Files
codex/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/README.md
Michael Bolin 26f355b67b linux-sandbox: use standalone bundled bwrap (#21255)
**Summary**
- Add `codex-bwrap`, a standalone `bwrap` binary built from the existing
vendored bubblewrap sources.
- Remove the linked vendored bwrap path from `codex-linux-sandbox`;
runtime now prefers system `bwrap` and falls back to bundled
`codex-resources/bwrap`.
- Add bundled SHA-256 verification with missing/all-zero digest as the
dev-mode skip value, then exec the verified file through
`/proc/self/fd`.
- Keep `launcher.rs` focused on choosing and dispatching the preferred
launcher. Bundled lookup, digest verification, and bundled exec now live
in `linux-sandbox/src/bundled_bwrap.rs`; Bazel runfiles lookup lives in
`linux-sandbox/src/bazel_bwrap.rs`; shared argv/fd exec helpers live in
`linux-sandbox/src/exec_util.rs`.
- Teach Bazel tests to surface the Bazel-built `//codex-rs/bwrap:bwrap`
through `CARGO_BIN_EXE_bwrap`; `codex-linux-sandbox` only honors that
fallback in debug Bazel runfiles environments so release/user runtime
lookup stays tied to `codex-resources/bwrap`.
- Allow `codex-exec-server` filesystem helpers to preserve just the
Bazel bwrap/runfiles variables they need in debug Bazel builds, since
those helpers intentionally rebuild a small environment before spawning
`codex-linux-sandbox`.
- Verify the Bazel bwrap target in Linux release CI with a build-only
check. Running `bwrap --version` is too strong for GitHub runners
because bubblewrap still attempts namespace setup there.

**Verification**
- Latest update: `cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox`
- Latest update: `just fix -p codex-linux-sandbox`
- `cargo check --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu -p codex-linux-sandbox`
could not run locally because this macOS machine does not have
`x86_64-linux-gnu-gcc`; GitHub Linux Bazel CI is expected to cover the
Linux-only modules.
- Earlier in this PR: `cargo test -p codex-bwrap`
- Earlier in this PR: `cargo test -p codex-exec-server`
- Earlier in this PR: `cargo check --release -p codex-exec-server`
- Earlier in this PR: `just fix -p codex-linux-sandbox -p
codex-exec-server`
- Earlier in this PR: `bazel test --nobuild
//codex-rs/linux-sandbox:linux-sandbox-all-test
//codex-rs/core:core-all-test
//codex-rs/exec-server:exec-server-file_system-test
//codex-rs/app-server:app-server-all-test` (analysis completed; Bazel
then refuses to run tests under `--nobuild`)
- Earlier in this PR: `bazel build --nobuild //codex-rs/bwrap:bwrap`
- Prior to this update: `just bazel-lock-update`, `just
bazel-lock-check`, and YAML parse check for
`.github/workflows/bazel.yml`


---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/21255).
* #21257
* #21256
* __->__ #21255
2026-05-05 17:14:29 -07:00

