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Author SHA1 Message Date
Ahmed Ibrahim
8aa5e7770c fmt + clippy: codex-core deterministic shell tool tests, conflict cleanup 2025-09-10 23:42:57 -07:00
4 changed files with 178 additions and 182 deletions

View File

@@ -468,7 +468,6 @@ impl Session {
tools_config: ToolsConfig::new(&ToolsConfigParams {
model_family: &config.model_family,
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy: sandbox_policy.clone(),
include_plan_tool: config.include_plan_tool,
include_apply_patch_tool: config.include_apply_patch_tool,
include_web_search_request: config.tools_web_search_request,
@@ -1148,7 +1147,6 @@ async fn submission_loop(
let tools_config = ToolsConfig::new(&ToolsConfigParams {
model_family: &effective_family,
approval_policy: new_approval_policy,
sandbox_policy: new_sandbox_policy.clone(),
include_plan_tool: config.include_plan_tool,
include_apply_patch_tool: config.include_apply_patch_tool,
include_web_search_request: config.tools_web_search_request,
@@ -1186,26 +1184,18 @@ async fn submission_loop(
{
warn!("failed to persist overrides: {e:#}");
}
if cwd.is_some() || approval_policy.is_some() || sandbox_policy.is_some() {
sess.record_conversation_items(&[ResponseItem::from(EnvironmentContext::new(
cwd,
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy,
// Shell is not configurable from turn to turn
None,
))])
.await;
}
}
Op::UserInput { items } => {
// attempt to inject input into current task
if let Err(items) = sess.inject_input(items) {
// no current task, spawn a new one
let task =
AgentTask::spawn(sess.clone(), Arc::clone(&turn_context), sub.id, items);
sess.set_task(task);
}
submit_user_input(
turn_context.cwd.clone(),
turn_context.approval_policy,
turn_context.sandbox_policy.clone(),
&sess,
&turn_context,
sub.id.clone(),
items,
)
.await;
}
Op::UserTurn {
items,
@@ -1250,7 +1240,6 @@ async fn submission_loop(
tools_config: ToolsConfig::new(&ToolsConfigParams {
model_family: &model_family,
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy: sandbox_policy.clone(),
include_plan_tool: config.include_plan_tool,
include_apply_patch_tool: config.include_apply_patch_tool,
include_web_search_request: config.tools_web_search_request,
@@ -1267,11 +1256,16 @@ async fn submission_loop(
shell_environment_policy: turn_context.shell_environment_policy.clone(),
cwd,
};
// TODO: record the new environment context in the conversation history
// no current task, spawn a new one with the perturn context
let task =
AgentTask::spawn(sess.clone(), Arc::new(fresh_turn_context), sub.id, items);
sess.set_task(task);
submit_user_input(
fresh_turn_context.cwd.clone(),
fresh_turn_context.approval_policy,
fresh_turn_context.sandbox_policy.clone(),
&sess,
&Arc::new(fresh_turn_context),
sub.id.clone(),
items,
)
.await;
}
}
Op::ExecApproval { id, decision } => match decision {
@@ -2833,6 +2827,30 @@ async fn handle_sandbox_error(
}
}
async fn submit_user_input(
cwd: PathBuf,
approval_policy: AskForApproval,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
sess: &Arc<Session>,
turn_context: &Arc<TurnContext>,
sub_id: String,
items: Vec<InputItem>,
) {
sess.record_conversation_items(&[ResponseItem::from(EnvironmentContext::new(
Some(cwd),
Some(approval_policy),
Some(sandbox_policy),
// Shell is not configurable from turn to turn
None,
))])
.await;
if let Err(items) = sess.inject_input(items) {
// no current task, spawn a new one
let task = AgentTask::spawn(Arc::clone(sess), Arc::clone(turn_context), sub_id, items);
sess.set_task(task);
}
}
fn format_exec_output_str(exec_output: &ExecToolCallOutput) -> String {
let ExecToolCallOutput {
aggregated_output, ..

