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## Summary Vendor Bubblewrap into the repo and add minimal build plumbing in `codex-linux-sandbox` to compile/link it. ## Why We want to move Linux sandboxing toward Bubblewrap, but in a safe two-step rollout: 1) vendoring/build setup (this PR), 2) runtime integration (follow-up PR). ## Included - Add `codex-rs/vendor/bubblewrap` sources. - Add build-time FFI path in `codex-rs/linux-sandbox`. - Update `build.rs` rerun tracking for vendored files. - Small vendored compile warning fix (`sockaddr_nl` full init). follow up in https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/9938
43 lines
2.0 KiB
Markdown
43 lines
2.0 KiB
Markdown
## Security and Disclosure Information Policy for the bubblewrap Project
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The bubblewrap Project follows the [Security and Disclosure Information Policy](https://github.com/containers/common/blob/HEAD/SECURITY.md) for the Containers Projects.
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### System security
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If bubblewrap is setuid root, then the goal is that it does not allow
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a malicious local user to do anything that would not have been possible
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on a kernel that allows unprivileged users to create new user namespaces.
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For example, [CVE-2020-5291](https://github.com/containers/bubblewrap/security/advisories/GHSA-j2qp-rvxj-43vj)
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was treated as a security vulnerability in bubblewrap.
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If bubblewrap is not setuid root, then it is not a security boundary
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between the user and the OS, because anything bubblewrap could do, a
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malicious user could equally well do by writing their own tool equivalent
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to bubblewrap.
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### Sandbox security
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bubblewrap is a toolkit for constructing sandbox environments.
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bubblewrap is not a complete, ready-made sandbox with a specific security
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policy.
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Some of bubblewrap's use-cases want a security boundary between the sandbox
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and the real system; other use-cases want the ability to change the layout of
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the filesystem for processes inside the sandbox, but do not aim to be a
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security boundary.
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As a result, the level of protection between the sandboxed processes and
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the host system is entirely determined by the arguments passed to
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bubblewrap.
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Whatever program constructs the command-line arguments for bubblewrap
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(often a larger framework like Flatpak, libgnome-desktop, sandwine
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or an ad-hoc script) is responsible for defining its own security model,
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and choosing appropriate bubblewrap command-line arguments to implement
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that security model.
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For example,
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[CVE-2017-5226](https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/security/advisories/GHSA-7gfv-rvfx-h87x)
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(in which a Flatpak app could send input to a parent terminal using the
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`TIOCSTI` ioctl) is considered to be a Flatpak vulnerability, not a
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bubblewrap vulnerability.
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