub fn assess_command_safety(
_ => SafetyCheck::AskUser,
}
}
}
},
}
}

View File

@@ -6,6 +6,9 @@
; start with closed-by-default
(deny default)
; allow read-only file operations
(allow file-read*)
; child processes inherit the policy of their parent
(allow process-exec)
(allow process-fork)

View File

@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ async fn spawn_codex() -> Codex {
model: config.model,
instructions: None,
approval_policy: config.approval_policy,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::NetworkAndFileWriteRestricted,
disable_response_storage: false,
},
})

View File

@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ async fn keeps_previous_response_id_between_tasks() {
model: config.model,
instructions: None,
approval_policy: config.approval_policy,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::NetworkAndFileWriteRestricted,
disable_response_storage: false,
},
})

View File

@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ async fn retries_on_early_close() {
model: config.model,
instructions: None,
approval_policy: config.approval_policy,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::NetworkAndFileWriteRestricted,
disable_response_storage: false,
},
})

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
[package]
name = "codex-exec"
version = { workspace = true }
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2021"
[[bin]]
@@ -13,11 +13,8 @@ path = "src/lib.rs"
[dependencies]
anyhow = "1"
chrono = "0.4.40"
clap = { version = "4", features = ["derive"] }
codex-core = { path = "../core", features = ["cli"] }
owo-colors = "4.2.0"
shlex = "1.3.0"
tokio = { version = "1", features = [
"io-std",
"macros",
@@ -27,3 +24,4 @@ tokio = { version = "1", features = [
] }
tracing = { version = "0.1.41", features = ["log"] }
tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3.19", features = ["env-filter"] }
owo-colors = "4.2.0"

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
use clap::Parser;
use clap::ValueEnum;
use codex_core::SandboxPermissionOption;
use codex_core::SandboxModeCliArg;
use std::path::PathBuf;
#[derive(Parser, Debug)]
@@ -14,12 +13,11 @@ pub struct Cli {
#[arg(long, short = 'm')]
pub model: Option<String>,
/// Convenience alias for low-friction sandboxed automatic execution (network-disabled sandbox that can write to cwd and TMPDIR)
#[arg(long = "full-auto", default_value_t = false)]
pub full_auto: bool,
#[clap(flatten)]
pub sandbox: SandboxPermissionOption,
/// Configure the process restrictions when a command is executed.
///
/// Uses OS-specific sandboxing tools; Seatbelt on OSX, landlock+seccomp on Linux.
#[arg(long = "sandbox", short = 's')]
pub sandbox_policy: Option<SandboxModeCliArg>,
/// Allow running Codex outside a Git repository.
#[arg(long = "skip-git-repo-check", default_value_t = false)]
@@ -29,19 +27,6 @@ pub struct Cli {
#[arg(long = "disable-response-storage", default_value_t = false)]
pub disable_response_storage: bool,
/// Specifies color settings for use in the output.
#[arg(long = "color", value_enum, default_value_t = Color::Auto)]
pub color: Color,
/// Initial instructions for the agent.
pub prompt: String,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, PartialEq, Eq, ValueEnum)]
#[value(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
pub enum Color {
Always,
Never,
#[default]
Auto,
pub prompt: Option<String>,
}