View File

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ use std::collections::HashMap;
use crate::model_family::ModelFamily;
use crate::plan_tool::PLAN_TOOL;
use crate::protocol::AskForApproval;
use crate::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use crate::tool_apply_patch::ApplyPatchToolType;
use crate::tool_apply_patch::create_apply_patch_freeform_tool;
use crate::tool_apply_patch::create_apply_patch_json_tool;
@@ -58,7 +57,7 @@ pub(crate) enum OpenAiTool {
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum ConfigShellToolType {
DefaultShell,
ShellWithRequest { sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy },
ShellWithRequest,
LocalShell,
StreamableShell,
}
@@ -76,7 +75,6 @@ pub(crate) struct ToolsConfig {
pub(crate) struct ToolsConfigParams<'a> {
pub(crate) model_family: &'a ModelFamily,
pub(crate) approval_policy: AskForApproval,
pub(crate) sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
pub(crate) include_plan_tool: bool,
pub(crate) include_apply_patch_tool: bool,
pub(crate) include_web_search_request: bool,
@@ -90,7 +88,6 @@ impl ToolsConfig {
let ToolsConfigParams {
model_family,
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy,
include_plan_tool,
include_apply_patch_tool,
include_web_search_request,
@@ -106,9 +103,7 @@ impl ToolsConfig {
ConfigShellToolType::DefaultShell
};
if matches!(approval_policy, AskForApproval::OnRequest) && !use_streamable_shell_tool {
shell_type = ConfigShellToolType::ShellWithRequest {
sandbox_policy: sandbox_policy.clone(),
}
shell_type = ConfigShellToolType::ShellWithRequest;
}
let apply_patch_tool_type = match model_family.apply_patch_tool_type {
@@ -251,7 +246,9 @@ fn create_unified_exec_tool() -> OpenAiTool {
})
}
fn create_shell_tool_for_sandbox(sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy) -> OpenAiTool {
const SHELL_TOOL_DESCRIPTION: &str = r#"Runs a shell command and returns its output"#;
fn create_shell_tool_for_sandbox() -> OpenAiTool {
let mut properties = BTreeMap::new();
properties.insert(
"command".to_string(),
@@ -263,79 +260,29 @@ fn create_shell_tool_for_sandbox(sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy) -> OpenAiTool {
properties.insert(
"workdir".to_string(),
JsonSchema::String {
description: Some("The working directory to execute the command in".to_string()),
description: Some("Working directory to execute the command in.".to_string()),
},
);
properties.insert(
"timeout_ms".to_string(),
JsonSchema::Number {
description: Some("The timeout for the command in milliseconds".to_string()),
description: Some("Timeout for the command in milliseconds.".to_string()),
},
);
if matches!(sandbox_policy, SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { .. }) {
properties.insert(
properties.insert(
"with_escalated_permissions".to_string(),
JsonSchema::Boolean {
description: Some("Whether to request escalated permissions. Set to true if command needs to be run without sandbox restrictions".to_string()),
description: Some("Request escalated permissions, only for when a command would otherwise be blocked by the sandbox.".to_string()),
},
);
properties.insert(
properties.insert(
"justification".to_string(),
JsonSchema::String {
description: Some("Only set if with_escalated_permissions is true. 1-sentence explanation of why we want to run this command.".to_string()),
description: Some("Required if and only if with_escalated_permissions == true. One sentence explaining why escalation is needed (e.g., write outside CWD, network fetch, git commit).".to_string()),
},
);
}
let description = match sandbox_policy {
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
network_access,
..
} => {
let network_line = if !network_access {
"\n - Commands that require network access"
} else {
""
};
format!(
r#"
The shell tool is used to execute shell commands.
- When invoking the shell tool, your call will be running in a sandbox, and some shell commands will require escalated privileges:
- Types of actions that require escalated privileges:
- Writing files other than those in the writable roots (see the environment context for the allowed directories){network_line}
- Examples of commands that require escalated privileges:
- git commit
- npm install or pnpm install
- cargo build
- cargo test
- When invoking a command that will require escalated privileges:
- Provide the with_escalated_permissions parameter with the boolean value true
- Include a short, 1 sentence explanation for why we need to run with_escalated_permissions in the justification parameter."#,
)
}
SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess => {
"Runs a shell command and returns its output.".to_string()
}
SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly => {
r#"
The shell tool is used to execute shell commands.
- When invoking the shell tool, your call will be running in a sandbox, and some shell commands (including apply_patch) will require escalated permissions:
- Types of actions that require escalated privileges:
- Writing files
- Applying patches
- Examples of commands that require escalated privileges:
- apply_patch
- git commit
- npm install or pnpm install
- cargo build
- cargo test
- When invoking a command that will require escalated privileges:
- Provide the with_escalated_permissions parameter with the boolean value true
- Include a short, 1 sentence explanation for why we need to run with_escalated_permissions in the justification parameter"#.to_string()
}
};
let description = SHELL_TOOL_DESCRIPTION.to_string();
OpenAiTool::Function(ResponsesApiTool {
name: "shell".to_string(),
@@ -348,7 +295,6 @@ The shell tool is used to execute shell commands.
