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## Why This is a small precursor to the larger permissions-migration work. Both the comparison stack in [#22401](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22401) / [#22402](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22402) and the alternate stack in [#22610](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22610) / [#22611](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22611) / [#22612](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22612) are easier to review if the terminology is already settled underneath them. Because `:project_roots` and `:danger-no-sandbox` have not shipped as stable user-facing surface area, carrying them forward as aliases would just add more migration logic to the later stacks. This PR removes that ambiguity now so the follow-on work can rely on one spelling for each built-in concept. ## What Changed - renamed the config-facing special filesystem key from `:project_roots` to `:workspace_roots` - dropped unpublished `:project_roots` parsing support in `core/src/config/permissions.rs`, so new config only recognizes `:workspace_roots` - renamed the built-in full-access permission profile id from `:danger-no-sandbox` to `:danger-full-access` - dropped unpublished `:danger-no-sandbox` support entirely, including the old active-profile canonicalization path, and added explicit rejection coverage for the legacy id - introduced shared built-in permission-profile id constants in `codex-rs/protocol/src/models.rs` - updated `core`, `app-server`, and `tui` call sites that special-case built-in profiles to use the shared constants and canonical ids - updated tests and the Linux sandbox README to use `:workspace_roots` / `:danger-full-access` ## Verification I focused verification on the three places this rename can regress: config parsing, active-profile identity surfaced back out of `core`, and user/server call sites that special-case built-in profiles. Targeted checks: - `config::tests::default_permissions_can_select_builtin_profile_without_permissions_table` - `config::tests::default_permissions_read_only_applies_additional_writable_roots_as_modifications` - `config::tests::default_permissions_can_select_builtin_full_access_profile` - `config::tests::legacy_danger_no_sandbox_is_rejected` - `workspace_root` filtered `codex-core` tests - `request_processors::thread_processor::thread_processor_tests::thread_processor_behavior_tests::requested_permissions_trust_project_uses_permission_profile_intent` - `suite::v2::turn_start::turn_start_rejects_invalid_permission_selection_before_starting_turn` - `status::tests::status_snapshot_shows_auto_review_permissions` - `status::tests::status_permissions_full_disk_managed_with_network_is_danger_full_access` - `app_server_session::tests::embedded_turn_permissions_use_active_profile_selection`
98 lines
5.1 KiB
Markdown
98 lines
5.1 KiB
Markdown
# codex-linux-sandbox
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This crate is responsible for producing:
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- a `codex-linux-sandbox` standalone executable for Linux that is bundled with the Node.js version of the Codex CLI
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- a lib crate that exposes the business logic of the executable as `run_main()` so that
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- the `codex-exec` CLI can check if its arg0 is `codex-linux-sandbox` and, if so, execute as if it were `codex-linux-sandbox`
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- this should also be true of the `codex` multitool CLI
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On Linux, Codex prefers the first `bwrap` found on `PATH`
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outside the current working directory whenever it is available. If `bwrap` is
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present but too old to support
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`--argv0`, the helper keeps using system bubblewrap and switches to a
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no-`--argv0` compatibility path for the inner re-exec. If `bwrap` is missing,
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the helper falls back to the bundled `codex-resources/bwrap` binary shipped
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with Codex.
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Codex also surfaces a startup warning when `bwrap` is missing so users know it
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is falling back to the bundled helper. Codex surfaces the same startup warning
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path when bubblewrap cannot create user namespaces. WSL2 follows the normal
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Linux bubblewrap path. WSL1 is not supported for bubblewrap sandboxing because
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it cannot create the required user namespaces, so Codex rejects sandboxed shell
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commands that would enter the bubblewrap path.
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**Current Behavior**
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- Legacy `SandboxPolicy` / `sandbox_mode` configs remain supported.
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- Bubblewrap is the default filesystem sandbox.
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- If `bwrap` is present on `PATH` outside the current working directory, the
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helper uses it.
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- If `bwrap` is present but too old to support `--argv0`, the helper uses a
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no-`--argv0` compatibility path for the inner re-exec.
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- If `bwrap` is missing, the helper falls back to the bundled
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`codex-resources/bwrap` path.
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- If `bwrap` is missing, Codex also surfaces a startup warning instead of
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printing directly from the sandbox helper.
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- If bubblewrap cannot create user namespaces, Codex surfaces a startup warning
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instead of waiting for a runtime sandbox failure.
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- WSL2 uses the normal Linux bubblewrap path.
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- WSL1 is not supported for bubblewrap sandboxing; Codex rejects sandboxed
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shell commands that would require the bubblewrap path before invoking `bwrap`.
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- Legacy Landlock + mount protections remain available as an explicit legacy
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fallback path.
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- Set `features.use_legacy_landlock = true` (or CLI `-c use_legacy_landlock=true`)
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to force the legacy Landlock fallback.
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- The legacy Landlock fallback is used only when the split filesystem policy is
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sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after `cwd` resolution.
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- Split-only filesystem policies that do not round-trip through the legacy
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`SandboxPolicy` model stay on bubblewrap so nested read-only or denied
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carveouts are preserved.
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- When bubblewrap is active, the helper applies `PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS` and a
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seccomp network filter in-process.
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- When bubblewrap is active, the filesystem is read-only by default via `--ro-bind / /`.
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- When bubblewrap is active, writable roots are layered with `--bind <root> <root>`.
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- When bubblewrap is active, protected subpaths under writable roots (for
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example `.git`,
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resolved `gitdir:`, and `.codex`) are re-applied as read-only via `--ro-bind`.
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- When bubblewrap is active, overlapping split-policy
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entries are applied in path-specificity order so narrower writable children
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can reopen broader read-only or denied parents while narrower denied subpaths
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still win. For example, `/repo = write`, `/repo/a = none`, `/repo/a/b = write`
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keeps `/repo` writable, denies `/repo/a`, and reopens `/repo/a/b` as
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writable again.
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- When bubblewrap is active, unreadable glob entries are expanded before
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launching the sandbox and matching files are masked in bubblewrap:
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```text
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Prefer: rg --files --hidden --no-ignore --glob <pattern> -- <search-root>
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Fallback: internal globset walker when rg is not installed
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Failure: any other rg failure aborts sandbox construction
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```
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Users can cap the scan depth per permissions profile:
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```toml
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[permissions.workspace.filesystem]
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glob_scan_max_depth = 2
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[permissions.workspace.filesystem.":workspace_roots"]
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"**/*.env" = "none"
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```
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- When bubblewrap is active, symlink-in-path and non-existent protected paths inside
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writable roots are blocked by mounting `/dev/null` on the symlink or first
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missing component.
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- When bubblewrap is active, the helper explicitly isolates the user namespace via
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`--unshare-user` and the PID namespace via `--unshare-pid`.
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- When bubblewrap is active and network is restricted without proxy routing, the helper also
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isolates the network namespace via `--unshare-net`.
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- In managed proxy mode, the helper uses `--unshare-net` plus an internal
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TCP->UDS->TCP routing bridge so tool traffic reaches only configured proxy
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endpoints.
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- In managed proxy mode, after the bridge is live, seccomp blocks new
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AF_UNIX/socketpair creation for the user command.
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- When bubblewrap is active, it mounts a fresh `/proc` via `--proc /proc` by default, but
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you can skip this in restrictive container environments with `--no-proc`.
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**Notes**
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- The CLI surface still uses legacy names like `codex debug landlock`.
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