View File

@@ -1,307 +0,0 @@
use chrono::Utc;
use codex_core::protocol::Event;
use codex_core::protocol::EventMsg;
use codex_core::protocol::FileChange;
use owo_colors::OwoColorize;
use owo_colors::Style;
use shlex::try_join;
use std::collections::HashMap;
/// This should be configurable. When used in CI, users may not want to impose
/// a limit so they can see the full transcript.
const MAX_OUTPUT_LINES_FOR_EXEC_TOOL_CALL: usize = 20;
pub(crate) struct EventProcessor {
call_id_to_command: HashMap<String, ExecCommandBegin>,
call_id_to_patch: HashMap<String, PatchApplyBegin>,
// To ensure that --color=never is respected, ANSI escapes _must_ be added
// using .style() with one of these fields. If you need a new style, add a
// new field here.
bold: Style,
dimmed: Style,
magenta: Style,
red: Style,
green: Style,
}
impl EventProcessor {
pub(crate) fn create_with_ansi(with_ansi: bool) -> Self {
let call_id_to_command = HashMap::new();
let call_id_to_patch = HashMap::new();
if with_ansi {
Self {
call_id_to_command,
call_id_to_patch,
bold: Style::new().bold(),
dimmed: Style::new().dimmed(),
magenta: Style::new().magenta(),
red: Style::new().red(),
green: Style::new().green(),
}
} else {
Self {
call_id_to_command,
call_id_to_patch,
bold: Style::new(),
dimmed: Style::new(),
magenta: Style::new(),
red: Style::new(),
green: Style::new(),
}
}
}
}
struct ExecCommandBegin {
command: Vec<String>,
start_time: chrono::DateTime<Utc>,
}
struct PatchApplyBegin {
start_time: chrono::DateTime<Utc>,
auto_approved: bool,
}
macro_rules! ts_println {
($($arg:tt)*) => {{
let now = Utc::now();
let formatted = now.format("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S").to_string();
print!("[{}] ", formatted);
println!($($arg)*);
}};
}
impl EventProcessor {
pub(crate) fn process_event(&mut self, event: Event) {
let Event { id, msg } = event;
match msg {
EventMsg::Error { message } => {
let prefix = "ERROR:".style(self.red);
ts_println!("{prefix} {message}");
}
EventMsg::BackgroundEvent { message } => {
ts_println!("{}", message.style(self.dimmed));
}
EventMsg::TaskStarted => {
let msg = format!("Task started: {id}");
ts_println!("{}", msg.style(self.dimmed));
}
EventMsg::TaskComplete => {
let msg = format!("Task complete: {id}");
ts_println!("{}", msg.style(self.bold));
}
EventMsg::AgentMessage { message } => {
let prefix = "Agent message:".style(self.bold);
ts_println!("{prefix} {message}");
}
EventMsg::ExecCommandBegin {
call_id,
command,
cwd,
} => {
self.call_id_to_command.insert(
call_id.clone(),
ExecCommandBegin {
command: command.clone(),
start_time: Utc::now(),
},
);
ts_println!(
"{} {} in {}",
"exec".style(self.magenta),
escape_command(&command).style(self.bold),
cwd,
);
}
EventMsg::ExecCommandEnd {
call_id,
stdout,
stderr,
exit_code,
} => {
let exec_command = self.call_id_to_command.remove(&call_id);
let (duration, call) = if let Some(ExecCommandBegin {
command,
start_time,
}) = exec_command
{
(
format_duration(start_time),
format!("{}", escape_command(&command).style(self.bold)),
)
} else {
("".to_string(), format!("exec('{call_id}')"))
};
let output = if exit_code == 0 { stdout } else { stderr };
let truncated_output = output
.lines()
.take(MAX_OUTPUT_LINES_FOR_EXEC_TOOL_CALL)
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join("\n");
match exit_code {
0 => {
let title = format!("{call} succeded{duration}:");
ts_println!("{}", title.style(self.green));
}
_ => {