},
})
}
fn create_view_image_tool() -> OpenAiTool {
// Support only local filesystem path.
let mut properties = BTreeMap::new();
@@ -589,8 +535,8 @@ pub(crate) fn get_openai_tools(
ConfigShellToolType::DefaultShell => {
tools.push(create_shell_tool());
}
ConfigShellToolType::ShellWithRequest { sandbox_policy } => {
tools.push(create_shell_tool_for_sandbox(sandbox_policy));
ConfigShellToolType::ShellWithRequest => {
tools.push(create_shell_tool_for_sandbox());
}
ConfigShellToolType::LocalShell => {
tools.push(OpenAiTool::LocalShell {});
@@ -686,7 +632,6 @@ mod tests {
let config = ToolsConfig::new(&ToolsConfigParams {
model_family: &model_family,
approval_policy: AskForApproval::Never,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly,
include_plan_tool: true,
include_apply_patch_tool: false,
include_web_search_request: true,
@@ -708,7 +653,6 @@ mod tests {
let config = ToolsConfig::new(&ToolsConfigParams {
model_family: &model_family,
approval_policy: AskForApproval::Never,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly,
include_plan_tool: true,
include_apply_patch_tool: false,
include_web_search_request: true,
@@ -730,7 +674,6 @@ mod tests {
let config = ToolsConfig::new(&ToolsConfigParams {
model_family: &model_family,
approval_policy: AskForApproval::Never,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly,
include_plan_tool: false,
include_apply_patch_tool: false,
include_web_search_request: true,
@@ -836,7 +779,6 @@ mod tests {
let config = ToolsConfig::new(&ToolsConfigParams {
model_family: &model_family,
approval_policy: AskForApproval::Never,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly,
include_plan_tool: false,
include_apply_patch_tool: false,
include_web_search_request: false,
@@ -914,7 +856,6 @@ mod tests {
let config = ToolsConfig::new(&ToolsConfigParams {
model_family: &model_family,
approval_policy: AskForApproval::Never,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly,
include_plan_tool: false,
include_apply_patch_tool: false,
include_web_search_request: true,
@@ -977,7 +918,6 @@ mod tests {
let config = ToolsConfig::new(&ToolsConfigParams {
model_family: &model_family,
approval_policy: AskForApproval::Never,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly,
include_plan_tool: false,
include_apply_patch_tool: false,
include_web_search_request: true,
@@ -1035,7 +975,6 @@ mod tests {
let config = ToolsConfig::new(&ToolsConfigParams {
model_family: &model_family,
approval_policy: AskForApproval::Never,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly,
include_plan_tool: false,
include_apply_patch_tool: false,
include_web_search_request: true,
@@ -1096,7 +1035,6 @@ mod tests {
let config = ToolsConfig::new(&ToolsConfigParams {
model_family: &model_family,
approval_policy: AskForApproval::Never,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly,
include_plan_tool: false,
include_apply_patch_tool: false,
include_web_search_request: true,
@@ -1150,13 +1088,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn test_shell_tool_for_sandbox_workspace_write() {
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec!["workspace".into()],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
exclude_slash_tmp: false,
};
let tool = super::create_shell_tool_for_sandbox(&sandbox_policy);
let tool = super::create_shell_tool_for_sandbox();
let OpenAiTool::Function(ResponsesApiTool {
description, name, ..
}) = &tool
@@ -1165,26 +1097,13 @@ mod tests {
};
assert_eq!(name, "shell");
let expected = r#"
The shell tool is used to execute shell commands.
- When invoking the shell tool, your call will be running in a sandbox, and some shell commands will require escalated privileges:
- Types of actions that require escalated privileges:
- Writing files other than those in the writable roots (see the environment context for the allowed directories)
- Commands that require network access
- Examples of commands that require escalated privileges:
- git commit
- npm install or pnpm install
- cargo build
- cargo test
- When invoking a command that will require escalated privileges:
- Provide the with_escalated_permissions parameter with the boolean value true
- Include a short, 1 sentence explanation for why we need to run with_escalated_permissions in the justification parameter."#;
let expected = super::SHELL_TOOL_DESCRIPTION;
assert_eq!(description, expected);
}
#[test]
fn test_shell_tool_for_sandbox_readonly() {
let tool = super::create_shell_tool_for_sandbox(&SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly);
let tool = super::create_shell_tool_for_sandbox();
let OpenAiTool::Function(ResponsesApiTool {
description, name, ..