98 lines
5.1 KiB
Markdown

# codex-linux-sandbox
This crate is responsible for producing:
- a `codex-linux-sandbox` standalone executable for Linux that is bundled with the Node.js version of the Codex CLI
- a lib crate that exposes the business logic of the executable as `run_main()` so that
- the `codex-exec` CLI can check if its arg0 is `codex-linux-sandbox` and, if so, execute as if it were `codex-linux-sandbox`
- this should also be true of the `codex` multitool CLI
On Linux, Codex prefers the first `bwrap` found on `PATH`
outside the current working directory whenever it is available. If `bwrap` is
present but too old to support
`--argv0`, the helper keeps using system bubblewrap and switches to a
no-`--argv0` compatibility path for the inner re-exec. If `bwrap` is missing,
the helper falls back to the bundled `codex-resources/bwrap` binary shipped
with Codex.
Codex also surfaces a startup warning when `bwrap` is missing so users know it
is falling back to the bundled helper. Codex surfaces the same startup warning
path when bubblewrap cannot create user namespaces. WSL2 follows the normal
Linux bubblewrap path. WSL1 is not supported for bubblewrap sandboxing because
it cannot create the required user namespaces, so Codex rejects sandboxed shell
commands that would enter the bubblewrap path.
**Current Behavior**
- Legacy `SandboxPolicy` / `sandbox_mode` configs remain supported.
- Bubblewrap is the default filesystem sandbox.
- If `bwrap` is present on `PATH` outside the current working directory, the
helper uses it.
- If `bwrap` is present but too old to support `--argv0`, the helper uses a
no-`--argv0` compatibility path for the inner re-exec.
- If `bwrap` is missing, the helper falls back to the bundled
`codex-resources/bwrap` path.
- If `bwrap` is missing, Codex also surfaces a startup warning instead of
printing directly from the sandbox helper.
- If bubblewrap cannot create user namespaces, Codex surfaces a startup warning
instead of waiting for a runtime sandbox failure.
- WSL2 uses the normal Linux bubblewrap path.
- WSL1 is not supported for bubblewrap sandboxing; Codex rejects sandboxed
shell commands that would require the bubblewrap path before invoking `bwrap`.
- Legacy Landlock + mount protections remain available as an explicit legacy
fallback path.
- Set `features.use_legacy_landlock = true` (or CLI `-c use_legacy_landlock=true`)
to force the legacy Landlock fallback.
- The legacy Landlock fallback is used only when the split filesystem policy is
sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after `cwd` resolution.
- Split-only filesystem policies that do not round-trip through the legacy
`SandboxPolicy` model stay on bubblewrap so nested read-only or denied
carveouts are preserved.
- When bubblewrap is active, the helper applies `PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS` and a
seccomp network filter in-process.
- When bubblewrap is active, the filesystem is read-only by default via `--ro-bind / /`.
- When bubblewrap is active, writable roots are layered with `--bind <root> <root>`.
- When bubblewrap is active, protected subpaths under writable roots (for
example `.git`,
resolved `gitdir:`, and `.codex`) are re-applied as read-only via `--ro-bind`.
- When bubblewrap is active, overlapping split-policy
entries are applied in path-specificity order so narrower writable children
can reopen broader read-only or denied parents while narrower denied subpaths
still win. For example, `/repo = write`, `/repo/a = none`, `/repo/a/b = write`
keeps `/repo` writable, denies `/repo/a`, and reopens `/repo/a/b` as
writable again.
- When bubblewrap is active, unreadable glob entries are expanded before
launching the sandbox and matching files are masked in bubblewrap:
```text
Prefer: rg --files --hidden --no-ignore --glob <pattern> -- <search-root>
Fallback: internal globset walker when rg is not installed
Failure: any other rg failure aborts sandbox construction
```
Users can cap the scan depth per permissions profile:
```toml
[permissions.workspace.filesystem]
glob_scan_max_depth = 2
[permissions.workspace.filesystem.":project_roots"]
"**/*.env" = "none"
```
- When bubblewrap is active, symlink-in-path and non-existent protected paths inside
writable roots are blocked by mounting `/dev/null` on the symlink or first
missing component.
- When bubblewrap is active, the helper explicitly isolates the user namespace via
`--unshare-user` and the PID namespace via `--unshare-pid`.
- When bubblewrap is active and network is restricted without proxy routing, the helper also
isolates the network namespace via `--unshare-net`.
- In managed proxy mode, the helper uses `--unshare-net` plus an internal
TCP->UDS->TCP routing bridge so tool traffic reaches only configured proxy
endpoints.
- In managed proxy mode, after the bridge is live, seccomp blocks new
AF_UNIX/socketpair creation for the user command.
- When bubblewrap is active, it mounts a fresh `/proc` via `--proc /proc` by default, but
you can skip this in restrictive container environments with `--no-proc`.
**Notes**
- The CLI surface still uses legacy names like `codex debug landlock`.