let title = format!("{call} exited {exit_code}{duration}:");
ts_println!("{}", title.style(self.red));
}
}
println!("{}", truncated_output.style(self.dimmed));
}
EventMsg::PatchApplyBegin {
call_id,
auto_approved,
changes,
} => {
// Store metadata so we can calculate duration later when we
// receive the corresponding PatchApplyEnd event.
self.call_id_to_patch.insert(
call_id.clone(),
PatchApplyBegin {
start_time: Utc::now(),
auto_approved,
},
);
ts_println!(
"{} auto_approved={}:",
"apply_patch".style(self.magenta),
auto_approved,
);
// Pretty-print the patch summary with colored diff markers so
// its easy to scan in the terminal output.
for (path, change) in changes.iter() {
match change {
FileChange::Add { content } => {
let header = format!(
"{} {}",
format_file_change(change),
path.to_string_lossy()
);
println!("{}", header.style(self.magenta));
for line in content.lines() {
println!("{}", line.style(self.green));
}
}
FileChange::Delete => {
let header = format!(
"{} {}",
format_file_change(change),
path.to_string_lossy()
);
println!("{}", header.style(self.magenta));
}
FileChange::Update {
unified_diff,
move_path,
} => {
let header = if let Some(dest) = move_path {
format!(
"{} {} -> {}",
format_file_change(change),
path.to_string_lossy(),
dest.to_string_lossy()
)
} else {
format!("{} {}", format_file_change(change), path.to_string_lossy())
};
println!("{}", header.style(self.magenta));
// Colorize diff lines. We keep file header lines
// (--- / +++) without extra coloring so they are
// still readable.
for diff_line in unified_diff.lines() {
if diff_line.starts_with('+') && !diff_line.starts_with("+++") {
println!("{}", diff_line.style(self.green));
} else if diff_line.starts_with('-')
&& !diff_line.starts_with("---")
{
println!("{}", diff_line.style(self.red));
} else {
println!("{diff_line}");
}
}
}
}
}
}
EventMsg::PatchApplyEnd {
call_id,
stdout,
stderr,
success,
} => {
let patch_begin = self.call_id_to_patch.remove(&call_id);
// Compute duration and summary label similar to exec commands.
let (duration, label) = if let Some(PatchApplyBegin {
start_time,
auto_approved,
}) = patch_begin
{
(
format_duration(start_time),
format!("apply_patch(auto_approved={})", auto_approved),
)
} else {
(String::new(), format!("apply_patch('{call_id}')"))
};
let (exit_code, output, title_style) = if success {
(0, stdout, self.green)
} else {
(1, stderr, self.red)
};
let title = format!("{label} exited {exit_code}{duration}:");
ts_println!("{}", title.style(title_style));
for line in output.lines() {
println!("{}", line.style(self.dimmed));
}
}
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest { .. } => {
// Should we exit?
}
EventMsg::ApplyPatchApprovalRequest { .. } => {
// Should we exit?
}
_ => {
// Ignore event.
}
}
}
}
fn escape_command(command: &[String]) -> String {
try_join(command.iter().map(|s| s.as_str())).unwrap_or_else(|_| command.join(" "))
}
fn format_file_change(change: &FileChange) -> &'static str {
match change {
FileChange::Add { .. } => "A",
FileChange::Delete => "D",
FileChange::Update {
move_path: Some(_), ..
} => "R",
FileChange::Update {
move_path: None, ..
} => "M",
}
}
fn format_duration(start_time: chrono::DateTime<Utc>) -> String {
let elapsed = Utc::now().signed_duration_since(start_time);
let millis = elapsed.num_milliseconds();
if millis < 1000 {
format!(" in {}ms", millis)
} else {
format!(" in {:.2}s", millis as f64 / 1000.0)
}
}