}) = &tool
@@ -1193,27 +1112,13 @@ The shell tool is used to execute shell commands.
};
assert_eq!(name, "shell");
let expected = r#"
The shell tool is used to execute shell commands.
- When invoking the shell tool, your call will be running in a sandbox, and some shell commands (including apply_patch) will require escalated permissions:
- Types of actions that require escalated privileges:
- Writing files
- Applying patches
- Examples of commands that require escalated privileges:
- apply_patch
- git commit
- npm install or pnpm install
- cargo build
- cargo test
- When invoking a command that will require escalated privileges:
- Provide the with_escalated_permissions parameter with the boolean value true
- Include a short, 1 sentence explanation for why we need to run with_escalated_permissions in the justification parameter"#;
let expected = super::SHELL_TOOL_DESCRIPTION;
assert_eq!(description, expected);
}
#[test]
fn test_shell_tool_for_sandbox_danger_full_access() {
let tool = super::create_shell_tool_for_sandbox(&SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess);
let tool = super::create_shell_tool_for_sandbox();
let OpenAiTool::Function(ResponsesApiTool {
description, name, ..
}) = &tool
@@ -1222,6 +1127,7 @@ The shell tool is used to execute shell commands.
};
assert_eq!(name, "shell");
assert_eq!(description, "Runs a shell command and returns its output.");
let expected = super::SHELL_TOOL_DESCRIPTION;
assert_eq!(description, expected);
}
}

View File

@@ -277,7 +277,25 @@ async fn resume_includes_initial_messages_and_sends_prior_items() {
"content": [{ "type": "input_text", "text": "hello" }]
}
]);
assert_eq!(request_body["input"], expected_input);
let input_array = request_body
.get("input")
.and_then(|v| v.as_array())
.cloned()
.expect("input array in request body");
let filtered: Vec<serde_json::Value> = input_array
.into_iter()
.filter(|item| {
let text = item
.get("content")
.and_then(|c| c.as_array())
.and_then(|a| a.first())
.and_then(|o| o.get("text"))
.and_then(|t| t.as_str())
.unwrap_or("");
!text.contains("<environment_context>")
})
.collect();
assert_eq!(serde_json::json!(filtered), expected_input);
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
@@ -950,34 +968,6 @@ async fn history_dedupes_streamed_and_final_messages_across_turns() {
assert_eq!(requests.len(), 3, "expected 3 requests (one per turn)");
// Replace full-array compare with tail-only raw JSON compare using a single hard-coded value.
let r3_tail_expected = json!([
{
"type": "message",
"role": "user",
"content": [{"type":"input_text","text":"U1"}]
},
{
"type": "message",
"role": "assistant",
"content": [{"type":"output_text","text":"Hey there!\n"}]
},
{
"type": "message",
"role": "user",
"content": [{"type":"input_text","text":"U2"}]
},
{
"type": "message",
"role": "assistant",
"content": [{"type":"output_text","text":"Hey there!\n"}]
},
{
"type": "message",
"role": "user",
"content": [{"type":"input_text","text":"U3"}]
}
]);
let r3_input_array = requests[2]
.body_json::<serde_json::Value>()
.unwrap()
@@ -985,12 +975,60 @@ async fn history_dedupes_streamed_and_final_messages_across_turns() {
.and_then(|v| v.as_array())
.cloned()
.expect("r3 missing input array");
// skipping earlier context and developer messages
let tail_len = r3_tail_expected.as_array().unwrap().len();
let actual_tail = &r3_input_array[r3_input_array.len() - tail_len..];
// We only assert on the last 5 items of the input history for request 3.
