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## Summary - adds macOS Seatbelt deny rules for unreadable glob patterns - expands unreadable glob matches on Linux and masks them in bwrap, including canonical symlink targets - keeps Linux glob expansion robust when `rg` is unavailable in minimal or Bazel test environments - adds sandbox integration coverage that runs `shell` and `exec_command` with a `**/*.env = none` policy and verifies the secret contents do not reach the model ## Linux glob expansion ```text Prefer: rg --files --hidden --no-ignore --glob <pattern> -- <search-root> Fallback: internal globset walker when rg is not installed Failure: any other rg failure aborts sandbox construction ``` ``` [permissions.workspace.filesystem] glob_scan_max_depth = 2 [permissions.workspace.filesystem.":project_roots"] "**/*.env" = "none" ``` This keeps the common path fast without making sandbox construction depend on an ambient `rg` binary. If `rg` is present but fails for another reason, the sandbox setup fails closed instead of silently omitting deny-read masks. ## Platform support - macOS: subprocess sandbox enforcement is handled by Seatbelt regex deny rules - Linux: subprocess sandbox enforcement is handled by expanding existing glob matches and masking them in bwrap - Windows: policy/config/direct-tool glob support is already on `main` from #15979; Windows subprocess sandbox paths continue to fail closed when unreadable split filesystem carveouts require runtime enforcement, rather than silently running unsandboxed ## Stack 1. #15979 - merged: cross-platform glob deny-read policy/config/direct-tool support for macOS, Linux, and Windows 2. This PR - macOS/Linux subprocess sandbox enforcement plus Windows fail-closed clarification 3. #17740 - managed deny-read requirements ## Verification - Added integration coverage for `shell` and `exec_command` glob deny-read enforcement - `cargo check -p codex-sandboxing -p codex-linux-sandbox --tests` - `cargo check -p codex-core --test all` - `cargo clippy -p codex-linux-sandbox -p codex-sandboxing --tests` - `just bazel-lock-check` --------- Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
98 lines
5.0 KiB
Markdown
98 lines
5.0 KiB
Markdown
# codex-linux-sandbox
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This crate is responsible for producing:
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- a `codex-linux-sandbox` standalone executable for Linux that is bundled with the Node.js version of the Codex CLI
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- a lib crate that exposes the business logic of the executable as `run_main()` so that
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- the `codex-exec` CLI can check if its arg0 is `codex-linux-sandbox` and, if so, execute as if it were `codex-linux-sandbox`
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- this should also be true of the `codex` multitool CLI
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On Linux, Codex prefers the first `bwrap` found on `PATH`
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outside the current working directory whenever it is available. If `bwrap` is
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present but too old to support
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`--argv0`, the helper keeps using system bubblewrap and switches to a
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no-`--argv0` compatibility path for the inner re-exec. If `bwrap` is missing,
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the helper falls back to the vendored bubblewrap path compiled into this
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binary.
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Codex also surfaces a startup warning when `bwrap` is missing so users know it
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is falling back to the vendored helper. Codex surfaces the same startup warning
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path when bubblewrap cannot create user namespaces. WSL2 follows the normal
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Linux bubblewrap path. WSL1 is not supported for bubblewrap sandboxing because
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it cannot create the required user namespaces, so Codex rejects sandboxed shell
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commands that would enter the bubblewrap path.
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**Current Behavior**
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- Legacy `SandboxPolicy` / `sandbox_mode` configs remain supported.
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- Bubblewrap is the default filesystem sandbox.
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- If `bwrap` is present on `PATH` outside the current working directory, the
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helper uses it.
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- If `bwrap` is present but too old to support `--argv0`, the helper uses a
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no-`--argv0` compatibility path for the inner re-exec.
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- If `bwrap` is missing, the helper falls back to the vendored bubblewrap
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path.
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- If `bwrap` is missing, Codex also surfaces a startup warning instead of
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printing directly from the sandbox helper.
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- If bubblewrap cannot create user namespaces, Codex surfaces a startup warning
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instead of waiting for a runtime sandbox failure.
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- WSL2 uses the normal Linux bubblewrap path.
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- WSL1 is not supported for bubblewrap sandboxing; Codex rejects sandboxed
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shell commands that would require the bubblewrap path before invoking `bwrap`.
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- Legacy Landlock + mount protections remain available as an explicit legacy
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fallback path.
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- Set `features.use_legacy_landlock = true` (or CLI `-c use_legacy_landlock=true`)
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to force the legacy Landlock fallback.
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- The legacy Landlock fallback is used only when the split filesystem policy is
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sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after `cwd` resolution.
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- Split-only filesystem policies that do not round-trip through the legacy
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`SandboxPolicy` model stay on bubblewrap so nested read-only or denied
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carveouts are preserved.
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- When bubblewrap is active, the helper applies `PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS` and a
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seccomp network filter in-process.
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- When bubblewrap is active, the filesystem is read-only by default via `--ro-bind / /`.
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- When bubblewrap is active, writable roots are layered with `--bind <root> <root>`.
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- When bubblewrap is active, protected subpaths under writable roots (for
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example `.git`,
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resolved `gitdir:`, and `.codex`) are re-applied as read-only via `--ro-bind`.
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- When bubblewrap is active, overlapping split-policy
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entries are applied in path-specificity order so narrower writable children
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can reopen broader read-only or denied parents while narrower denied subpaths
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still win. For example, `/repo = write`, `/repo/a = none`, `/repo/a/b = write`
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keeps `/repo` writable, denies `/repo/a`, and reopens `/repo/a/b` as
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writable again.
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- When bubblewrap is active, unreadable glob entries are expanded before
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launching the sandbox and matching files are masked in bubblewrap:
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```text
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Prefer: rg --files --hidden --no-ignore --glob <pattern> -- <search-root>
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Fallback: internal globset walker when rg is not installed
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Failure: any other rg failure aborts sandbox construction
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```
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Users can cap the scan depth per permissions profile:
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```toml
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[permissions.workspace.filesystem]
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glob_scan_max_depth = 2
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[permissions.workspace.filesystem.":project_roots"]
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"**/*.env" = "none"
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```
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- When bubblewrap is active, symlink-in-path and non-existent protected paths inside
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writable roots are blocked by mounting `/dev/null` on the symlink or first
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missing component.
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- When bubblewrap is active, the helper explicitly isolates the user namespace via
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`--unshare-user` and the PID namespace via `--unshare-pid`.
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- When bubblewrap is active and network is restricted without proxy routing, the helper also
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isolates the network namespace via `--unshare-net`.
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- In managed proxy mode, the helper uses `--unshare-net` plus an internal
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TCP->UDS->TCP routing bridge so tool traffic reaches only configured proxy
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endpoints.
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- In managed proxy mode, after the bridge is live, seccomp blocks new
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AF_UNIX/socketpair creation for the user command.
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- When bubblewrap is active, it mounts a fresh `/proc` via `--proc /proc` by default, but
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you can skip this in restrictive container environments with `--no-proc`.
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**Notes**
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- The CLI surface still uses legacy names like `codex debug landlock`.
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