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,4 @@
mod cli;
mod event_processor;
use std::io::IsTerminal;
use std::sync::Arc;
pub use cli::Cli;
@@ -11,71 +8,80 @@ use codex_core::config::ConfigOverrides;
use codex_core::protocol::AskForApproval;
use codex_core::protocol::Event;
use codex_core::protocol::EventMsg;
use codex_core::protocol::FileChange;
use codex_core::protocol::InputItem;
use codex_core::protocol::Op;
use codex_core::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use codex_core::util::is_inside_git_repo;
use event_processor::EventProcessor;
use owo_colors::OwoColorize;
use owo_colors::Style;
use tracing::debug;
use tracing::error;
use tracing::info;
use tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter;
/// Returns `true` if a recognised API key is present in the environment.
///
/// At present we only support `OPENAI_API_KEY`, mirroring the behaviour of the
/// Node-based `codex-cli`. Additional providers can be added here when the
/// Rust implementation gains first-class support for them.
fn has_api_key() -> bool {
std::env::var("OPENAI_API_KEY")
.map(|s| !s.trim().is_empty())
.unwrap_or(false)
}
pub async fn run_main(cli: Cli) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let Cli {
images,
model,
full_auto,
sandbox,
skip_git_repo_check,
disable_response_storage,
color,
prompt,
} = cli;
let (stdout_with_ansi, stderr_with_ansi) = match color {
cli::Color::Always => (true, true),
cli::Color::Never => (false, false),
cli::Color::Auto => (
std::io::stdout().is_terminal(),
std::io::stderr().is_terminal(),
),
};
assert_api_key(stderr_with_ansi);
if !skip_git_repo_check && !is_inside_git_repo() {
eprintln!("Not inside a Git repo and --skip-git-repo-check was not specified.");
std::process::exit(1);
}
// TODO(mbolin): Take a more thoughtful approach to logging.
let default_level = "error";
let allow_ansi = true;
let _ = tracing_subscriber::fmt()
.with_env_filter(
EnvFilter::try_from_default_env()
.or_else(|_| EnvFilter::try_new(default_level))
.unwrap(),
)
.with_ansi(stderr_with_ansi)
.with_ansi(allow_ansi)
.with_writer(std::io::stderr)
.try_init();
let sandbox_policy = if full_auto {
Some(SandboxPolicy::new_full_auto_policy())
} else {
sandbox.permissions.clone().map(Into::into)
};
let Cli {
images,
model,
sandbox_policy,
skip_git_repo_check,
disable_response_storage,
prompt,
..
} = cli;
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------
// API key handling
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------
if !has_api_key() {
eprintln!(
"\n{msg}\n\nSet the environment variable {var} and re-run this command.\nYou can create a key here: {url}\n",
msg = "Missing OpenAI API key.".red(),
var = "OPENAI_API_KEY".bold(),
url = "https://platform.openai.com/account/api-keys".bold().underline(),
);
std::process::exit(1);
}
if !skip_git_repo_check && !is_inside_git_repo() {
eprintln!("Not inside a Git repo and --skip-git-repo-check was not specified.");
std::process::exit(1);
} else if images.is_empty() && prompt.is_none() {
eprintln!("No images or prompt specified.");
std::process::exit(1);
}
// Load configuration and determine approval policy
let overrides = ConfigOverrides {
model,
model: model.clone(),
// This CLI is intended to be headless and has no affordances for asking
// the user for approval.
approval_policy: Some(AskForApproval::Never),
sandbox_policy,
sandbox_policy: sandbox_policy.map(Into::into),
disable_response_storage: if disable_response_storage {
Some(true)
} else {
@@ -109,6 +115,7 @@ pub async fn run_main(cli: Cli) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
res = codex.next_event() => match res {
Ok(event) => {
debug!("Received event: {event:?}");
process_event(&event);
if let Err(e) = tx.send(event) {
error!("Error sending event: {e:?}");
break;
@@ -124,8 +131,8 @@ pub async fn run_main(cli: Cli) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
});
}
// Send images first, if any.
if !images.is_empty() {
// Send images first.
let items: Vec<InputItem> = images
.into_iter()
.map(|path| InputItem::LocalImage { path })