// With per-turn environment context injected, the last 5 should be:
// [env_ctx, U2, assistant("Hey there!\n"), env_ctx, U3]
let actual_tail = &r3_input_array[r3_input_array.len() - 5..];
// env_ctx 1
assert_eq!(actual_tail[0]["type"], serde_json::json!("message"));
assert_eq!(actual_tail[0]["role"], serde_json::json!("user"));
let env_text_1 = &actual_tail[0]["content"][0]["text"];
assert!(
env_text_1
.as_str()
.expect("env text should be string")
.contains("<environment_context>")
);
// U2
assert_eq!(
serde_json::Value::Array(actual_tail.to_vec()),
r3_tail_expected,
"request 3 tail mismatch",
actual_tail[1],
serde_json::json!({
"type": "message",
"role": "user",
"content": [ { "type": "input_text", "text": "U2" } ]
})
);
// assistant response
assert_eq!(
actual_tail[2],
serde_json::json!({
"type": "message",
"role": "assistant",
"content": [ { "type": "output_text", "text": "Hey there!\n" } ]
})
);
// env_ctx 2
assert_eq!(actual_tail[3]["type"], serde_json::json!("message"));
assert_eq!(actual_tail[3]["role"], serde_json::json!("user"));
let env_text_2 = &actual_tail[3]["content"][0]["text"];
assert!(
env_text_2
.as_str()
.expect("env text should be string")
.contains("<environment_context>")
);
// U3
assert_eq!(
actual_tail[4],
serde_json::json!({
"type": "message",
"role": "user",
"content": [ { "type": "input_text", "text": "U3" } ]
})
);
}

View File

@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ async fn prefixes_context_and_instructions_once_and_consistently_across_requests
let shell = default_user_shell().await;
let expected_env_text = format!(
let expected_env_text_init = format!(
r#"<environment_context>
<cwd>{}</cwd>
<approval_policy>on-request</approval_policy>
@@ -285,13 +285,28 @@ async fn prefixes_context_and_instructions_once_and_consistently_across_requests
None => String::new(),
}
);
// Per-turn environment context omits the shell tag.
let expected_env_text_turn = format!(
r#"<environment_context>
<cwd>{}</cwd>
<approval_policy>on-request</approval_policy>
<sandbox_mode>read-only</sandbox_mode>
<network_access>restricted</network_access>
</environment_context>"#,
cwd.path().to_string_lossy(),
);
let expected_ui_text =
"<user_instructions>\n\nbe consistent and helpful\n\n</user_instructions>";
let expected_env_msg = serde_json::json!({
let expected_env_msg_init = serde_json::json!({
"type": "message",
"role": "user",
"content": [ { "type": "input_text", "text": expected_env_text } ]
"content": [ { "type": "input_text", "text": expected_env_text_init } ]
});
let expected_env_msg_turn = serde_json::json!({
"type": "message",
"role": "user",
"content": [ { "type": "input_text", "text": expected_env_text_turn } ]
});
let expected_ui_msg = serde_json::json!({
"type": "message",
@@ -307,7 +322,12 @@ async fn prefixes_context_and_instructions_once_and_consistently_across_requests
let body1 = requests[0].body_json::<serde_json::Value>().unwrap();
assert_eq!(
body1["input"],
serde_json::json!([expected_ui_msg, expected_env_msg, expected_user_message_1])
serde_json::json!([
expected_ui_msg,
expected_env_msg_init,
expected_env_msg_turn,
expected_user_message_1
])
);
let expected_user_message_2 = serde_json::json!({
@@ -319,7 +339,7 @@ async fn prefixes_context_and_instructions_once_and_consistently_across_requests
let expected_body2 = serde_json::json!(
[
body1["input"].as_array().unwrap().as_slice(),
[expected_user_message_2].as_slice(),
[expected_env_msg_turn, expected_user_message_2].as_slice(),
]
.concat()
);
@@ -547,10 +567,24 @@ async fn per_turn_overrides_keep_cached_prefix_and_key_constant() {
"role": "user",
"content": [ { "type": "input_text", "text": "hello 2" } ]
});
let expected_env_text_2 = format!(
r#"<environment_context>
<cwd>{}</cwd>
<approval_policy>never</approval_policy>
<sandbox_mode>workspace-write</sandbox_mode>
<network_access>enabled</network_access>
</environment_context>"#,
new_cwd.path().to_string_lossy()
);
let expected_env_msg_2 = serde_json::json!({
"type": "message",
"role": "user",
"content": [ { "type": "input_text", "text": expected_env_text_2 } ]
});
let expected_body2 = serde_json::json!(
[
body1["input"].as_array().unwrap().as_slice(),
[expected_user_message_2].as_slice(),
[expected_env_msg_2, expected_user_message_2].as_slice(),
]
.concat()
);