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## Summary - detect WSL1 before Codex probes or invokes the Linux bubblewrap sandbox - fail early with a clear unsupported-operation message when a command would require bubblewrap on WSL1 - document that WSL2 follows the normal Linux bubblewrap path while WSL1 is unsupported ## Why Codex 0.115.0 made bubblewrap the default Linux sandbox. WSL1 cannot create the user namespaces that bubblewrap needs, so shell commands currently fail later with a raw bwrap namespace error. This makes the unsupported environment explicit and keeps non-bubblewrap paths unchanged. The WSL detection reads /proc/version, lets an explicit WSL<version> marker decide WSL1 vs WSL2+, and only treats a bare Microsoft marker as WSL1 when no explicit WSL version is present. addresses https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/16076 --------- Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
88 lines
4.4 KiB
Markdown
88 lines
4.4 KiB
Markdown
# codex-core
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This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
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## Dependencies
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Note that `codex-core` makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
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### macOS
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Expects `/usr/bin/sandbox-exec` to be present.
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When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
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writes under the configured writable roots while keeping `.git` (directory or
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pointer file), the resolved `gitdir:` target, and `.codex` read-only.
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Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
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`SandboxPolicy`. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
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Seatbelt also keeps the legacy default preferences read access
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(`user-preference-read`) needed for cfprefs-backed macOS behavior.
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### Linux
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Expects the binary containing `codex-core` to run the equivalent of `codex sandbox linux` (legacy alias: `codex debug landlock`) when `arg0` is `codex-linux-sandbox`. See the `codex-arg0` crate for details.
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Legacy `SandboxPolicy` / `sandbox_mode` configs are still supported on Linux.
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They can continue to use the legacy Landlock path when the split filesystem
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policy is sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after `cwd` resolution.
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Split filesystem policies that need direct `FileSystemSandboxPolicy`
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enforcement, such as read-only or denied carveouts under a broader writable
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root, automatically route through bubblewrap. The legacy Landlock path is used
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only when the split filesystem policy round-trips through the legacy
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`SandboxPolicy` model without changing semantics. That includes overlapping
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cases like `/repo = write`, `/repo/a = none`, `/repo/a/b = write`, where the
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more specific writable child must reopen under a denied parent.
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The Linux sandbox helper prefers the first `bwrap` found on `PATH` outside the
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current working directory whenever it is available. If `bwrap` is present but
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too old to support `--argv0`, the helper keeps using system bubblewrap and
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switches to a no-`--argv0` compatibility path for the inner re-exec. If
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`bwrap` is missing, it falls back to the vendored bubblewrap path compiled into
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the binary and Codex surfaces a startup warning through its normal notification
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path instead of printing directly from the sandbox helper. Codex also surfaces
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a startup warning when bubblewrap cannot create user namespaces. WSL2 uses the
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normal Linux bubblewrap path. WSL1 is not supported for bubblewrap sandboxing
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because it cannot create the required user namespaces, so Codex rejects
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sandboxed shell commands that would enter the bubblewrap path before invoking
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`bwrap`.
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### Windows
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Legacy `SandboxPolicy` / `sandbox_mode` configs are still supported on
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Windows.
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The elevated setup/runner backend supports legacy `ReadOnlyAccess::Restricted`
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for `read-only` and `workspace-write` policies. Restricted read access honors
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explicit readable roots plus the command `cwd`, and keeps writable roots
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readable when `workspace-write` is used.
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When `include_platform_defaults = true`, the elevated Windows backend adds
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backend-managed system read roots required for basic execution, such as
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`C:\Windows`, `C:\Program Files`, `C:\Program Files (x86)`, and
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`C:\ProgramData`. When it is `false`, those extra system roots are omitted.
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The elevated Windows sandbox also supports:
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- legacy `ReadOnly` and `WorkspaceWrite` behavior
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- split filesystem policies that need exact readable roots, exact writable
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roots, or extra read-only carveouts under writable roots
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The unelevated restricted-token backend still supports the legacy full-read
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Windows model for legacy `ReadOnly` and `WorkspaceWrite` behavior. It also
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supports a narrow split-filesystem subset: full-read split policies whose
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writable roots still match the legacy `WorkspaceWrite` root set, but add extra
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read-only carveouts under those writable roots.
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New `[permissions]` / split filesystem policies remain supported on Windows
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only when they can be enforced directly by the selected Windows backend or
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round-trip through the legacy `SandboxPolicy` model without changing semantics.
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Policies that would require direct explicit unreadable carveouts (`none`) or
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reopened writable descendants under read-only carveouts still fail closed
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instead of running with weaker enforcement.
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### All Platforms
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Expects the binary containing `codex-core` to simulate the virtual `apply_patch` CLI when `arg1` is `--codex-run-as-apply-patch`. See the `codex-arg0` crate for details.
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