@@ -139,56 +146,101 @@ pub async fn run_main(cli: Cli) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
}
}
// Send the prompt.
let items: Vec<InputItem> = vec![InputItem::Text { text: prompt }];
let initial_prompt_task_id = codex.submit(Op::UserInput { items }).await?;
info!("Sent prompt with event ID: {initial_prompt_task_id}");
// Run the loop until the task is complete.
let mut event_processor = EventProcessor::create_with_ansi(stdout_with_ansi);
while let Some(event) = rx.recv().await {
let last_event =
event.id == initial_prompt_task_id && matches!(event.msg, EventMsg::TaskComplete);
event_processor.process_event(event);
if last_event {
break;
if let Some(prompt) = prompt {
// Send the prompt.
let items: Vec<InputItem> = vec![InputItem::Text { text: prompt }];
let initial_prompt_task_id = codex.submit(Op::UserInput { items }).await?;
info!("Sent prompt with event ID: {initial_prompt_task_id}");
while let Some(event) = rx.recv().await {
if event.id == initial_prompt_task_id && matches!(event.msg, EventMsg::TaskComplete) {
break;
}
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// If a valid API key is not present in the environment, print an error to
/// stderr and exits with 1; otherwise, does nothing.
fn assert_api_key(stderr_with_ansi: bool) {
if !has_api_key() {
let (msg_style, var_style, url_style) = if stderr_with_ansi {
(
Style::new().red(),
Style::new().bold(),
Style::new().bold().underline(),
)
} else {
(Style::new(), Style::new(), Style::new())
};
eprintln!(
"\n{msg}\n\nSet the environment variable {var} and re-run this command.\nYou can create a key here: {url}\n",
msg = "Missing OpenAI API key.".style(msg_style),
var = "OPENAI_API_KEY".style(var_style),
url = "https://platform.openai.com/account/api-keys".style(url_style),
);
std::process::exit(1);
fn process_event(event: &Event) {
let Event { id, msg } = event;
match msg {
EventMsg::Error { message } => {
println!("Error: {message}");
}
EventMsg::BackgroundEvent { .. } => {
// Ignore these for now.
}
EventMsg::TaskStarted => {
println!("Task started: {id}");
}
EventMsg::TaskComplete => {
println!("Task complete: {id}");
}
EventMsg::AgentMessage { message } => {
println!("Agent message: {message}");
}
EventMsg::ExecCommandBegin {
call_id,
command,
cwd,
} => {
println!("exec('{call_id}'): {:?} in {cwd}", command);
}
EventMsg::ExecCommandEnd {
call_id,
stdout,
stderr,
exit_code,
} => {
let output = if *exit_code == 0 { stdout } else { stderr };
let truncated_output = output.lines().take(5).collect::<Vec<_>>().join("\n");
println!("exec('{call_id}') exited {exit_code}:\n{truncated_output}");
}
EventMsg::PatchApplyBegin {
call_id,
auto_approved,
changes,
} => {
let changes = changes
.iter()
.map(|(path, change)| {
format!("{} {}", format_file_change(change), path.to_string_lossy())
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join("\n");
println!("apply_patch('{call_id}') auto_approved={auto_approved}:\n{changes}");
}
EventMsg::PatchApplyEnd {
call_id,
stdout,
stderr,
success,
} => {
let (exit_code, output) = if *success { (0, stdout) } else { (1, stderr) };
let truncated_output = output.lines().take(5).collect::<Vec<_>>().join("\n");
println!("apply_patch('{call_id}') exited {exit_code}:\n{truncated_output}");
}
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest { .. } => {
// Should we exit?
}
EventMsg::ApplyPatchApprovalRequest { .. } => {
// Should we exit?
}
_ => {
// Ignore event.
}
}
}
/// Returns `true` if a recognized API key is present in the environment.
///
/// At present we only support `OPENAI_API_KEY`, mirroring the behavior of the
/// Node-based `codex-cli`. Additional providers can be added here when the
/// Rust implementation gains first-class support for them.
fn has_api_key() -> bool {
std::env::var("OPENAI_API_KEY")
.map(|s| !s.trim().is_empty())
.unwrap_or(false)
fn format_file_change(change: &FileChange) -> &'static str {
match change {
FileChange::Add { .. } => "A",
FileChange::Delete => "D",
FileChange::Update {
move_path: Some(_), ..
} => "R",
FileChange::Update {
move_path: None, ..
} => "M",
}
}

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
[package]
name = "codex-repl"
version = { workspace = true }
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2021"
[[bin]]

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
use clap::ArgAction;
use clap::Parser;
use codex_core::ApprovalModeCliArg;
use codex_core::SandboxPermissionOption;
use codex_core::SandboxModeCliArg;
use std::path::PathBuf;
/// Commandline arguments.
@@ -37,12 +37,11 @@ pub struct Cli {
#[arg(long = "ask-for-approval", short = 'a')]
pub approval_policy: Option<ApprovalModeCliArg>,
/// Convenience alias for low-friction sandboxed automatic execution (-a on-failure, network-disabled sandbox that can write to cwd and TMPDIR)
#[arg(long = "full-auto", default_value_t = false)]
pub full_auto: bool,
#[clap(flatten)]
pub sandbox: SandboxPermissionOption,
/// Configure the process restrictions when a command is executed.
///
/// Uses OS-specific sandboxing tools; Seatbelt on OSX, landlock+seccomp on Linux.
#[arg(long = "sandbox", short = 's')]
pub sandbox_policy: Option<SandboxModeCliArg>,
/// Allow running Codex outside a Git repository. By default the CLI
/// aborts early when the current working directory is **not** inside a

View File

@@ -6,9 +6,7 @@ use std::sync::Arc;
use codex_core::config::Config;
use codex_core::config::ConfigOverrides;
use codex_core::protocol;
use codex_core::protocol::AskForApproval;
use codex_core::protocol::FileChange;
use codex_core::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use codex_core::util::is_inside_git_repo;
use codex_core::util::notify_on_sigint;
use codex_core::Codex;
@@ -78,21 +76,11 @@ pub async fn run_main(cli: Cli) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
// Initialize logging before any other work so early errors are captured.
init_logger(cli.verbose, !cli.no_ansi);
let (sandbox_policy, approval_policy) = if cli.full_auto {
(
Some(SandboxPolicy::new_full_auto_policy()),
Some(AskForApproval::OnFailure),
)
} else {
let sandbox_policy = cli.sandbox.permissions.clone().map(Into::into);
(sandbox_policy, cli.approval_policy.map(Into::into))
};
// Load config file and apply CLI overrides (model & approval policy)
let overrides = ConfigOverrides {
model: cli.model.clone(),
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy,
approval_policy: cli.approval_policy.map(Into::into),
sandbox_policy: cli.sandbox_policy.map(Into::into),
disable_response_storage: if cli.disable_response_storage {
Some(true)
} else {

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
use clap::Parser;
use codex_core::ApprovalModeCliArg;
use codex_core::SandboxPermissionOption;
use codex_core::SandboxModeCliArg;
use std::path::PathBuf;
#[derive(Parser, Debug)]
@@ -21,12 +21,11 @@ pub struct Cli {
#[arg(long = "ask-for-approval", short = 'a')]
pub approval_policy: Option<ApprovalModeCliArg>,
/// Convenience alias for low-friction sandboxed automatic execution (-a on-failure, network-disabled sandbox that can write to cwd and TMPDIR)
#[arg(long = "full-auto", default_value_t = false)]
pub full_auto: bool,
#[clap(flatten)]
pub sandbox: SandboxPermissionOption,
/// Configure the process restrictions when a command is executed.
///
/// Uses OS-specific sandboxing tools; Seatbelt on OSX, landlock+seccomp on Linux.
#[arg(long = "sandbox", short = 's')]
pub sandbox_policy: Option<SandboxModeCliArg>,
/// Allow running Codex outside a Git repository.
#[arg(long = "skip-git-repo-check", default_value_t = false)]
@@ -35,4 +34,12 @@ pub struct Cli {
/// Disable serverside response storage (sends the full conversation context with every request)
#[arg(long = "disable-response-storage", default_value_t = false)]
pub disable_response_storage: bool,
/// Convenience alias for low-friction sandboxed automatic execution (-a on-failure, -s network-and-file-write-restricted)
#[arg(long = "full-auto", default_value_t = true)]
pub full_auto: bool,
/// Convenience alias for supervised sandboxed execution (-a unless-allow-listed, -s network-and-file-write-restricted)
#[arg(long = "suggest", default_value_t = false)]
pub suggest: bool,
}

View File

@@ -6,8 +6,6 @@
use app::App;
use codex_core::config::Config;
use codex_core::config::ConfigOverrides;
use codex_core::protocol::AskForApproval;
use codex_core::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use codex_core::util::is_inside_git_repo;
use log_layer::TuiLogLayer;
use std::fs::OpenOptions;
@@ -35,22 +33,12 @@ pub use cli::Cli;
pub fn run_main(cli: Cli) -> std::io::Result<()> {
assert_env_var_set();
let (sandbox_policy, approval_policy) = if cli.full_auto {
(
Some(SandboxPolicy::new_full_auto_policy()),
Some(AskForApproval::OnFailure),
)
} else {
let sandbox_policy = cli.sandbox.permissions.clone().map(Into::into);
(sandbox_policy, cli.approval_policy.map(Into::into))
};
let config = {
// Load configuration and support CLI overrides.
let overrides = ConfigOverrides {
model: cli.model.clone(),
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy,
approval_policy: cli.approval_policy.map(Into::into),
sandbox_policy: cli.sandbox_policy.map(Into::into),
disable_response_storage: if cli.disable_response_storage {
Some(true)
} else {

View File

@@ -1,152 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Automate the release procedure documented in `../README.md → Releasing codex`.
Run this script from the repository *root*:
```bash
python release_codex.py
```
It performs the same steps that the README lists manually:
1. Create and switch to a `bump-version-<timestamp>` branch.
2. Bump the timestamp-based version in `codex-cli/package.json` **and**
`codex-cli/src/utils/session.ts`.
3. Commit with a DCO sign-off.
4. Copy the top-level `README.md` into `codex-cli/` (npm consumers see it).
5. Run `pnpm release` (copies README again, builds, publishes to npm).
6. Push the branch so you can open a PR that merges the version bump.
The current directory can live anywhere; all paths are resolved relative to
this file so moving it elsewhere (e.g. into `scripts/`) still works.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import datetime as _dt
import json as _json
import os
import re
import shutil
import subprocess as _sp
import sys
from pathlib import Path
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Paths
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# repo-root/
# ├── codex-cli/
# ├── scripts/ <-- you are here
# └── README.md
REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
CODEX_CLI = REPO_ROOT / "codex-cli"
PKG_JSON = CODEX_CLI / "package.json"
SESSION_TS = CODEX_CLI / "src" / "utils" / "session.ts"
README_SRC = REPO_ROOT / "README.md"
README_DST = CODEX_CLI / "README.md"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Helpers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def sh(cmd: list[str] | str, *, cwd: Path | None = None) -> None:
"""Run *cmd* printing it first and exit on non-zero status."""
if isinstance(cmd, list):
printable = " ".join(cmd)
else:
printable = cmd
print("+", printable)
_sp.run(cmd, cwd=cwd, shell=isinstance(cmd, str), check=True)
def _new_version() -> str:
"""Return a new timestamp version string such as `0.1.2504301234`."""
return "0.1." + _dt.datetime.utcnow().strftime("%y%m%d%H%M")
def bump_version() -> str:
"""Update package.json and session.ts, returning the new version."""
new_ver = _new_version()
# ---- package.json
data = _json.loads(PKG_JSON.read_text())
old_ver = data.get("version", "<unknown>")
data["version"] = new_ver
PKG_JSON.write_text(_json.dumps(data, indent=2) + "\n")
# ---- session.ts
pattern = r'CLI_VERSION = "0\\.1\\.\\d{10}"'
repl = f'CLI_VERSION = "{new_ver}"'
_text = SESSION_TS.read_text()
if re.search(pattern, _text):
SESSION_TS.write_text(re.sub(pattern, repl, _text))
else:
print(
"WARNING: CLI_VERSION constant not found file format may have changed",
file=sys.stderr,
)
print(f"Version bump: {old_ver}{new_ver}")
return new_ver
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Main
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def main() -> None: # noqa: C901 readable top-level flow is desired
# Ensure we can locate required files.
for p in (CODEX_CLI, PKG_JSON, SESSION_TS, README_SRC):
if not p.exists():
sys.exit(f"Required path missing: {p.relative_to(REPO_ROOT)}")
os.chdir(REPO_ROOT)
# ------------------------------- create release branch
branch = "bump-version-" + _dt.datetime.utcnow().strftime("%Y%m%d-%H%M")
sh(["git", "checkout", "-b", branch])
# ------------------------------- bump version + commit
new_ver = bump_version()
sh(
[
"git",
"add",
str(PKG_JSON.relative_to(REPO_ROOT)),
str(SESSION_TS.relative_to(REPO_ROOT)),
]
)
sh(["git", "commit", "-s", "-m", f"chore(release): codex-cli v{new_ver}"])
# ------------------------------- copy README (shown on npmjs.com)
shutil.copyfile(README_SRC, README_DST)
# ------------------------------- build + publish via pnpm script
sh(["pnpm", "install"], cwd=CODEX_CLI)
sh(["pnpm", "release"], cwd=CODEX_CLI)
# ------------------------------- push branch
sh(["git", "push", "-u", "origin", branch])
print("\n✅ Release script finished!")
print(f" • npm publish run by pnpm script (branch: {branch})")
print(" • Open a PR to merge the version bump once CI passes.")
if __name__ == "__main__":
try:
main()
except KeyboardInterrupt:
sys.exit("\nCancelled by user")